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Performance-based budgeting (PBB) is a variation of pay for performance that is applicable to 
government programs.  It works by increasing or decreasing funding based on pre-established 
performance thresholds, which incentivizes organizations to improve performance.  In late 
2006, the U.S. Army implemented a PBB program in all of its healthcare facilities due to rising 
concerns over costs and quality in its facilities.  The U.S. Army’s PBB program tied hospital-
level funding decisions to performance on key cost and quality-related metrics.  This study 
examined the impact of this program and a subsequent PBB program on quality improvement in 
Abstract
 
 
 
U.S. Army healthcare facilities.  Drawing from resource dependence theory, two hypotheses 
were developed, predicting that PBB would have a positive and sustained impact on quality 
performance in U.S. Army healthcare facilities.  These hypotheses were tested using a 
retrospective difference-in-differences analysis of quality performance data in facilities exposed 
to PBB programs in comparison to Air Force and Navy facilities not exposed to PBB programs, 
both before and after program implementation.  Data for this study were retrieved and merged 
from two data repositories operated by the Defense Health Agency in order to create a dataset 
encompassing a wide range of administrative, demographic, and performance information about 
428 military healthcare facilities.  The sample of 428 military healthcare facilities was divided 
into two groups based on exposure to the Army’s PBB programs.  Facility-level performance 
data on population health indicators and an inpatient clinical safety indicator were compared 
between the intervention group of 187 Army facilities participating in PBB programs and a 
comparison group of 241 Navy and Air Force facilities that did not participate in these 
programs.  The study findings supported both hypotheses and suggest that the Army’s PBB 
programs had a positive impact on quality performance.  Facilities that participated in PBB 
programs increased performance after program implementation, relative to comparison 
facilities, for over half of the indicators under investigation.  Furthermore, performance was 
evaluated for a 5-year period after program implementation for six quality measures.  
Performance in PBB facilities, relative to comparison facilities, was either sustained or 
continued to improve over the 5-year postperiod for five of the six performance indicators 
examined.  Although this study has several limitations, the results are promising.  The findings 
are relevant to clinicians and administrators in military and government-funded healthcare 
 
 
 
organizations, as they offer evidence to support the future use of PBB as a mechanism for 
improving quality performance
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This chapter is divided into six sections.  The first two sections frame the study problem 
and its resultant research questions.  The next two sections provide an overview of the 
theoretical framework and an analytic approach for the study.  The fifth section discusses the 
significance of the study.  The chapter concludes with an outline of the subsequent chapters in 
this dissertation.   
Study Problem 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM; 2001) report on the quality of the U.S. healthcare 
delivery system sparked almost two decades of research and experimentation to improve the 
quality of healthcare in the United States.  Healthcare quality is a major concern for public and 
private payers alike, as medical errors and poor-quality care can increase the consumption of 
healthcare services and lead to excess costs (A. DeVries et al., 2012; Encinosa & Hellinger, 
2008; Zhan & Miller, 2003).  As a result, public and private payers have implemented a wide 
variety of financial incentive programs over the past 20 years to encourage healthcare 
organizations to deliver higher quality care.  
Pay for performance is one approach for improving the quality of healthcare services.  
Pay for performance is an umbrella term used to describe the practice of providing financial 
remuneration linked to performance metrics (Glickman et al., 2007).  The underlying logic is 
that when performance on an outcome metric is tied to financial incentives, organizations have a 
Chapter 1: Introduction
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motive to pay more attention to that outcome and allocate internal resources to improve 
performance (T. L. Jones, 2018; Ocasio, 1997).   
Pay for performance programs gained popularity among health insurers in the United 
States following demonstration programs sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) from 2003-2009 (James, 2012).  In fiscal year (FY) 2013, CMS introduced a 
reimbursement model in which a small percentage of revenues were withheld from hospitals 
and had to be earned back through improvement on patient satisfaction and process of care 
measures (Petrullo, Lamar, Nwankwo-Otti, Alexander-Mills, & Viola, 2012).  It has also been 
implemented internationally in countries such as England, where 70% of general practitioners 
are subject to pay for performance structures (Lester, Matharu, Mohammed, Lester, & Foskett-
Tharby, 2013).   
Though pay for performance has been widely implemented in U.S. healthcare systems, 
there has been little research consensus regarding its effectiveness.  Pay for performance 
programs have been studied extensively in Veterans Health Administration (VHA) hospitals, 
public hospitals, and private hospitals, but these studies have yielded mixed results (Eijkenaar, 
Emmert, Scheppach, & Schöffski, 2013; Emmert, Eijkenaar, Kemter, Esslinger, & Schoffski, 
2012; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; R. Werner, Kolstad, Stuart, & Polsky, 2011).  Specifically, pay 
for performance has only been shown to have a marginal positive impact on process of care 
measures and have little to no effect on outcome measures (Chee, Ryan, Wasfy, & Borden, 
2016; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Houle, McAlister, Jackevicius, Chuck, & 
Tsuyuki, 2012; R. Werner et al., 2011).   
Additionally, initial performance gains attributable to pay for performance incentives 
tend to diminish over time (Chee et al., 2016; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Petersen et al., 2013; R. 
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Werner et al., 2011).  While some studies have documented pay for performance successes 
(Calikoglu, Murray, & Feeney, 2012; Huang et al., 2013; Lin, Yin, Huang, & Du, 2016; Yip et 
al., 2017), the overall evidence supporting its use is mixed and inconclusive (Damberg et al., 
2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Van Herck, De Smedt, Annemans, Remmen, 
& Rosenthal, 2010). 
A less common and less researched form of pay for performance is performance-based 
budgeting (PBB), which is specific to government programs (Kong, 2005).  It is a policy 
mechanism that works by incorporating performance measures into the budgeting process in an 
effort to stimulate higher performance (Dunning, 2014; Kong, 2005).  PBB enables key 
decision-makers to systematically account for the results achieved through public funding 
through the use of key performance indicators, a performance measurement system, and 
program evaluation (Dunning, 2014).  The goal is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public expenditure by connecting organizational funding to specific results (Dunning, 2014).  
In broad terms, PBB can be categorized as a specific form of pay for performance. 
Christianson, Leatherman, and Sutherland (2008) defined pay for performance as “any payment 
arrangement that specifically rewards quality” (p. 6S).  Though PBB fits within this definition, a 
few key characteristics distinguish it from most traditional forms of pay for performance.  First, 
PBB provides performance rewards almost exclusively at the organizational level.  This 
contrasts with private sector pay for performance programs that have the potential to impact the 
individual pay of healthcare professionals.  For example, the State of Georgia uses PBB to make 
decisions about funding particular department activities, which are then broken down into 
specific programs.  Most of the performance measures used for these budget decisions relate to 
workload efficiency measures, such as number of clients served, number of cases completed, or 
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proportion of various tasks accomplished (Lauth, 1985).  These productivity data are submitted 
with budget requests and used for the purpose of allocating money in the budgeting process.  
Thus, the reward for strong performance is greater program funding, which occurs at the 
program or department level.   
Another distinguishing feature of PBB is that the incentives are typically disbursed by a 
single government agency or organization.  This enables managers to focus organizational 
attention on the metrics that are most important to the agency controlling the bulk of its 
financing.  For the purposes of the current study, PBB is defined as a specific form of pay for 
performance that (a) applies to state or federally funded healthcare organizations and (b) 
incentivizes performance at the organization level through budget mechanisms.   
In 2006, the U.S. Army implemented a PBB program in all of its healthcare facilities 
due to rising concerns over costs and quality in its facilities.  The U.S. Army’s PBB program 
tied hospital-level funding decisions to performance on key cost and quality-related metrics.  
Initial results from a pilot study demonstrated significant hospital-level improvements in 
productivity and quality performance measures (West & Cronk, 2011).  However, PBB in U.S. 
Army healthcare facilities has not been systematically studied over time to determine if the 
initial effects have been sustained.   
Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of PBB on performance 
improvement in U.S. military healthcare facilities.  The study’s purpose is met through two 
research aims, both of which focus on the performance improvement in healthcare quality 
metrics.  The first aim is to determine the impact of PBB on quality improvement in U.S. Army 
healthcare facilities.  The second seeks to determine if quality improvements tied to PBB are 
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sustained over time in those same facilities.  Although the U.S. Army Medical Command’s 
(MEDCOM’s) PBB programs have targeted administrative, efficiency, and quality metrics, this 
study focuses solely on quality metrics due to the consistency with which these metrics have 
been measured and incentivized over the study period.   
Research Question 1 draws upon observations from a wide body of research on pay for 
performance in order to examine whether similar patterns of results are observed for PBB 
programs.  As mentioned, pay for performance programs have generated mixed results 
(Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012;  Kondo et al., 2018; Werner et al., 2011), varying 
from no effect to strongly beneficial (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Huang et al., 
2013; Van Herck et al., 2010).  Mixed results have largely been blamed on the heterogeneity of 
healthcare organizations and pay for performance incentive structures, (K. K. Kondo et al., 
2018), but some of the variation can also be attributed to methodological differences across 
studies.   
For example, the evidence for quality improvement in pay for performance programs 
tends to be weaker for studies with strong methodological designs in comparison to studies with 
weaker designs (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013).  A few programs have 
demonstrated quality improvement in select measured areas (Lee et al., 2012; Weyer, Bobiak, & 
Stange, 2008), but some researchers have found that these improvements are not statistically 
better than results achieved through intensive quality improvement efforts without performance 
incentives (Glickman et al., 2007).  Aside from methodological concerns, variations in findings 
of pay for performance studies are likely the result of design choices, context (Van Herck et al., 
2010), patient characteristics, and provider characteristics (Chee et al., 2016).  In light of these 
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mixed findings in pay for performance studies, Research Question 1 examines whether PBB 
might demonstrate more promising effects in military hospitals. 
 
Research Question 1: What is the impact of performance-based budgeting on quality 
improvement in U.S. Army healthcare facilities?   
 
Some researchers have questioned the long-term sustainability of performance 
improvement attributable to pay for performance incentives (Mendelson et al., 2017).  Several 
studies have noted that initial performance improvements tend to attenuate or diminish over 
time (Bonfrer et al., 2014; Jha, Joynt, Orav, & Epstein, 2012; Van Herck et al., 2010; R. Werner 
et al., 2011).  Specifically, the long-term effects of pay for performance can be impacted by 
factors such as an organization’s baseline performance (K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Lin et al., 
2016; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017) and ceiling effects (Ryan, Blustein, Doran, Michelow, & 
Casalino, 2012).  In light of these observations in pay for performance studies, Research 
Question 2 examines whether similar effects are observed in PBB programs.   
 
Research Question 2: Are quality improvements tied to performance-based budgeting 
sustained over time in U.S. Army hospitals?   
 
Theoretical Framework 
The current study employs the theoretical framework of Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to examine the impact of PBB on quality metrics in U.S. 
Army medical facilities.  The RDT framework has been used extensively in healthcare research 
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related to financial incentives (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014) and can therefore be useful in 
guiding this study on the effects of PBB incentives.   
According to RDT, organizations depend on critical resources from the external 
environment to function and survive.  Organizations must develop strategies to manage or 
reduce dependencies on those external resources critical to survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014).  RDT posits that external forces in the environment can 
influence the strategies that organizations adopt in order to manage access to critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
Three environmental factors that affect organizations’ access to critical resources are 
munificence, complexity, and dynamism.  Munificence refers to the overall supply and 
accessibility of resources in the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Yeager, Menachemi, et 
al., 2014). Environmental complexity and dynamism are both related to the overall degree of 
uncertainty in the market (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014).  Complexity refers to factors that 
make strategic decision-making and actions more difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Dynamism refers to the level of change internal and external to the organization (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  The current study explores how these constructs can be applied within the 
context of the Military Health System (MHS) to explain and predict how PBB impacts quality 
performance in military healthcare facilities. 
Analytic Approach 
This study employs a quasi-experimental, post-hoc analysis of performance data in 
military healthcare facilities.  Quality performance in facilities exposed to PBB programs are 
compared facilities not exposed to PBB programs, both before and after program 
implementation.   
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The data for this study are retrieved from two data repositories operated by the Defense 
Health Agency (DHA).  The Military Health System Data Repository (MDR) is a centralized 
data repository that receives, archives, and validates DHA corporate healthcare data from 
military healthcare facilities worldwide (DHA, 2019f).  The MDR uses standardized data 
processing methods to ensure that health data are collected and managed in a consistent manner 
across all U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) healthcare organizations (DHA, 2019f).  The 
Carepoint Information Portal is also operated by the DHA and contains facility-level 
performance data for a wide range of quality measures (DHA, 2019b).  It is the primary 
platform used by clinical leaders in MHS facilities to monitor and track performance trends for 
improvement initiatives.  
The measures under analysis are commonly used in healthcare performance evaluation 
in the private sector.  Measures include the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS; National Committee for Quality Assurance [NCQA], 2019) and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Program.   
The study sample consists of 428 U.S. Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) that are 
operated by the U.S. MHS. The MHS is a comprehensive, integrated health system that 
combines both direct and purchased care components to provide health services to eligible 
beneficiaries worldwide (Defense Health Agency: 2017 Stakeholder Report, 2017; DOD, 2014).  
All facilities in the sample are primarily operated by the medical departments of one of the three 
major service components (i.e., Army, Navy, or Air Force).   
For Research Question 1, a difference-in-difference (DID) approach is used to study the 
effects of PBB on quality indicators in U.S. Army hospitals over a 16-year period from FY 2004 
to FY 2019. During that period, U.S. Army hospitals implemented two successive PBB 
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programs and incentivized various performance metrics at different points in time.  Navy and 
Air Force healthcare facilities tracked performance on many of the same metrics but did not 
participate in PBB programs that tied their quality performance to hospital funding.  Thus, 
performance trends in U.S. Army facilities (n =187) participating in PBB are compared to 
performance trends in a comparison sample of Navy (n = 153) and Air Force (n = 88) and 
combined-service facilities not participating in PBB programs.  To assess performance trends 
on metrics prior to the implementation of the Army’s PBB programs, performance data for each 
metric is examined for 2 years prior to incentivization.  Additionally, data are examined for all 
metrics for 2 to 5 years after incentives are offered, depending on data availability.  The overall 
effects of the PBB programs are assessed by comparing performance between the intervention 
and comparison groups in both the pre- and postincentive periods.   
Research Question 2 addresses the sustainment of performance gains attributable to PBB 
programs.  Performance trends are analyzed for two distinct postimplementation time periods: 
the first 2-1/2 years after incentivization, and the second 2-1/2 years postincentivization.  This 
analysis is used to determine if performance trends are sustained for at least 5 years after the 
implementation of incentives and if there is an overall change in the pattern of performance over 
time (i.e., did performance decline, stay the same, or improve in the two postincentive time 
periods). 
Significance 
This study is significant due to its policy and research implications.  From a policy 
perspective, improving the value of healthcare is a priority for the U.S. military.  The scale of 
healthcare spending in this domain is enormous: the MHS is the second-largest healthcare 
system in the United States, operating at an annual cost of $50-$52 billion in service of  9.5 
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million military beneficiaries (DHA, 2019e; Kellermann, 2017; Mendez, 2018a).  Over the past 
20 years, healthcare spending in the U.S. military has risen sharply, consuming approximately 
8-10% of the total annual defense budget (Mendez, 2018a), and raising concerns over long-term 
budget sustainability.   
Healthcare quality is a particular concern within the MHS because active duty 
servicemembers must maintain peak health (i.e., medical readiness) in order to maintain 
military effectiveness and perform military duties in demanding environments (Hosek & 
Cecchine, 2001).  This implies that the quality of healthcare that ill or injured soldiers receive 
potentially affects their availability to perform their military duties.  It also generates an 
operational need for focused attention on population health and preventive care measures such 
as health screenings, tobacco cessation, weight management, vaccinations, and disease 
surveillance, since this can affect the overall readiness of the U.S. military force; therefore, the 
quality of military healthcare has been identified as a national defense priority (Pellerin, 2017).  
Despite this priority, performance-stimulating mechanisms such as PBB have not received 
much empirical attention.  The current study addresses that gap by conducting a retrospective 
assessment of PBB in U.S. military healthcare organizations to determine its long-term effects.   
The current study is also significant due to organizational changes that are occurring 
within the MHS.  Over the next few years, the DHA will merge three separate healthcare 
systems (Army, Navy, and Air Force) into a single governance structure that will assume 
operational control over all U.S. military healthcare facilities (National Defense Authorization 
Act [NDAA], 2017).  Since the DHA will have significant latitude to allocate resources among 
healthcare facilities across all three services, it is imperative for key decision-makers to have 
empirical evidence regarding the effects of PBB in military facilities.  The mission of the DHA 
 
19 
 
is guided by the MHS’s Quadruple Aim of increased medical readiness (pertaining to the 
military force): better health, better care and lower cost (DHA, 2019c; Martin, Nelson, Lloyd, & 
Nolan, 2007).  Therefore, it is important for leaders to know if PBB is an effective mechanism 
for quality improvement in U.S. Army healthcare facilities.  If so, then leaders may consider 
expanding this policy to include all U.S. military facilities.  
The current study is also important from a research perspective.  In contrast to typical 
forms of pay for performance, there is little research on PBB and its effects in the healthcare 
field.  The majority of the literature on PBB is derived from the political science domain and is 
not specific to healthcare organizations.  There are very few experimental or quasi-experimental 
studies, so the effectiveness of PBB in comparison to other mechanisms has yet to be 
established.  This study addresses that gap by providing a quasi-experimental approach to 
studying PBB in the healthcare domain.   
The current study is also significant because it examines the impact of financial 
incentives in the underresearched context of military healthcare facilities.  As Christianson et al. 
(2008) noted, the context in which pay for performance incentives are disbursed is a critical 
component to evaluating its effects.  Contextual factors such as the size of the incentive (K. K. 
Kondo et al., 2018; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007), the target of the incentive (individual, group, or 
organization; K. K. Kondo et al., 2018; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; Petersen et al., 2013; 
Rosenthal & Dudley, 2011; Van Herck et al., 2010), and hospital characteristics (Damberg et 
al., 2014; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; R. Werner et al., 2011) have all been shown to moderate 
the effects of pay for performance.  It is important to expand the pay for performance research 
to include a wider variety of study settings to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
contextual factors that are associated with stronger (or weaker) pay for performance effects.  
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Additionally, there is considerable research on federally sponsored pay for performance 
programs from the perspective federal purchasers (such as Medicare and Medicaid); there are 
very few studies that address the effects of pay for performance from the perspective of 
federally funded healthcare providers.  This study addresses those gaps by examining the effects 
of pay for performance in a military healthcare setting. 
The current study also contributes to the pay for performance literature by examining the 
effects of performance-based incentives over an extended period of time.  The initial results 
from a pilot study of the Army’s PBB program demonstrated significant improvement in 
productivity and HEDIS performance measures (West, Cronk, Goodman, & Waymire, 2010).  
This study builds upon that evaluation to examine whether initial performance gains are 
sustained over a longer period of time.  This is the first study of its kind to address the 
longitudinal impact of PBB in federally funded healthcare environments to determine if 
performance trends are similar to those observed in the private sector.   
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters.  This introductory chapter briefly 
outlined the thematic focus of the study, defined the research problem and research questions, 
introduced the conceptual approach and analytic approaches, and briefly explained the study’s 
significance.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature on pay for performance 
and PBB.  It then transitions into an overview of the study setting, providing an explanation of 
the MHS and performance monitoring in military hospitals.  Chapter 2 concludes with a 
description of the evolution of the Army’s PBB programs.  Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual 
model for this study, with an emphasis on RDT and its application in a military healthcare 
setting.  The theoretical foundations of RDT are applied to derive two testable hypotheses.  
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Chapter 4 discusses the study’s data, methodology, research design, and analytic approach.  The 
results of the analysis are provided in Chapter 5, including the descriptive analyses, regression 
models, sensitivity analysis, and major study findings.  Chapter 6 reflects on the results of the 
study, providing a discussion of its implications and limitations.   
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This chapter is divided into four sections.  The first section provides a broad overview of 
pay for performance, summarizing its history, uses and research findings. Section one also 
discusses the heterogeneity of research results in the pay for performance literature.  The second 
section defines PBB and discusses its relevance to the pay for performance literature.  The third 
section provides background information relevant to the context of this study in the MHS.  The 
fourth section describes the evolution of the Army’s PBB programs and the state of research 
into these programs.  The chapter ends with a summary. 
Overview of Pay for Performance 
In broad terms, pay for performance is a financial arrangement in which payment is 
contingent upon performance.  Within the healthcare domain, pay for performance is applied in 
an effort to improve clinical quality, increase efficiency, improve health outcomes, and enhance 
the patient experience (Damberg et al., 2014). The IOM (2007) described pay for performance 
as “the systematic and deliberate use of payment incentives that recognize and reward high 
levels of quality and quality improvement . . . and a powerful stimulus to drive institutional and 
provider behavior toward better quality” (p. 5).  Thus, pay for performance is one part of an 
overall nationwide strategy to enhance the value of medical care in the United States.   
Pay for performance initiatives have become increasingly popular in U.S. healthcare 
organizations over the last 20 years.  This increase in popularity is partially attributable to two 
seminal reports published by the IOM: To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (2000) 
Chapter 2: Literature Review
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and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (2001).  These two 
reports highlighted the fact that the U.S. healthcare system is not structured to provide safe, 
timely, and necessary care in support of the best possible health outcomes for patients.  These 
reports asserted that under some circumstances, poorly delivered healthcare services can result 
in preventable patient harm or even death.   
As a result, healthcare leaders have devoted the last 20 years to engaging a wide range of 
strategies aimed at reducing preventable harm and improving healthcare quality.  Incentive 
programs have been directed toward a multitude of healthcare applications, including diabetes 
management (Gupta & Ayles, 2019; Huang et al., 2013), immunizations (Chaix-Couturier, 
Durand-Zaleski, Jolly, & Durieux, 2000; Kouides et al., 1998), hypertension (Petersen et al., 
2013), ophthalmology (Herbst & Emmert, 2017), prenatal care (Rosenthal, Li, Robertson, & 
Milstein, 2009), reduction of hospital-acquired conditions (HACs; Bastian, Kang, Nembhard, 
Bloschichak, & Griffin, 2016; Calikoglu et al., 2012; Vokes, Bearman, & Bazzoli, 2018; Waters 
et al., 2017), cardiovascular conditions (Glickman et al., 2007), and chronic liver disease 
(Natarajan & Kanwal, 2015).   
Pay for performance is just one of many strategies used to encourage healthcare 
providers to focus on quality improvement and reduction in preventable harm.  Under pay for 
performance, payers adjust fee-for-service reimbursement rates on the basis of performance.  
Providers can either be rewarded (i.e., receive bonuses) or penalized (i.e., have payments 
reduced) for performance on pre-established targets for quality or efficiency (Damberg et al., 
2014).  For the purposes of the current study, this specific arrangement is distinguished from 
other types of performance-related risk-sharing agreements, such as capitated payments to 
accountable care organizations or bundled payments; however, it is important to note that there 
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is a considerable amount of overlap in the research literature on all of these strategies (Damberg 
et al., 2014). 
History and Evidence for Pay for Performance in the United States 
The use of financial incentives to influence provider behavior and costs of care in the 
private sector dates back to the early 1990s (Damberg et al., 2014; Winslow, 1994) when 
private insurers sought alternatives to the traditional fee-for-service arrangements that rewarded 
providers based on the complexity and quantity of the services provided.  Early programs in the 
United States started with small-scale efforts among a limited number of commercial insurers 
(Doran, Maurer, & Ryan, 2017; Rosenthal, Fernandopulle, Song, & Landon, 2004).  These early 
programs were mostly implemented in managed care settings, in which providers were paid 
either through capitation or lump-sum arrangements for a given set of services (James, 2012).  
These payment arrangements motivated providers to control costs because they were sharing the 
financial risks of healthcare delivery with payers. 
Pay for performance started to proliferate more widely in the United States in the early 
2000s.  Following the release of the two IOM (2000, 2001) reports highlighting safety errors 
and preventable harm in U.S. healthcare facilities, leaders and policymakers started seeking 
programs aimed at improving quality performance (James, 2012).  Pay for performance 
emerged within this context as a method for incentivizing providers to improve quality and 
safety.  The advent of the pay for performance was a major change for the U.S. healthcare 
industry (Dietrich, 2013; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007).  By 2006, over half of all health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States included pay for performance in 
provider contracts (Rosenthal, Landon, Normand, Frank, & Epstein, 2006).   
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Pay for performance emerged in federal programs starting in 2003 with Medicare’s 
flagship demonstration project, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (Premier 
HQID).  The initial phase of this voluntary demonstration project rewarded hospitals in the top 
two performance deciles for quality-related metrics pertaining to three medical conditions (acute 
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia) and two surgical procedures 
(coronary artery bypass grafting and total hip/knee replacement).  Demonstration hospitals had 
the opportunity to earn a 1-2% bonus for high quality performance or (after 2006) be penalized 
for poor performance (Chee et al., 2016).  Because the initial incentive structure did little to 
motivate low-performing hospitals to improve quality, the program was changed at the end of 
2006 to reward quality improvement as well as performance relative to peers (Shih, Nicholas, 
Thumma, Birkmeyer, & Dimick, 2014).   
Evidence for the effectiveness of the Premier HQID project is very limited.  For 
example, Shih et al. (2014) found that the Premier HQID failed to improve surgical outcomes in 
participating hospitals.  Similarly, numerous studies have found no greater reductions in 
mortality among demonstration  hospitals in comparison to non-demonstration hospitals 
(Damberg et al., 2014; Glickman et al., 2007; Ryan, 2009).  Lindenauer et al. (2007) found 
some limited evidence that pay for performance led to small improvements in process of care 
and appropriate care metrics in demonstration hospitals; however, they noted that much of this 
improvement could also be attributed to the effects of public reporting.   
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 served as a catalyst for further expansion of 
pay for performance in the United States.  Numerous provisions in the ACA were designed to 
lower costs and improve the quality of healthcare delivery in the United States.  Despite limited 
evidence to support their use, several programs were adopted to shift payments from volume-
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based reimbursement to value-based reimbursement predicated on quality performance (Doran 
et al., 2017).  For example, Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program 
incentivized quality performance by adjusting payments to hospitals based on how well they 
performed on either quality metrics relative to other hospitals or quality improvement over 
baseline (CMS, 2019b).  Designed to be budget-neutral, the HVBP worked by withholding a 
portion of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals and then redistributing these funds among 
hospitals based on relative quality scores (Chee et al., 2016; Figueroa, Tsugawa, Jie Zheng, 
Orav, & Jha, 2016).  The HVBP is modeled after the Premier HQID demonstration project, 
except participation in the HVBP was broader in scope and mandatory for all Medicare 
hospitals (Figueroa et al., 2016).   
Early evaluations of the HVBP program did not demonstrate any more positive 
outcomes than the HQID demonstration project (Doran et al., 2017).  For example, Ryan, 
Burgess, Pesko, Borden, and Dimick (2015) compared HVBP hospitals to critical access 
hospitals and hospitals in Maryland that were exempt from the program.  They concluded that 
the HVBP hospitals demonstrated no greater improvement on process of care metrics or patient 
experience than exempt (non-HVBP) hospitals.  Similar null effects were also observed for 
mortality associated with acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia (Figueroa et 
al., 2016).   
The Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and the HAC Reduction Program are two 
additional programs sponsored by the CMS.  These programs target quality improvement by 
reducing or eliminating payments to hospitals for adverse events or preventable hospital 
readmissions.  For example, the HAC Reduction Program policy decrements reimbursements by 
1% for the worst-performing quartile of hospitals nation-wide (CMS, 2019a; Vokes et al., 
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2018).  The impact of this policy with respect to reducing HACs remains unclear (Vokes et al., 
2018).  Waters et al. (2017) found that the policy was associated with an 11% reduction in the 
rate of change in central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) and a 10% reduction 
in the rate of change in catheter-associated urinary tract infections.  However, a similar study on 
infection rates following major urologic surgery did not find the rate of HACs to be affected by 
the policy (Rude et al., 2017).   
The ACA also stimulated the adoption of pay for performance in outpatient care.  For 
example, CMS initiated the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) in 2011, rewarding 
physicians for reporting on a select set of quality metrics. This broadly scoped program 
included all physicians and allied health providers who billed Medicare for outpatient services 
(Natarajan & Kanwal, 2015).  In 2015, CMS initiated the Physician Value-Based Modifier 
Program (PVBMP), which was closely linked to the PQRS.  The PVBMP utilized the same 
basic reporting infrastructure as the PQRS, except that it applied penalties for not reporting 
quality data.  It also expanded the scope of incentives to include performance-based penalties 
and bonuses (CMS, 2018; Chee et al., 2016).   
In 2015, additional legislation set the conditions for the creation of the largest value-
based purchasing program in the United States (Doran et al., 2017).  The Medicare Access and 
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (MACRA) rescinded the sustainable 
growth formula previously used to establish physician payment rates.  MACRA consolidated 
several quality programs into a single program known as the Quality Payment Program (QPP).  
The intent of this program was to change the physician payment scheme to better reward 
quality, value, and outcomes in healthcare services (CMS, 2015, 2020).  The QPP rewarded 
quality using one of two methods: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System or Advanced 
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Alternative Payment Models.  Rigorous studies of performance change under QPP and 
MACRA are not yet available, so it is unclear what effect this legislation will have on 
healthcare quality in the United States.   
International Pay for Performance Programs 
In addition to the United States, pay for performance has become increasingly popular 
internationally, particularly among the developed countries that are members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; Feng et al., 2019; Milstein 
& Schreyoegg, 2016).  Unlike the United States, most OECD countries have some form of 
universal healthcare coverage for its citizens (Dietrich, 2013).  This factor is important because 
pay for performance programs can be more broadly implemented in single-payer systems in 
comparison to systems like the United States in which healthcare organizations cater to a 
diverse set of payers.  No study has specifically compared the effects of pay for performance in 
countries with and without universal healthcare coverage, so it is unclear if this and other 
contextual factors may have the potential to alter the effects of pay for performance; however, 
due to differences in universal healthcare coverage, the effects of any international studies on 
pay for performance should be interpreted with caution when compared with studies in the 
United States.  Despite this difference, international studies add to the overall depth of what is 
known to researchers about the effects of pay for performance in healthcare.   
A significant portion of international research on pay for performance is derived from 
studies conducted in the United Kingdom and Taiwan, both of which provide universal 
healthcare coverage to their citizens.  The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is one of 
the most widely researched programs, having been initiated in 2004 by England’s National 
Health Service (NHS) in primary care settings.  It was originally designed to boost recruitment 
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in primary care by providing physicians with a substantial increase in pay (Roland & Campbell, 
2014).  In an effort to enhance performance on quality metrics, physician pay increases were 
made contingent upon performance in clinical indicators (i.e., condition-based care), 
organizational indicators (i.e., records, data, education and training, and practice management) 
and patient experience indicators (i.e., patient engagement surveys).  Over the next 10 years, 
several changes were made to the performance indicators, including the addition of several 
more clinical indicators; the removal of organizational indicators; and the addition of public 
health indicators related to smoking, obesity, and sexual health (Roland & Campbell, 2014).  
The majority of studies on the QOF found positive performance effects, mostly on process of 
care metrics (Mendelson et al., 2017). 
One of the most widely researched programs in Taiwan is the Diabetes Mellitus Pay for 
Performance Program initiated in 2001.  Program enrollment was optional, and physicians were 
given the latitude to choose which patients to enroll (Chang, Lin, & Aron, 2012; Mendelson et 
al., 2017).  This program started by incentivizing performance on process-of-care metrics but 
later transitioned to intermediate health outcome measures in 2006.  Evidence from studies in 
this program is mixed, but most studies have documented positive effects on both process of 
care and intermediate health outcome measures (Mendelson et al., 2017).   
International studies have generally reported positive effects of pay for performance in 
hospitals, though with decelerating trends in improvement over time (Kondo et al., 2015).  
International studies, particularly those in the United Kingdom and Taiwan, were more likely to 
show positive effects than studies within the United States (Mendelson et al., 2017); the reasons 
for these differences have not been established empirically.   
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Heterogeneity of Evidence on Pay for Performance 
Overall, the evidence for pay for performance in the United States and abroad is 
contradictory and mixed.  Some scholars have proposed that the lack of consensus may be the 
result of heterogeneity in patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural 
capabilities, and program characteristics (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).  This heterogeneity is 
particularly visible in systematic review studies, which often incorporate findings from both 
single and multipayer systems, in various physician settings, and across multiple performance 
domains (Benabbas, Shan, Akindutire, Mehta, & Sinert, 2019).  Due to these variations, it has 
been difficult for scholars to make broad generalizations about the overall success or failure of 
pay for performance (Allen, Mason, & Whittaker, 2014).  Despite this, some context-specific 
trends have emerged in the research literature.  Studies have shown that the effects of pay for 
performance may be sensitive to contextual influences such as care setting, patient factors, 
program design elements, and selection of quality metrics (Allen et al., 2014; Benabbas et al., 
2019; Chen et al., 2017; Chien et al., 2012; Gupta & Ayles, 2019; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).  
The following sections explore the impact of these factors in greater detail. 
Care setting. Some of the heterogeneity observed in pay for performance studies may 
be attributable to differences in the care setting.  There is considerable evidence that the effects 
of pay for performance are contingent upon the context in which incentives are introduced 
(Allen et al., 2014; Gupta & Ayles, 2019).  Generally speaking, studies in ambulatory care 
settings have reported more positive results than studies in hospital settings, though the 
evidence in both settings has been mixed.   
Some studies of hospital pay for performance have reported positive effects (Calikoglu 
et al., 2012), and others have reported negligible or no effects at all (Damberg et al., 2014; 
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Glickman et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2014).  Hospital-based studies focused primarily on outcome 
metrics such as mortality, surgical outcomes, and HACs.  Damberg et al. (2014) found that most 
mortality-focused studies offered no evidence that pay for performance reduced in-hospital 
mortality.  Similarly, two studies on Medicare’s Premier HQID project found no appreciable 
differences in quality improvement among pay for performance hospitals and comparison (non-
pay for performance) hospitals.   
Shih et al. (2014) studied mortality rates and surgical complications following cardiac 
and orthopedic procedures.  They did not find an appreciable difference in mortality or 
complication rates following surgical procedures between demonstration and non-demonstration 
hospitals.  Glickman et al. (2007) studied the effects of pay for performance on quality of care 
and outcomes for acute myocardial infarction.  They compared 54 hospitals in the CMS Premier 
HQID project to 446 control hospitals that were not participating.  They concluded that 
improvement in pay for performance hospitals was not incrementally better than improvement 
in comparison hospitals for quality of care or outcome measures.   
In contrast to these studies, a study of two Maryland-based hospital pay for performance 
programs documented positive results.  Calikoglu et al. (2012) found that all clinical process of 
care measures improved in the 4-year period following the implementation of value-based 
purchasing.  They also found that HACs declined by more than 15% after implementation of a 
risk-adjusted pay for performance program.   
Similar to hospital-based studies, evidence on pay for performance in ambulatory care 
settings is mixed (Allen et al., 2014).  Findings varied based on the types of measures 
investigated and the quality of the studies.  For example, there has been some limited evidence 
of success in diabetes care and disease management in primary care settings (Gupta & Ayles, 
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2019; Lin et al., 2016).  Similarly, a systematic review on vaccinations found that eight out of 
nine studies in primary care settings noted a significant increase in vaccination rates following 
implementation of pay for performance incentives (Benabbas et al., 2019).  In contrast to these 
findings, provider incentives were not found to have a large impact on other metrics, including 
well-baby care targeting low income patients (Felt-Lisk, Gimm, & Peterson, 2007).   
According to two systematic reviews, variation in the results may be attributable to the 
quality of the study.  For example, a systematic review by Scott et al. (2011) found modest, 
positive results in six out of seven studies, but the authors noted that many of these studies were 
low quality and subject to significant selection bias.  Similarly, another systematic review that 
included a different set of ambulatory care studies concluded that  higher quality studies tended 
to find either very small positive effects or no effects at all (Damberg et al., 2014).   
Patient factors. Another source of heterogeneity in pay for performance results is the 
patient population.  There is evidence that socioeconomic factors and medical risk in the patient 
population can impact facility performance.  For example, in a study on Medicare’s PVBMP, 
Chen et al. (2017) investigated facility-level performance on cost and quality indicators for 
physician practices serving medically and socially high-risk patients.  Chen et al. found that 
physician practices serving more patients with high social risk factors had lower quality and 
lower costs, while practices serving a greater proportion of medically high-risk patients had 
lower quality and higher costs.  Similarly, Chien et al. (2012) suggested that physician practices 
operating in economically depressed areas perform more poorly on pay for performance 
measures related to clinical quality, patient experience, and health technology usage.   
Program design elements.  Another factor that may explain the lack of consistency in 
pay for performance results is a variation in program design features.  Pay for performance 
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programs vary widely in the United States with incentive structures and program design features 
differing across payers and healthcare organizations.  The most common form of pay for 
performance is a bonus or penalty adjustment that is attached to fee-for-service reimbursement 
rates.  These rate adjustments are made on the basis of performance on various cost and quality 
indicators.  For example, in FY 2013, CMS introduced a reimbursement model in which a small 
percentage of revenues were withheld from hospitals and had to be earned back through 
improvement on quality outcome measures and consistent patient satisfaction (Petrullo et al., 
2012).  Regardless of structure, the primary goal of pay for performance is consistent across 
programs: increase the value of healthcare purchasing by adding incentives for quality to 
complement payments for volume and complexity of services.   
Though few studies have addressed these effects directly, there is evidence that program 
design features such as benchmarking, incentive target, incentive size, measure type, and 
provider engagement may play a role in obtaining the desired effects from pay for performance 
programs (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010).  The following sections explore these 
factors in greater detail. 
Incentive size.  Scholars have hypothesized that in order to impact quality performance, 
the size of the incentive must, at a minimum, be large enough for facilities to cover the costs 
associated with performance improvement efforts (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Werner & Dudley, 
2012).  Ideally, extrinsic rewards such as financial incentives should be large enough to 
motivate participation but not large enough to encourage undesirable behaviors such as 
exclusion of vulnerable or high-risk patients (Kondo et al., 2018).   
A few studies have documented a relationship between incentive size and impact on 
performance (Damberg et al., 2014; Mullen, Frank, & Rosenthal, 2010; Werner et al., 2011).  
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Studies on England’s QOF have also provided evidence regarding the effects of large incentives 
on quality performance.  The QOF offered substantial quality bonuses to providers with 
physician practices having the opportunity to earn up to 1,000 quality points.  Each quality point 
was worth £76- £130 (U.S. $133-$204), which provided a significant opportunity for physicians 
to boost their income.  In 2009-2010, the average practice earned 937 points (range 878-972), 
resulting in approximately a 25% increase in individual physician income (Doran et al., 2006; 
Gillam, Niroshan Siriwardena, & Steel, 2012).   
There is evidence that these large incentives worked.  In a longitudinal study, Doran, 
Kontopantelis, and Valderas (2011) found significant increases in the rate of quality 
improvement for 22 of 23 quality indicators for the first year of implementation.  Although the 
rate of improvement plateaued after the initial implementation period, the quality of care 
remained higher than pre-incentive levels for the remaining 2 years of the study.  Improvements 
were also noted for staffing, documentation, and adoption of information technology (Roland & 
Campbell, 2014).   
Some U.S.-based studies have also documented a relationship between incentive size 
and improvement.  In a literature review, Damberg et al. (2014) found that larger incentives 
were positively associated with larger performance gains.  Qualitative interview data from a 
VHA study suggested that the most effective way to impact clinically meaningful performance 
among physicians was to apply bigger, higher frequency incentives to performance measures 
that are within physician control (Kondo et al., 2018).  Additionally, evidence from the Premier 
HQID demonstration project found that performance improvements were largest in facilities 
eligible for the largest bonuses (Werner et al., 2011).   
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Though economic theory predicts that the size of the reward impacts the degree to which 
organizations respond to incentives, the overall empirical evidence is inconclusive.  Scholars 
have proposed a few explanations for the inconsistency in results (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).  In 
the United States, payer fragmentation may dilute financial incentives and reduce the impact of 
pay for performance programs (Van Herck et al., 2010).  In multipayer systems, payer mix and 
number of patients for each payer impact the total financial incentive available to each 
healthcare provider.  In some cases, the incentive may be very small.  A study on Medicare’s 
HBVP program found that performance incentives only changed payments by a fraction of 1% 
for two thirds of Medicare’s participating hospitals, leading researchers to question whether 
such small incentives can significantly alter facility performance (Werner & Dudley, 2012).  
Another study on well-baby care in Medicaid highlighted the fact that incentives may not work 
if they insufficiently compensate providers for the effort required to access them (Felt-Lisk et 
al., 2007).   
Though a few studies have suggested that larger incentives are more effective at 
changing behavior (Kondo et al., 2018; Van Herck et al., 2010; Werner et al., 2011), some 
healthcare leaders have criticized the use of large incentives on professional grounds.  Their 
arguments are rooted in behavior theory, which proposes that extrinsic rewards such as 
monetary incentives may undermine the intrinsic motivation of healthcare providers (Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).  This has the potential to degrade the altruism, compassion, and trust 
that are fundamental to health professions (Doran, 2014; Doran et al., 2017).  Despite the 
perception from providers that pay for performance limits autonomy and professionalism, there 
is not yet conclusive evidence to support the assertion that pay for performance negatively 
impacts intrinsic motivation (Allen et al., 2014). 
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Selection of performance metrics.  A key consideration for evaluating pay for 
performance programs is defining a common conception of clinical quality.  The IOM (1990) 
defined clinical quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional 
knowledge” (p. 21).  A multitude of different performance measures have emerged in the 
healthcare literature under this broad definition.  This wide range of metrics presents a challenge 
for healthcare leaders attempting to design pay for performance programs that provide the 
maximum benefit to patients.  As Jha (2017) noted, healthcare professionals often have 
difficulty achieving consensus regarding which metrics should be prioritized and by what 
degree.  Inclusion of too many performance metrics in pay for performance programs may make 
it more difficult for organizations to prioritize their efforts on the measures that are most 
clinically beneficial to patients (Jha, 2017).  This has the potential to dampen the effects of pay 
for performance programs and may be one factor explaining null effects in some pay for 
performance studies.   
There are many domains of performance included in pay for performance programs.  
Early programs primarily focused on quality measures, but programs have recently expanded to 
include measures for both cost and quality.  According to a RAND review of pay for 
performance (Damberg et al., 2014), categories of measurement typically include clinical 
processes, intermediate outcomes, patient safety measures, utilization, patient experience, 
outcomes, and structural elements.  Though the healthcare quality literature contains many 
operationalizations of clinical quality, two of the most commonly used categories in the 
research literature are processes of care and outcomes of care (Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, & 
Jiang, 2008).  Process of care metrics measure the degree to which healthcare providers follow 
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established protocols in their treatment of patients.  Outcome metrics indicate the impact the 
treatments and interventions have on the health status of patients (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2015).  These two categories are consistent with the 
Donabedian classification paradigm for comparing healthcare quality on the basis of structure, 
process, and outcomes (AHRQ, 2015; Donabedian, 1980).   
A great deal of literature has highlighted the difference in pay for performance effects 
between process metrics and outcome metrics (Damberg et al., 2014; Flodgren et al., 2011).  
For example, in a systematic review, Flodgren et al. (2011) found that financial incentives can 
be an effective means for changing physician behaviors in areas such as admissions, referrals, 
prescribing patterns, and processes of care; however, there is little evidence that these incentives 
improve patient outcomes (Allen et al., 2014; Flodgren et al., 2011).  In a later systematic 
review, Damberg et al. (2014) compared process metrics and intermediate outcome measures 
and found mixed evidence for both.  In general, higher quality studies have been less likely to 
identify performance improvement effects.  Taken as a whole, most review studies have found 
evidence that process indicators yield higher performance gains than outcome measures in pay 
for performance programs (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 
2010); however, effect sizes were small and results were mixed for both measure types.   
Incentive thresholds.  Performance thresholds for earning incentives can vary 
substantially among pay for performance programs.  Some programs use absolute performance 
thresholds in which organizations must meet a fixed benchmark in order to obtain a bonus.  
Other programs rely on relative thresholds in which providers are assessed for performance 
relative to peers (Damberg et al., 2014).  These two forms of benchmarking raise concerns that 
hospitals serving vulnerable and socioeconomically disadvantaged patients may be 
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disproportionately penalized due to higher readmission rates, lower patient experience scores, 
and lower performance on process measures (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017).   
Because physician organizations in socially disadvantaged areas score more poorly on 
pay for performance measures, some scholars have raised concerns that pay for performance 
may inadvertently increase resource gaps between organizations serving serve high- and low-
income patients, thereby increasing health disparities (Chien et al., 2012).  To address this 
concern, some programs have incorporated performance improvement incentives to help 
stimulate improvement efforts in low-performing facilities.  Research evidence supporting the 
use of performance improvement incentives is limited.  Within the Premier HQID program, 
performance improvement incentives were not shown to improve performance more rapidly 
among low-performing hospitals (Ryan, Blustein, & Casalino, 2012).  A second study on Phase 
2 of the Premier HQID program by Shih et al. (2014) yielded  similar results.  Expanding 
incentive opportunities for performance improvement was not shown to significantly impact 
surgical outcomes for cardiac and orthopedic procedures in demonstration hospitals.  Despite 
limited evidence to support the use of performance improvement incentives, a study of a large 
insurer in Hawaii found that lower performing providers did respond well to small increases in 
the absolute performance thresholds (Bond, 2018).  This study suggests that small increases in 
absolute performance thresholds may stimulate performance improvement in low-performing 
providers without raising costs.   
Diminishing performance improvement effects.  One consistent theme among pay for 
performance studies is that performance gains tend to diminish over time (Bonfrer et al., 2014; 
Kondo et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; Markovitz & Ryan, 2017; Mendelson et al., 2017; Ryan, 
Bluestein, & Casolino, 2012; Van Herck et al., 2010; R. Werner et al., 2011).  One example is 
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with the Quality Incentive Program in the United States.  The early results of this program were 
positive: during the first year of incentives for end stage renal disease measures, 55-96% of 
facilities showed significant improvements on clinical process measures relative to baseline 
performance 2 years earlier (VanLare & Conway, 2012).  However, many of the positive results 
captured in the initial program evaluations did not hold up in longer term studies.  A 5-year 
study of the Premier HQID program found that more demonstration hospitals achieved high 
performance scores in the first few years after the implementation of pay for performance than 
in comparison hospitals not participating in pay for performance.  However, the effect 
diminished over time, and differences disappeared after 5 years (Werner et al., 2011).  
Similarly, another 6-year study on long-term effects of pay for performance in inpatient settings 
found no evidence for a long-term effect on 30-day mortality (Jha et al., 2012).  Comparable 
results were also observed for long-term studies of screening and preventive care in primary 
care settings (Kondo et al., 2018).   
Despite a general lack of research consensus regarding the effects of pay for 
performance on outcome measures, one noteworthy study did find positive effects.  A study on 
a hospital-based program in Pennsylvania found that participation in pay for performance was 
associated with a 27% reduction in the rate of CLABSIs (Bastian et al., 2016).  Researchers also 
noted significant effects based on the length of time the hospitals participated in the program.  
For example, long-participating hospitals had an average of 3.13 fewer CLABSIs per year in 
comparison to those participating for fewer than 4 years (Bastian et al., 2016).  This study is 
noteworthy because it suggests that length of program participation may be an important 
consideration for researchers evaluating the effects of pay for performance on outcome 
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measures.  Evaluation periods that are too short my run a risk of failing to fully capture 
significant effects.  
A long-term study within the VHA provided a notable exception to the pattern of 
diminishing performance effects observed in most pay for performance studies.  This study 
found significant and sustained improvements on process measures for six out of seven 
indicators within VHA facilities participating in pay for performance (Benzer et al., 2014; 
Kondo et al., 2018).  This unique finding lends itself to additional research, particularly 
regarding the long-term effects of pay for performance in federal healthcare facilities.  It raises 
questions about the potential influence of contextual factors such as hospital type (e.g., federal 
versus privately operated hospitals) on the effects of pay for performance. 
PBB: A Special Case 
The management concepts of pay for performance can also be applied in government 
programs.  This special form of pay for performance is known as performance-based budgeting 
(PBB).  Though there are many forms of PBB discussed in the following sections, the basic 
mechanism for all forms of PBB is to provide a financial motivation for public programs and 
government-funded organizations to improve and maintain performance.  This is achieved by 
establishing performance criteria and using data on these criteria to assess performance and 
allocate budget resources.  Robinson and Brumby (2005) defined PBB as “procedures or 
mechanisms intended to strengthen the links between funds provided to public sector entities 
and their outcomes and/or outputs through the use of formal performance information in 
resource allocation decision-making” (p. 15). PBB is a policy mechanism that enables decision-
makers to systematically account for the results achieved with public funds (Dunning, 2014).  
The goal of PBB is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure by 
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connecting organizational funding to specific results (Dunning, 2014).  Because the theoretical 
basis of PBB is closely linked to pay for performance, the following sections discuss its 
definitions, history, and similarities to pay for performance.  Key distinctions from pay for 
performance are also discussed, as well as its application in healthcare settings.  
Definitions 
The academic literature on PBB introduces a range of definitions and applications.  PBB 
has been described as a budgeting system in which input costs are related to performance 
(DeVries & Nemec, 2019, p. 5) and funding allocation is related to measurable results (OECD, 
2003).  It has also been described as a process involving the use of performance information for 
budgetary purposes (Mauro, Cinquini, & Grossi, 2017; OECD, 2007).  Jordan and Hackbart 
(1999) distinguished between performance budgeting and performance funding, defining the 
former as “preparing a budget document that includes performance information” and the latter 
as “the allocation or distribution of a percentage of appropriated funds contingent upon the 
assessment of the performance measures identified in the budget” (p. 69). Using these 
distinctions, performance funding is a more regimented form of PBB because it allocates money 
on the basis of performance thresholds rather than just using performance information while 
making budget decisions.   
The academic literature delineates two separate dimensions for measuring performance 
in PBB programs (DeVries & Nemec, 2019; Robinson & Brumby, 2005).  The first dimension, 
outputs, focuses on the organizational activities involved with delivering a product or service 
(Kong, 2005, p. 97).  Output-based performance measurement is intended to achieve allocative 
efficiency.  In the economic literature, allocative efficiency refers to an optimal distribution of 
goods and services in which the output of production is as close as possible to the marginal cost 
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(Agarwal, 2019).  In the PBB literature, allocative efficiency refers to funding programs that 
provide the maximum benefit for public expenditure (Robinson & Brumby, 2005).  This is 
accomplished by linking funding to quantifiable activity measures such as relative value units 
(RVUs), the number of patients seen, or the quantity of healthcare services delivered.  
Performance is defined in terms of outputs as a function of budget inputs.   
The second dimension of PBB gauges performance through the use of outcome 
measures.  Outcome-based measures address the question of whether or not a program achieves 
its intended goals (Kong, 2005, p. 97).  Outcome measures are used to assess the quality or 
effectiveness of programs and services and are therefore the most useful to policymakers in 
budget decisions (Kong, 2005).  In contrast to output measures that focus on what is bought 
through resource expenditures, outcome measures focus on what is actually achieved through 
resource expenditure (M. S. DeVries & Nemec, 2019).   
History 
PBB is purported to have originated in the U.S. Congress in the late 1940s, though some 
scholars have argued that it has existed in concept since the rule of Chinese Emperor K’ang-shi 
in the 1700s (DeVries & Nemec, 2019).  The U.S. experience with PBB started under President 
Truman in the late 1940s.  The Hoover Commission, a body charged with recommending 
administrative changes to the executive branch of government, proposed changes to the federal 
budgeting processes. The proposed changes shifted budgeting from its traditional line-item 
expenditure format to a new performance budget that emphasized functions, costs, activities, 
and accomplishments of federal expenditures (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
1997).  In 1949, the National Security Act Amendment prompted the implementation of 
performance budgeting in the U.S. Military (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999).  Shortly after, Congress 
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passed the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, which modernized federal 
accounting procedures by requiring the president to submit “functions and activities” of the 
government with the budget request; this new format shifted focus from inputs (expenditures) to 
outputs of the federal government, such as programs, weapons. and training (McGill, 2001, pp. 
377-378).  The Hoover Commission reforms were critical to the development of PBB in the 
United States because they established the philosophical underpinnings of a new performance-
oriented approach to budgeting that would evolve over the next 70 years (Jordan & Hackbart, 
1999, p. 68; GAO, 1997). 
The Hoover Commission reforms were followed by a series of legislative actions that 
incrementally transformed budgeting and managerial practices in public sector agencies in the 
United States.  The first evolution occurred in 1965 with the initiation of President Johnson’s 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).  The PPBS established a framework for 
executive branch decision-making that incorporated an analysis of long-term policy objectives 
in the budget formulation process (GAO, 1997).  Similar to the Hoover Commission’s budget 
legacy, under the PPBS, performance was mostly measured in terms of government outputs 
(GAO, 1997).  A critical aspect of PPBS was its use of sophisticated analytical tools to link 
government outputs to long-term policy objectives.  This complexity of analysis, combined with 
its inability to account nonquantifiable political factors, ultimately led to the replacement of the 
PPBS form of budgeting (McGill, 2001, p. 378). 
The next evolution in U.S. PBB occurred with the introduction of President Nixon’s  
Management by Objectives (MBO), which was intended to hold managers accountable for the 
outputs of their organizations by linking the stated objectives of agencies to their budget 
requests (McGill, 2001).  Like previous programs, performance under MBO was mostly 
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measured in terms of outputs and efficiency measures; however, it also included some early 
efforts at assessing program results and outcomes (McGill, 2001).  Both PPBS and MBO were 
important points of evolution in PBB because they championed the use of sophisticated 
performance measurements and analysis in spending decisions (GAO, 1997).   
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) was introduced into the executive budgeting process in 
1977 by President Carter.  ZBB required government agencies to rank order priorities based on 
alternative spending levels without the use of a budget base from previous fiscal periods (GAO, 
1997).  This structure required agencies to re-analyze and re-prioritize expenditures with each 
fiscal cycle.  ZBB was an important step in the PBB evolution in the United States because it 
was the first to pursue a specific connection between budget resources and program results 
(GAO, 1997), effectively forcing agencies to make hard choices between priorities at alternative 
spending levels (McGill, 2001).   
The most recent evolution in PBB is the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA/Results Act) of 1993, which was designed to strengthen federal decision-making and 
accountability while helping Congress gain better visibility of program results in relation to 
government expenditures (GAO, 1999). The Results Act shifted the focus of accountability 
from processes to results, requiring federal agencies to submit 5-year strategic plans outlining 
the outcomes they hoped to achieve with government resources (“Linking Program Funding to 
Performance Results,” 2002).  It also required agencies to submit annual performance plans 
detailing performance goals and plans for achieving them.  The Results Act was a significant 
advancement to progress in PBB in the United States because it explicitly required each agency 
to incorporate performance goals and program activities to their budget requests (GAO, 1999).  
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It was also significant because it relied on the use of objective information to determine the 
relative effectiveness and efficiency of government programs.   
By 2002, several analyses indicated that federal policymakers had largely failed to 
adequately establish a link between performance results and their funding decisions (“Linking 
Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002; GAO, 1999) as intended by the Results Act.  
In response to this issue, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed the Program 
Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) in 2002.  The PART was designed to help agencies assess 
programs more objectively.  It also aided agencies in developing reasonable goals and 
measures, feasible strategies to achieve their goals, and credible performance information 
(“Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002, p. 7).  The PART assessment 
included four basic questions, including the following: 
1. Does the program have a clear definition of success, and is it designed to achieve it? 
2. Are the program goals sufficiently outcome-oriented and aggressive? 
3. Is the program well managed? 
4. Does the program achieve its goals? (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005, p. 5) 
Programs were awarded points based on the answers to each of these questions.  After adding 
all of the points, each program was rated according to five categories: effective, moderately 
effective, adequate, ineffective, and results not demonstrated.  In addition to making the ratings 
public, Congress started to use ratings in budget deliberations.  As of 2004, 29 programs were 
terminated or reduced due to receiving a rating of Results Not Demonstrated (“Performance-
Based Budgeting,” 2005, p.6).   
 The PART was used by Congress until 2008 when it was replaced by performance 
initiatives crafted by the Obama Administration.  In 2010, the Obama Administration enacted 
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legislation that updated the GPRA of 1993.  The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 
111-352) placed emphasis on incorporating performance into federal program management.  
This legislation not only encouraged the use of performance information in budgeting, it also 
encouraged federal managers to incorporate objective performance information into the overall 
management of federal programs.   
In aggregate, the evolution of PBB in the United States since the 1940s demonstrates a 
persistent effort to broaden the use of performance information in the budgeting and 
management of federal programs.  While there is a consensus among scholars that these 
programs have often failed to achieve the goals of their design (McGill, 2001; GAO, 1997, 
2018b), each transformation moved the practice of PBB forward in a visible way (Kong, 2005).  
PBB started in the late 1940s with the Hoover Commission’s recommendation to emphasize the 
outputs of government funds rather than the expenditures alone.  By the 1990s, PBB evolved to 
emphasize the goals of measuring performance in terms of outcomes rather than outputs.  By 
2003, the GAO (2018b) found that government leaders had greater access to performance 
information than they had in the late 1990s.  Despite this forward progress, several recent 
government reports still call for PBB programs to more concretely link performance to budget 
decisions (OMB, 2011; “Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002; 
“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005; GAO, 2018b).  Thus, PBB programs continue to 
undergo evaluation and change.  Though PBB research continues to evolve, the following 
section provides an overview of what is currently known about the effectiveness of PBB in 
government programs.   
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Key Findings About PBB 
Because budgeting is a fundamentally political action, the academic literature on PBB is 
mostly situated in the political science domain.  Budgeting is a political action because it forces 
policymakers to exercise political choice in allocating resources among a range of alternatives 
(GAO, 1999).  PBB infuses performance data into this inherently political process.  Most of the 
research literature on PBB is supported through case studies, government reports, literature 
reviews, and international comparisons.  Unlike the management and healthcare literature, there 
are very few experimental or quasi-experimental designs in the PBB literature. 
Though there have been a few documented successes, many PBB program attempts have 
failed (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999; McGill, 2001; McNab & Melese, 2003; GAO, 1997). 
According to a review by McNab and Melese (2003), these failures are attributable to 
“administrative complexities, lack of investment in managerial, accounting and information 
systems, and the lack of institutional incentives to promote gains in economic efficiency” (p. 
73). 
One consistent problem is the failure to use available performance information in the 
budgeting process.  Numerous reviews of PBB programs in the United States have indicated 
that even when performance information is available, most programs fail to explicitly 
incorporate that information into budget decisions (Coplin, Merget, & Bourdeaux, 2002; Kong, 
2005; “Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002; GAO, 2018b).  A GAO  
(2018b) survey found that while state government officials reported greater availability of 
performance information since 1997, there had been little to no change in the use of that 
information for various management activities (p. 6).  Similarly, another GAO survey found that 
government-wide use of performance information did not improve after the enactment of the 
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2010 GPRMA Modernization Act.  Though managers had access to more performance 
information, they did not use that performance information in program management any more 
often in 2017 than in 2013 (GAO, 2018b).  This trend was also noted by Representative Stephen 
Horn, who opened a 2002 Congressional hearing on performance budgeting by stating that 
“policymakers have failed to establish a connection between performance results and their 
funding decisions . . . and the effectiveness of funding decisions [is] largely untested” (“Linking 
Program Funding to Performance Results,” 2002).  
Though performance information is more widely available to policymakers now than in 
the 1980s and 1990s, many leaders have still cited difficulty obtaining and communicating 
credible performance information.  According to a GAO survey conducted in 2002, only five of 
the government’s 24 largest agencies could attest to the completeness and reliability of the 
information used in budget decisions (“Linking Program Funding to Performance Results,” 
2002).  One factor is that highly useful information is often costly or difficult to obtain (Schick, 
2003, p.74).  The costs associated with implementing a sophisticated performance monitoring 
system can be high in terms of manpower, additional documentation requirements, and 
information technology for data mining.  This contributes to the pervasive view that the 
administrative costs outweigh its benefits (Kong, 2005, p. 93).  Despite the high cost, when 
resources are allocated to data collection, it impacts the degree to which performance 
information is used in budgeting.  For example, Jordan and Hackbart (1999) found a positive 
association with the number of analysts in a budget office and the state’s use of performance 
information in funding processes.   
Another complication for PBB is that institutional, functional, policy, and political 
constraints are fundamental to the American decision-making system (Radin, 2000, p. 133).  
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This means that performance is not the only information considered in budgeting decisions, 
even when sophisticated PBB programs exist.  Dongsung Kong (2005) noted,  
Public budgeting at all levels of government is intrinsically political.  Performance 
measures, or any rational ideas, will not supersede political priorities in any near future. 
PBB can be appropriate and applicable to managerial and less political decisions, but not 
highly political decisions. (p. 103)  
This means that even when highly developed analytical tools are used to review performance 
data during budget deliberations, political forces can eclipse objective analyses.   
For example, in the early 2000s, Congress used the PART to affect change in the budget 
process for the Community Development Block Grant Program.  Despite its intended analytical 
approach, Representative Michael Conaway testified that Congress “did not get it done in the 
budgetary process.  The political backlash, the whole ownership of those particular programs 
overran the analysis piece of what was going on” (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005).  As 
some other members of Congress have noted, performance information in PBB programs do not 
fully account for all of the factors that must be considered in budget deliberations.  For example, 
according to testimony by Clay Johnson of the OMB, high priority activities (such as certain 
defense programs) must sometimes be funded regardless of performance (“Performance-Based 
Budgeting,” 2005). 
Deciding upon an appropriate measurement system can also be politically problematic.  
According to congressional testimony from James Nussle, Chairman of the House Budget 
Committee, one of the key challenges with implementing the PART was determining how 
performance would be measured and who would decide which performance measurements 
would be used (“Performance-Based Budgeting,” 2005).  When PBB applies to politically 
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sensitive programs, there may also be political interest in defining a particular measurement 
approach.   
Interpreting performance information is another factor that complicates the 
implementation of PBB programs.  Though outcomes-based performance measures are widely 
accepted as the most desirable for PBB programs (Schick, 2003, p. 74), these data can often be 
difficult to interpret for budgeting purposes.  For example, it is sometimes complex to 
disentangle the effects of multiple programs on a particular outcome (Kong, 2005).  When 
multiple programs contribute to a particular outcome, it can be difficult to make an allocation 
decision.  Williams and Melhuish (1999) noted, “with no means to measure an individual’s 
contribution, a system of ‘sticks and carrots’ is arbitrary and of little impact” (p. 25).  
For all of the reasons mentioned, PBB programs have evolved over time in the United 
States.  PBB programs have been redesigned through multiple legislative iterations, suggesting 
that certain aspects of these programs may not have worked smoothly in the intervening years 
(Schick, 2003).  Like pay for performance, the effects of PBB programs are often moderated by 
factors outside of the program itself.  PBB programs are difficult to implement if they are overly 
complex, include performance measures that are outside of managerial control, or fail to 
explicitly link performance to financial incentives.  In contrast to pay for performance, PBB 
programs have the additional complication of being influenced by political forces that threaten 
to undermine their analytic approach.  The following section provides a more detailed 
comparison of PBB and pay for performance within the domain of healthcare. 
Comparison of PBB and Pay for Performance in Healthcare 
PBB programs in federal healthcare facilities are very similar to traditional forms of pay 
for performance.  PBB incorporates many of the same basic mechanisms as pay for performance 
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but applies them to government-sponsored programs rather than private sector organizations.  
Christianson et al. (2008) defined pay for performance as “any payment arrangement that 
specifically rewards quality” (p. 6S).  Under this broad definition, PBB can be categorized as a 
pay for performance program, though three key distinctions exist.  First, government 
organizations are not subject to the same market forces as private sector organizations (Williams 
& Melhuish, 1999; Zemrani, 2019).  In the private sector, market forces are the catalyst for 
performance improvement.  Businesses must address quality and satisfaction concerns of 
patients and customers to remain viable (Zemrani, 2019, p. 36).  Similarly, hospitals and 
healthcare organizations compete with each other in terms of the quality of their healthcare 
services and patient amenities in order to attract business and remain financially viable.  In the 
public sector, these market forces are less pronounced or absent.  The ultimate measure of 
success for government programs is the service that is delivered through public expenditure not 
its profit margin (Williams & Melhuish, 1999, p. 23).  When publicly funded organizations have 
stable funding that is not tied to performance, they have less incentive to improve performance 
and address satisfaction concerns.  By linking performance to the level of resourcing, PBB 
provides a potential mechanism for policymakers to hold organizations accountable for service 
quality and costs.  
A second distinction between PBB and pay for performance is pay for performance 
programs have the potential to impact individual pay, whereas most PBB programs usually do 
not.  Many U.S. pay for performance programs employ quality-based bonus payments that 
supplement capitation rates or fee-for-service reimbursements (Christianson et al., 2008).  
Payment arrangements and performance thresholds are usually stipulated in contracts between 
purchasers and healthcare organizations, but organizations can also incentivize individual 
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physicians by offering performance bonuses (Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007).  U.S. physicians and 
physician groups can earn up to 10% of their annual income in pay for performance bonuses, 
although the amount is typically less (Christianson et al., 2008; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007; 
Sherry, 2016).  In VHA facilities, pay for performance bonuses are disbursed at the organization 
level through a central VA office, and facility-level senior managers then have the ability to 
distribute bonuses to individual providers and employees (Benzer et al., 2014).  In contrast to 
pay for performance, PBB incentives usually remain at the organizational level.  Incentives are 
disbursed through budget mechanisms (increased or decreased program funding) and have less 
potential to directly impact individual pay.  
A third difference for PBB in the healthcare domain is that incentives are typically 
controlled by a single government agency rather than a collection of individual payers.  Since 
federal hospitals are almost exclusively financed through public expenditure, organizations are 
usually dependent upon a single agency for the majority of their operational resources.  
Obtaining critical resources through a single agency reduces the complexity associated with 
tailoring performance improvement initiatives to suit the requirements of multiple payers.  With 
fewer competing demands, organizational decision-makers may be more able to focus 
organizational attention on the performance metrics that are most important to the agency 
controlling the bulk of its funding and financial resources (Ocasio, 1997).   
In contrast to publicly funded programs, commercial healthcare organizations must 
manage performance targets from a conglomerate of healthcare purchasers.  For example, an 
analysis of 48 state and regional health measure sets identified 509 distinct metrics with only 
20% overlap of metrics between programs (Bazinsky & Bailit, 2013).  If performance measures 
do not overlap across multiple insurers, organizations must expend additional resources on 
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measuring and reporting across many different metrics.  As Cassel et al. (2012) noted, this can 
lead to measurement fatigue without a corresponding change in results.   
As mentioned, having too many metrics makes it difficult for managers to focus 
organizational attention on the metrics that matter the most to patient outcomes (Cassel et al., 
2012; Ocasio, 1997).  As a result, it is possible for organizational efforts to focus on minimally 
beneficial metrics rather than measures that may have a greater impact on patient outcomes.  
This is a factor that may account for the relative lack of success in many U.S.-based pay for 
performance programs in comparison to programs in single-payer countries such as the United 
Kingdom (Mendelson et al., 2017).  Also, incentives from single payers are potentially larger 
because they are applicable to the entire population of patients rather than being segmented 
among patients based on patient insurance coverage.   
Due to the aforementioned distinctions in market forces, incentive source (government 
funding versus insurance payments), and incentive impact (organizations versus individuals), 
PBB should be considered a special case of healthcare pay for performance that is specific to 
government-financed healthcare organizations.  For the purposes of this dissertation, PBB is 
defined as a specific form of pay for performance that (a) applies to state or federally funded 
healthcare organizations and (b) incentivizes performance at the organization level through 
budget mechanisms.   
Overview of the MHS and Links to PBB 
One U.S. government organization to use PBB is MEDCOM, which is one component 
of the U.S. MHS.  MEDCOM experimentation with PBB started around 2004 with a small pilot 
program conducted in a handful of U.S. Army medical facilities in the southeast region of the 
United States. As of 2019, the DHA is in the process of expanding PBB to all other service 
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components within the MHS.  The following two sections discuss that program and the broader 
context of the MHS, which set the conditions for its inception. 
The MHS is one of the largest health systems in the world, delivering medical and dental 
care to military beneficiaries in almost 700 hospitals and clinics worldwide (Smith, Bono, & 
Slinger, 2017).  The MHS is a comprehensive, integrated health system that combines both 
direct and purchased care components to provide health services to eligible military 
beneficiaries (Defense Health Agency: 2017 Stakeholder Report, 2017; DOD, 2014).  As of 
2018, the MHS employs a total of over 240,000 medical staff, split between active duty (48%) 
and reserve (30%) personnel, federal civilians (18%), and contractors (4%) (GAO, 2018a).  The 
scope and scale of MHS healthcare services are substantial.  The MHS provides services to 9.51 
million eligible patients, including 1.4 million active duty servicemembers and 8.1 million 
reservists, retirees, and family members and survivors (DHA, 2019e; DOD, 2014; Weil, 2019).  
In 2018, MHS hospitals documented over 204,000 inpatient admissions, 39 million outpatient 
encounters and 1.17 million emergency department visits (Adirim, 2019).   
Patient care is provided in the MHS through two integrated components (Childress, 
2013, p. 7). The direct care component is comprised of health facilities directly operated by 
agencies within the DOD.  The direct care system in the MHS is analogous to a staff-model 
HMO that directly employs salaried providers (Bond & Schwab, 2019, p. 1328).  The purchased 
care component is comprised of a network of contracted civilian healthcare providers who offer 
a critical supplement to the healthcare services delivered within the MHS direct care system.  
These supplemental contract services allow the MHS to provide access to beneficiaries when 
MTFs are over capacity or beneficiaries live outside of the catchment area of military healthcare 
facilities.  They also provide a referral option when the scope of services required exceed the 
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services available through local military hospitals (Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).  Sixty percent of 
DOD health services are delivered through these contracted providers (Adirim, 2019, p. 1269).   
TRICARE is the health plan that integrates the direct care and purchased care 
components.  Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code authorizes the entitlement of TRICARE health 
benefits as a component of the compensation package afforded to active duty military 
personnel, their families, and retirees.  Eligible beneficiaries can participate in three main 
benefit plans.  TRICARE Prime is a HMO option with very little cost sharing.  TRICARE 
Select operates like a preferred provider organization, in which beneficiaries are offered more 
choices for civilian healthcare providers but often pay higher cost shares.  TRICARE for Life is 
a Medicare wrap-around plan that is offered to Medicare-eligible retirees.  The TRICARE 
program also includes pharmacy benefits and optional vision and dental plans (Mendez, 2018a, 
p. 10 ).  TRICARE benefits and available plans vary slightly with respect to priority of access to 
military facilities and degree of cost sharing.  This is largely based on the beneficiary category 
(i.e., active duty, dependent, retiree, retiree dependent, reserve, national guard).  For example, 
active duty beneficiaries have no out-of-pocket costs, while family members of active duty 
incur cost-sharing expenses only when using out-of-network care without a referral (Tanielian 
& Farmer, 2019).   
10 U.S. C. §1074 defines priorities for access to care in MTFs.  Active duty 
servicemembers are the only beneficiary group entitled to care in MTFs (10 U.S. C. §1074).  
Space available priority for access to MTF care is then provided (in order) for active duty 
family members enrolled in TRICARE Prime, retirees, and their family members enrolled in 
TRICARE prime; active duty family members not enrolled in TRICARE Prime; and all other 
eligible persons (32 C.F.R. §199.17(d) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2011).   
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Coverage and benefits have expanded in the TRICARE program over the last 20 years 
due to their necessity in attracting and maintaining an all-volunteer military force during a 
period of extended military conflict.  Cost-sharing has remained very low relative to civilian 
insurance programs (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000; Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission, 2015; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).  Because these benefits 
constitute a substantial investment of federal funds, members of Congress work closely with 
key leaders in the DOD and MHS to ensure that the medical needs of military members, retirees 
and military families are met through the MHS and TRICARE infrastructure.  This is evidenced 
by the fact that Congress has updated military healthcare benefits in every FY since 1976 
(Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000).  Though Congress maintains responsibility for defining eligibility 
criteria and scope of benefits under the TRICARE program, the MHS establishes the contracts, 
policy, budget, oversight, and civilian provider networks necessary to deliver this care (Hutter et 
al., 2019; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).   
Mission of the MHS 
The mission of the MHS is to  
ensure America’s 1.4 million active duty and 331,000 reserve-component personnel are 
healthy so they can complete their national security missions; to ensure that all active 
and reserve medical personnel in uniform are trained and ready to provide medical care 
in support of operational forces around the world; and to provide a medical benefit 
commensurate with the service and sacrifice of more than 9.4 million active duty 
personnel, military retirees and their families. (DHA, 2019a)   
Commensurate with this mission, the MHS has two critical objectives—often referred to as the 
readiness mission and the benefits mission (Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).  The primary objective 
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of the MHS is the readiness mission.  The readiness mission involves maintaining the health of 
military personnel so they can carry out their military duties and deliver healthcare services 
during military operations (Mendez, 2018a; DOD, 2014).  In support of this readiness task, the 
MHS provides preventive and restorative health services to military personnel so that they can 
be medically prepared to deploy at a moment’s notice.  U.S. military forces are deployed 
worldwide in support of diverse missions such as combat operations, responses to natural 
disasters, humanitarian intervention, training, deterrence, and diplomacy (Hutter et al., 2019).  
These missions require servicemembers to be at peak health to withstand the physical and 
mental strains associated with working in austere and demanding operational environments.   
As part of its readiness mission, the MHS is also charged with maintaining a ready 
medical force of military healthcare providers who are trained and equipped to provide medical 
care in a complex operational environment (Hutter et al., 2019).  Most of this preparation is 
accomplished through the operation of hospitals and care facilities throughout the United States.  
Medical staff work and train in these hospitals, which allows them to maintain and improve 
medical skills during peacetime operations.  For example, the DOD operates a certified Level 1 
trauma center in San Antonio, Texas.  This facility is authorized to provide trauma services for 
non-military patients in order to provide a platform for uniformed medical providers to maintain 
critical trauma skills (Sanchez, 2018).   
The secondary purpose of the MHS is its benefits mission, which more closely resembles 
the missions of civilian healthcare systems.  The peacetime mission of the MHS is to provide 
medical services to eligible beneficiaries, including retirees and family members of active and 
retired servicemembers.  Services are provided to non-uniformed beneficiaries (e.g., family 
members, retirees) in military facilities on a space-available basis.  This allows military 
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providers to maintain their training and readiness for a diverse patient population in the military 
hospitals, medical centers, ambulatory care facilities, and dental clinics in the direct care system 
(Adirim, 2019).   
Performance objectives in the MHS are guided by the four tenets of the MHS Quadruple 
Aim.  The MHS Quadruple Aim is similar to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s triple 
aim of improving the experience of care, improving the health of populations, and reducing per 
capita costs of healthcare (Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008).  The key distinction for the 
MHS is the addition of a fourth aim—readiness.  The MHS readiness aim encompasses 
accountability for “ensuring that the total military force is medically ready to deploy and that 
the medical force is ready to deliver healthcare anytime, anywhere in support of the full range of 
military operations, including humanitarian missions” (DHA, 2013).   
Governance 
The MHS executes its mission through five major DOD organizations: Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, DHA, MEDCOM, Navy Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery, and Air Force Medical Services (Mendez, 2018b).  Leadership is comprised of a 
combination of uniformed personnel and civilian government employees (DHA, 2019d).  Each 
organization executes distinct responsibilities, but they cooperate through a federated 
governance structure that enables collaboration, resource sharing, and streamlining of 
administrative functions (see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1. Governance structure of the MHS through October 1, 2021. This organization chart 
depicts the organization structure of the MHS prior to the transfer of management authority of 
all MTFs to the DHA. Adapted from “Military Medical Care: Frequently Asked Questions, 
Report No 45399, Version 4,” by Bryce Mendez, 2018, Congressional Research Service, p. 3. 
 
Prior to 2013, the operational aspects of the MHS were divided among the medical 
departments of the three uniformed services (Army; Navy, to include the Marine Corps; and Air 
Force) with each service independently operating its own clinics, hospitals, and medical centers 
(Bono, 2017; DOD, 2014).  In September 2013, U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5136.13 
established the DHA, which effectively unified these three subcomponents (DOD, 2013).   
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The role of the DHA is to manage the TRICARE Program; manage and execute the 
Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation; support the coordinated management of multi-
service markets (MSM);1 and exercise management responsibility for shared services, functions, 
and activities of the MHS (Mendez, 2018a, p. 5).  The DHA was created in order to reduce costs 
by consolidating services, providing better coordination of resources, promoting more rapid 
flow of information, and achieving more informed decision-making (Basu, 2012; Bono, 2017; 
Cain, 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2015).  The DHA established common business 
practices and integrated functions among the three uniformed services.  These integrated 
functions include purchasing medical supplies, management of the TRICARE health plan, 
pharmacy services, health information technology, education and training, contracting, facility 
planning, resource management, and research and development (Collins, 2015; Hutter et al., 
2019; DOD, 2013). The DHA also increased interoperability among the services, especially 
with respect to technology and the management of access to care through the TRICARE health 
plan.  As a result of cost-saving initiatives and efficiencies gained by creating the DHA, the rate 
of healthcare spending growth slowed throughout the MHS.   
In 2017, Congress further expanded the role of the DHA with the passage of the FY 
2017 NDAA.  The NDAA is a series of federal laws that are passed each year to specify the 
budget and expenditures of the DOD.  Aside from authorizing the annual budget, the NDAA 
also specifies how certain funds or activities within the DOD will be managed.  The 2017 
NDAA directs the MHS to consolidate the management of all DOD MTFs under the DHA.  The 
purpose of this transformation is to eliminate duplicative activities, achieve efficiencies in 
management functions, and to reduce headquarters-level personnel requirements (GAO, 2018c). 
 
1 Multi-service markets are healthcare markets in which the clinics or hospitals from two or more uniformed 
services have overlapping service areas (DHA, 2019h; TRICARE, 2019).   
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As part of this centralization process, the DHA will assume responsibility for hospital budgets 
and common performance standards pertaining to readiness, quality, access, outcomes, and 
safety (Smith et al., 2017).   
Transformation efforts commenced in 2018 and will continue through 2021.  Congress 
requires the DOD to transfer 457 MTFs to the administration of the DHA by October 1, 2021 
(NDAA, 2019).  Figure 2 depicts the governance structure of the MHS once this change has 
been fully implemented.  
 
Figure 2. Governance structure of the MHS after October 1, 2021. This organization chart 
depicts the organization of the MHS after the DHA assumes management of MTFs after 
October 1, 2021.  Adapted from “The U.S. Military Health System: Promoting Readiness and 
Providing Health Care, by Terri Tanielian and Carrie Farmer, 2019, Health Affairs, 38(8), p. 
1260. 
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Funding 
The MHS is funded through congressional appropriations in the Unified Medical 
Budget, which is managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.  This 
budget includes resourcing for medical personnel, military construction projects, operational 
costs of military medical facilities, and non-war-related health services (Mendez, 2018b).  
Funding for the delivery of health services is covered by the DHP, which typically constitutes 
approximately 67% of the total unified health budget (Mendez, 2018b).  The unified budget 
request of $50.6 billion for FY 2019 includes $33.7 billion for the DHP, $8.9 billion for military 
personnel, $0.4 billion for military construction, and $7.5 billion for healthcare accrual (GAO, 
2018a).  This outlay encompasses approximately 9% of the total defense budget (DHA, 2018a, 
2019e; Mendez, 2018b).   
Once Congress appropriates funds to the Unified Medical Budget and DHP, they are 
disbursed to each of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force).  The medical departments 
of each service in turn allocate funding to each MTF (see Figure 3).  Almost all of each 
facility’s funding comes from this budget process, though there are a few secondary funding 
sources.  For example, 10 U.S.C. §1097(b) authorizes MTFs to undertake third-party collections 
to other insurance payers for beneficiary care that is delivered in treatment facilities if enrollees 
carry such extra insurance (Mendez, 2018b).  Additionally, a standing authorization exists for 
transfers between the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund and TRICARE that 
reimburses MTFs for the cost of healthcare delivered to Medicare-eligible military retirees in 
military facilities.  Supplementary funding is also provided to MTFs through other reimbursable 
special programs and transfer authorities (Mendez, 2018b).   
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Figure 3. MHS funding process. Adapted from “Performance-Based Adjustment Model 
Overview” presentation by Robert Griffith on March 26, 2013 at the HFMA 2013 Texas State 
Conference.   
 
Facilities 
As of 2019, the direct care system is comprised of 51 inpatient hospitals and medical 
centers, and 672 ambulatory care, occupational health, and dental clinics (Adirim, 2019, p. 
1269).  These facilities, collectively referred to as MTFs, are typically located on military 
installations or in areas densely populated by military personnel and their families.  They are 
operated in a federated manner by the medical departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 
and overseen by the DHA (Adirim, 2019; Tanielian & Farmer, 2019).   
MTFs are divided into three facility types.  Health clinics are defined as ambulatory care 
medical facilities that do not provide inpatient services.  Health clinics typically offer primary 
care services and a limited number of specialty care services (DHA, 2019g).  Hospitals are 
defined as facilities that offer both inpatient and outpatient services and a variety of specialty 
care services.  Medical Centers are defined as large hospitals that offer both inpatient and 
outpatient care, as well as a combination of specialty and subspecialty care services.  Medical 
Centers typically operate Level 1 Trauma Centers that are authorized to provide emergency care 
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for non-military patients in their respective communities.  Due to the diversity of specialty care 
provided, Medical Centers also host Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs and medical 
research (DHA, 2019g).   
Key Distinctions Between the MHS and the Private Sector 
Several characteristics of the MHS distinguish it from other health systems in the United 
States.  Terry Adirim (2019) noted, the MHS “is more akin to a single payer than to the 
fragmented civilian sector system [in the United States]” (p. 1270).  Due to this distinction, the 
MHS is not bound by the same market forces that drive strategy in civilian healthcare 
organizations.  Instead of attempting to gain market share and increase revenues, military 
organizations survive by seeking efficiencies that drive down costs to the federal government 
and increase value to taxpayers (Adirim, 2019).  This is one of the drivers for consolidation 
efforts, including the creation of the DHA (GAO, 2018; Smith et al., 2017).   
In addition to lowering costs, MHS organizations are also driven to avoid low-value 
healthcare services.  Since MHS providers are not paid through fee-for-service arrangements, 
there is less incentive to order unnecessary diagnostic tests, conduct nonessential follow-up 
visits, or prescribe clinically inappropriate care such as antibiotics for viral infections.  There is 
evidence that patterns of low-value care differ between the MHS and private sector 
counterparts.  For example, a comparative study between MHS providers and purchased care 
(civilian) providers found that private sector providers prescribe expensive, low-value care more 
often than MHS providers (Koehlmoos et al., 2019).  Another study on defensive medicine also 
found that patients in military healthcare facilities receive less intensive medical services with 
no measurable adverse impact on outcomes (Frakes & Gruber, 2019).   
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As discussed, the primary mission of the MHS also differs markedly from commercial 
counterparts.  While most civilian healthcare organizations (e.g., for-profit and not-for profit 
community hospitals) provide healthcare services to general patient populations or to specific 
types of patients, such as children, veterans, women, or cancer patients (Bolon, 2005), military 
healthcare organizations have the added role of providing medical support for military 
operations.  To support these unique requirements, MHS organizations often adopt strategies 
that would not be tenable in typical civilian healthcare facilities.  For example, the DOD 
maintains hospitals in isolated areas with low populations.  These are often located near some of 
the largest defense training areas such as the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California; 
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California; and the Joint 
Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana.  Maintaining hospitals in such deeply rural 
areas would not be financially viable for most civilian hospitals without a government or charity 
funding source, yet the DOD maintains these facilities because they are required to support 
high-risk training operations and to provide medical services to the remotely stationed 
servicemembers and families.   
Another key distinction for military healthcare is the maintenance of critical services 
that are not available within the local healthcare markets.  For example, many military hospitals 
maintain inpatient services despite a very low daily inpatient census. The average daily inpatient 
census across the MHS for FY 2016 was 37.4 with many facilities falling well below the 
minimal census required to keep the doors open in a civilian facility (Bono, 2017).   
Some scholars have believed that these additional support requirements elevate the costs 
of military healthcare; however, these costs are difficult to quantify and have not historically 
been measured (Adirim, 2019, p. 1270).  Though it may be difficult to conduct straightforward 
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comparisons between military and civilian healthcare costs (GAO, 2018a), there are some 
requirements specific to military healthcare organizations that are easily measurable.  For 
example, DOD (2016) regulations require every servicemember to undergo an annual physical 
assessment (DODI 6200.06), which drives up yearly healthcare utilization rates by minimum of 
one encounter per servicemember per year.  Additional health assessments are also required 
before and after deployments, in addition to care provided for any deployment-related health 
conditions.  These assessments come with measurable costs that are unique to military 
healthcare organizations.   
Other financial impacts, such as the influence of military requirements on provider 
turnover and discontinuity of care, are less easily quantified and measured.  The financial 
consequences of staff turnover in civilian healthcare organizations are well documented in the 
existing literature (Gray, Phillips, & Normand, 1996; C. B. Jones, 2005; Waldman, Kelly, 
Arora, & Smith, 2010).  These effects may be exacerbated in MHS facilities because military-
specific requirements for active duty medical staff (e.g., training, deployments and permanent 
reassignments) add to the organizational stressors associated with the typical drivers of 
turnover.  Deployed staff are usually replaced by temporary backfills from the U.S. Reserves or 
contracted civilian providers, although it is common for facilities to experience periods of 
underlap during these transitions (GAO, 2018a).   
In addition to deployments, military facilities are also impacted by the frequent 
reassignment of military servicemembers.  On average, military servicemembers are reassigned 
to a different geographic location at least once every 36 months, although moves can be more 
frequent due to requirements for professional development, training, and deployments (Vergun, 
2013).  Frequent moves by active duty military members can also have a direct impact on non-
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military (civilian) employees in healthcare facilities.  Many government service employees are 
family members of active duty personnel and move just as frequently as their military spouses.   
Research has shown that these military-specific disruptions impact healthcare delivery in 
MHS facilities.  For example, a study of military physicians preparing for deployment found 
that their patients experienced a 15-30% increase in specialist visits and a 15-18% increase in 
emergency room visits during the deployment and pre-deployment periods (Schwab, 2018).  
These changes were attributable to discontinuity of care as their physicians prepared for an 
extended departure.  Another study of military hospitals from 2001 to 2006 found that hospital 
productivity was negatively impacted by support requirements for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Childress, 2013).  These studies highlight the fact that readiness mission of the 
MHS is linked to financial and performance consequences for hospitals that add to the 
complexity of comparisons to civilian healthcare organizations.  
Cost, Quality, and Access in the MHS 
Like many civilian healthcare organizations, cost, quality, and access are three of the 
biggest strategic concerns in the MHS.  Cost has become increasingly important to 
Congressional, DOD, and MHS leaders over the last 20 years due to ballooning defense 
expenditures on healthcare.  From 2001-2017, the MHS experienced a 217% increase in costs, 
prompting a call for intervention from the GAO (2017).  From 2001 to 2010, spending on 
healthcare rose across the DOD by an average of 11.6% annually, which was significantly 
higher than the average 6.4% increase in healthcare spending across the United States for the 
same time period (Adirim, 2019; CMS, 2019c).  Throughout the last 20 years, healthcare costs 
have consumed an average of 8-10% of the total annual DOD budget (Mendez, 2018a).   
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These increases are attributable to several factors.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
created an increased demand for healthcare services among servicemembers.  Additionally, the 
costs associated with resourcing an agile medical force to support combat operations also places 
a strain on healthcare funding.  Another factor is the expansion of healthcare benefits in the 
TRICARE program.  Starting in 2001, Congress initiated the TRICARE for Life program that 
provided secondary insurance coverage for over 2 million Medicare-eligible military retirees 
and their dependents (DHA, 2018b).  A generous new pharmacy benefit also expanded 
prescription drug coverage for this same population of Medicare-eligible military retirees 
(Adirim, 2019; DHA, 2018b).  Though these new benefits are resourced through allocations of 
money set aside for retiree healthcare, they are often included in estimates of military healthcare 
spending. 
Healthcare quality in the MHS is another critical concern for Congress, DOD, and MHS 
leaders.  As noted, active duty servicemembers are required to maintain a high level of physical 
health (i.e., medical readiness) in order to perform military duties in demanding environments.  
The healthcare services that ill or injured soldiers receive have the potential to impact the 
amount of time they are available to perform their military duties.  Since poor quality healthcare 
can impact the overall readiness of the U.S. military force, the quality of military healthcare has 
been identified as a national defense priority (Pellerin, 2017).   
Congress has closely monitored healthcare quality in the MHS over the last 20 years.  
Media attention regarding conditions at the Walter Reed Hospital (NPR.org, 2011; Priest & 
Hull, 2007), allegations of medical errors (LaFraniere & Lehran, 2014a, 2014b), complaints 
about access to care (Kime, 2014), and organizational changes across the MHS prompted the 
Secretary of Defense to order a 90-day review of quality, access, and safety across the MHS in 
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2014.  This comprehensive study, known as the MHS Review, provides the basis for a 
considerable amount of literature that has been published on military healthcare in the last 5 
years.  The MHS Review commissioned a panel of military and non-DOD healthcare experts 
who compared the performance of the MHS to civilian counterparts using nationally recognized 
performance benchmarks.  Overall, the MHS Review found that the MHS provides high quality, 
safe, and timely care that is comparable to the civilian sector.  However, the review also noted  
wide performance variability, with the MHS performing better than national benchmarks in 
some areas and below national benchmarks in others (DOD, 2014). This was one of many 
factors that laid the foundation for ongoing quality improvement efforts across the MHS.  These 
efforts emphasize reducing variation and transitioning into high reliability organizations with 
respect to safety and quality.   
Access to care is another major concern for MHS leaders.  The IOM (1993) defined 
access to care as “the timely use of personal healthcare services to achieve the best health 
outcomes” (p. 4).  Although no universal definition of timely access to care has been established 
nationally, the access standards for the MHS are codified by law (32 C.F.R. §199.17(p)(5) - 
TRICARE program, n.d.).  Access standards for military beneficiaries include (32 C.F.R. 
§199.17(p)(5) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2014): 
1. No more than 30-minute drive time for primary care 
2. Specialty care appointments available within 4 weeks 
3. Routine medical appointments available within 1 week 
4. Wait time for urgent care appointments will not exceed 24 hours 
5. Emergency room access available 24 hours per day/7 days per week 
6. No more than 60-minute drive time for specialty care appointments 
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7. Office wait times not to exceed 30 minutes unless emergency care is being rendered 
to another patient 
These access standards are met through a combination of healthcare services provided in 
the direct and purchased care systems.  The purchased care component serves as a safety net 
when access to care standards cannot be met through the direct care system or when military 
facilities are over capacity (32 C.F.R. §199.17(p)(5) - TRICARE program, n.d.; DOD, 2014).  
Access to care is monitored and managed at each MTF through designated Group Practice 
Managers (Air Force) or Access to Care managers (DHA, Army, and Navy; DOD, 2014).  The 
role of these access managers is to monitor access, communicate with clinic leaders, and 
coordinate care through the purchased care system when access standards cannot be met in 
military facilities.   
The 2014 MHS Review found that, on average, the MHS meets or exceeds its own 
access to care benchmarks (DOD, 2014).  According to this review, the average wait time for 
specialty care appointments in the direct care system is 12.4 days, while the average wait for 
urgent (non-emergency) appointments is less than 24 hours in most facilities.  However, the 
MHS Review panel also noted that there is high variability among MTFs regarding compliance 
with access-to-care mandates (DOD, 2014).  The cause of this variability has not been studied 
empirically, but operational requirements for military medical staff may be one factor.  Short-
term deployments of military providers often disproportionately affect hospitals located in close 
proximity to deploying combat units and are often difficult for MTF leaders to program into 
long-term manpower planning.  According to the GAO (2018a), MTFs often struggle to fill 
positions vacated by deployed medical staff due to the length of the federal and civilian hiring 
process, uncompetitive wages for federal civilians and contractors, and federal hiring freezes.   
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When MTFs are unable to meet access to care requirements in the direct care system, 
they rely on the purchased care system to supplement access.  Since participation in the 
TRICARE program is voluntary for contracted civilian providers, this safety net does not 
always guarantee that there will be enough participation among local providers to meet access 
to care standards with purchased care.  Studies have shown that the acceptance rate for 
TRICARE insurance among primary care providers (67%) is less than acceptance rate for 
private insurance (95%) and Medicare (86%) and is comparable to Medicaid (65%; Ben-
Shalom, Schone, & Bannick, 2019; Boukus, Cassil, & O’Malley, 2009).  These low acceptance 
rates have caused TRICARE beneficiaries to report problems with access to care in select 
markets (Ben-Shalom et al., 2019; GAO, 2006, 2011, 2013).  
In addition to monitoring access to care using objective metrics such as the average wait 
time for appointments, the MHS also monitors access to care using subjective measures such as 
satisfaction surveys.  Assessment of these two types of measures often produce conflicting 
findings in relation to access.  For example, the MHS Review noted a discrepancy between 
documented MTF compliance with access-to-care standards and patients’ reported satisfaction 
with timely access to care (DOD, 2014).  Another study found that TRICARE-insured family 
members report access to care that is similar to uninsured or publicly insured populations 
(Seshadri, Strane, Matone, Ruedisueli, & Rubin, 2019).  The cause of these discrepancies 
between self-reported access and objective measures of access has not yet been empirically 
determined, although low reimbursement rates and low acceptance rates for TRICARE 
insurance in the purchased care component may be one factor (Ben-Shalom et al., 2019; GAO, 
2006, 2011, 2013).   
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Since Congress and MHS leaders are accountable to the American public for the value 
of military healthcare services delivered through taxpayer funding, matters related to cost and 
quality have generated congressional attention over the last 20 years.  Many of these concerns 
prompted lawmakers and military leaders to seek policies aimed at reducing costs and 
increasing healthcare quality.  This provided the impetus for the PBB programs that the 
MEDCOM has experimented with over the past 15 years.  Though the Army’s PBB programs 
included performance measures for cost, quality and access, this study focuses specifically on 
the quality measures.   
Summary 
The unique demands of the MHS required a tailored approach for addressing 
performance that differed from the traditional pay for performance approaches that were 
popular among civilian hospitals in the 2000s and beyond.  Because the MHS operates with a 
federated governance structure and funding resources are shared between facilities, traditional 
pay for performance approaches are less appropriate in this context.  MHS healthcare facilities 
do not have financial relationships with multiple insurers, nor do they operate with a traditional 
business model in which more money can be earned through greater efficiency, productivity, 
marketing, or patient volume.  Instead, PBB is a better approach because healthcare facilities are 
resourced through a finite federal budget that is allocated through a top-down approach.  
Performance improvement can be encouraged in this context by including performance 
thresholds in the budgeting process for each facility, such that higher performing facilities are 
rewarded with greater funding.  Though this study does not provide a direct comparison to pay 
for performance, it examines PBB to determine if it has similar impacts on quality performance 
that are observed with traditional pay for performance programs.   
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Evolution of PBB in U.S. Army Healthcare Facilities 
In 2004, a select group of Army hospitals in the southeast region of the United States 
were chosen to participate in pilot program testing PBB.  There were several drivers for this 
transition, but the main catalyst for the early program was cost control.  As described above, 
mounting fiscal pressures from increased healthcare costs and the impacts of the dual wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan prompted Army leaders to seek alternatives to the traditional method of 
building treatment facility budgets.  In light of these fiscal pressures, MEDCOM initiated 
sweeping changes to its funding model for all of its facilities starting in 2006.  This program, 
known as the Performance-Based Adjustment Model (PBAM), was a mandatory Army-wide 
program intended to address concerns over unsustainable healthcare costs, improve 
accountability, and improve the quality of healthcare services (Griffith, 2013; West et al., 2010) 
by making a portion of MTF funding contingent upon performance (i.e., PBB).   
Prior to 2006, Army hospitals were funded in the traditional manner: Congress 
appropriated funds to the DHP, which were then disbursed to each of the three services and 
allocated to the MTFs through the services’ medical departments.  Under this arrangement, 
Army MTFs typically received “last year’s budget plus inflation” (West & Cronk, 2011, p. 32) 
at the beginning of each FY.  This allocation method is associated with some undesirable effects 
(Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, & West, 2007; West et al., 2010).  Many scholars have argued that 
the annual U.S. fiscal cycle does little to support performance and long-term investment.  
Budget lapsing refers to a typical feature of government programs in which unspent funds do 
not carry over from one budget cycle to the next (Balakrishnan et al., 2007; Zimmerman, 2003).  
The threat of having unspent funds removed from future budgets or transferred to other 
organizations creates a disincentive for public managers to improve efficiency or implement 
 
74 
 
cost-saving techniques (McNab & Melese, 2003).  As a result, managers often engage in a 
counterproductive method of saving and dissaving throughout the FY.   
Balakrishnan et al. (2007) documented this spending pattern in a 5-year study of 31 
Army hospitals.  They found evidence that administrators were managing uncertainty by 
maintaining a reserve of funds throughout the year, only to be expended in a large outflow at the 
end of the FY.  Not only was this funding method and its resultant spending patterns inefficient, 
it did little to incentivize more constructive pursuits, such as investment in quality improvement 
or enhanced productivity.  West et al. (2010) argued that the traditional funding model did little 
to hold administrators accountable for the output of their organizations.  When administrators 
and managers expect their funding levels to remain relatively stable regardless of their 
performance or productivity, there is little incentive to increase output or improve quality.  
Because the primary performance indicator for administrators and managers is staying within 
budget, there is little fiscal incentive to increase output or improve quality under the traditional 
funding model. 
The PBAM was designed to address these concerns by “aligning hospital- and 
department-level managers’ incentives with both funding and MEDCOM’s strategic goals” 
(West et al., 2010, p. 53).  PBAM reversed the existing incentive structure by rewarding 
managers for efficiency, productivity, and quality improvement rather than penalizing 
departments for returning unused funds.  Even though MEDCOM could not change the way that 
funds were disbursed from Congress and the DOD, PBAM allowed high-level leaders to adjust 
how the funds were disbursed across the system (West et al., 2010, p. 53).  This enabled 
MEDCOM to implement a new incentive structure that incorporated performance information 
in budget decisions across Army hospitals.   
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Based on the outputs versus outcomes paradigm of PBB  that was previously described 
(M. S. DeVries & Nemec, 2019), the PBAM program can be categorized as a hybrid of both of 
these goals.  It was designed to resource hospitals based on a combination of productivity 
measures (outputs) and quality measures (outcomes; see Figure 4).  
   
Figure 4. Performance-based resourcing of U.S. Army hospitals under PBAM and IRIS 
programs.  Adapted from “Performance-Based Adjustment Model Overview” presentation by 
Robert Griffith on March 26, 2013 at the HFMA 2013 Texas State Conference.   
 
 
Under the PBAM program, MEDCOM resourced MTFs at the beginning of the FY 
based on productivity data that was determined by workload and efficiency measures (Rheney, 
2007).  Throughout the year, adjustments (decrements and bonuses) were applied to facility-
level funding based on performance in three areas: capacity (workload and efficiency), 
administrative performance (i.e., coding accuracy, cost accounting, staffing management) and 
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quality (i.e., evidence-based practice, patient satisfaction).  Though performance adjustments 
were calculated and reported monthly, actual budget adjustments typically occurred three to 
four times per year (Griffith, 2013, 2019).  This encouraged administrators to closely monitor 
performance on a monthly basis in order to forecast funding levels throughout the year. 
PBAM performance adjustments represented a small portion of the overall MTF budget; 
no more than 5% of the total budget was at risk for adjustment.  On average, actual bonuses 
(and penalties) typically added up to approximately 3% of the budget (Griffith, 2019).  Despite 
the small size of the incentive, there was initial evidence suggesting a link to increased 
performance.  A pilot study conducted with six Army healthcare facilities in the southeast 
region of the United States provided an initial proof of concept.  This model was then endorsed 
by the Army Surgeon General and rolled out to the rest of the Army in 2006.  After 
implementing PBAM, Army facilities across MEDCOM realized a 13.9% increase in total 
output, a 3.3% gain in provider efficiency, and a 15% gain in coding accuracy (West et al., 
2010).  Initial gains were also documented for quality measures such as patient satisfaction and 
population health screening (Griffith, 2013; Waymire & West, 2010).  For example, prior to 
2006, Army facilities significantly underperformed on measures in the HEDIS relative to Air 
Force and Navy peers.  By 2009, this trend reversed and Army outperformed Navy and Air 
Force facilities on the same measures (Griffith, 2013).   
In 2014, the U.S. Army transitioned from PBAM to another PBB program known as the 
Integrated Resource and Incentive System (IRIS).  The purpose of IRIS was to “align funding & 
incentives in order to enhance MTF value production” (Dunning, 2014, Slide 6).  This program 
was very similar to PBAM, except that it integrated the workload-based resourcing system with 
the performance-based incentive system (Griffith, 2019). The key distinction between the IRIS 
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and PBAM programs was the introduction of a subcapitation model for primary care at each 
facility.   
Under the new IRIS model, Army hospitals were funded based a per member per month 
capitated rate that was directly linked to the number of patients enrolled to their facilities.  
Funding levels at each facility were projected at the beginning of each FY based on the 
anticipated enrollment of patients at that facility.  Each facility had the opportunity for base 
funding levels to increase or decrease throughout the year based on enrollment changes and 
performance on pre-established metrics.  The IRIS program promoted even greater involvement 
of administrators and managers at each facility because leaders were required to submit a 
performance plan at the beginning of each FY.  These changes also required leaders to focus on 
enrollment rather than RVU production alone in order to increase base funding levels (Dunning, 
2014).  This new structure emphasized high-value healthcare services that were intended to 
keep patients healthier and reduce the need for future preventable healthcare services.  This 
strategy also reduced the incentive to deliver low-value healthcare services that were not 
evidence-based. 
The incentive structure for quality was essentially the same for both the PBAM and IRIS 
programs.  Although the incentive size and the number of performance measures shifted from 
year to year, both programs rewarded quality by incorporating small, organization-level budget 
adjustments (bonuses or penalties) based on performance over a rolling 12-month period.  
Under both programs, a small portion of each facility’s overall budget was placed “at risk” 
contingent upon quality performance.  From 2006-2018, quality metrics were added, dropped 
and revised annually for both the IRIS and PBAM programs (see Table 1 for the yearly 
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evolution of metrics from 2006-2018), giving Army leaders the ability to align incentives with 
changing strategic priorities (Griffith, 2013, 2019).  
Table 1 
Incentivized Quality Measures Under PBAM and IRIS, 2004-2019  
Measure Year Measure source Definition 
Breast cancer 
screening 
2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible enrollees (age 42-69) with 
screening mammography within the last 24 
months.   
Cervical 
cancer 
screening 
2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible enrollees (age 24-64) with 
an appropriate cervical cancer screening in the 
past 36 months.  
Diabetes-A1C 
Screening 
2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percentage of eligible patients with diabetes 
who have had A1C testing within the past 12 
months.  
Diabetes-A1C 
Control 
2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible patients with diabetes with 
HbA1C levels at nine or below within the last 
year.  
Diabetes-LDL 
Control 
2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible patients diagnosed with 
diabetes who have an LDL level below 
100mg/dl within the last year.  
Asthma Care 2004/2006* NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible enrollees (age 5-56) with 
persistent asthma who are prescribed 
medications considered acceptable as a primary 
therapy for the long-term control of asthma.  
Colorectal 
cancer 
screening 
2006 NCQA/HEDIS Percent of eligible enrollees, age 50-80, who 
have had appropriate colorectal cancer 
screening. Screening intervals vary according 
to the method of screening.  
Chlamydia 
screening 
2009 NCQA/HEDIS Percent of enrolled active duty women, age 16-
25, who have received a chlamydia screening 
within past 12 months.   
Pneumonia 
vaccination 
status 
2009 Managed Care 
Organization 
Accreditation 
Benchmarks and 
Thresholds  
Percent of eligible enrollees 65 years older who 
have received one or more pneumococcal 
vaccinations. 
Patient 
satisfaction 
(APLSS) 
2009 Army 
MEDCOM 
Percent of patient satisfaction surveys returned 
with a rating of 4 or 5 (out of 5) on Question 
21, the “overall satisfaction” item.    
Inpatient 
professional 
service rounds 
2009 Army 
MEDCOM 
Number of physician-associated inpatient 
episodes of care meeting documentation 
standards (based on E & M codes). 
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Measure Year Measure source Definition 
Antibiotics 
w/in 1 hour of 
surgery 
2010 Joint 
Commission/ 
ORYX 
Number of surgical patients with prophylactic 
antibiotics initiated within 1 hour prior to 
surgical incision (2 hours if receiving 
vancomycin).  
Children’s 
asthma care: 
Home 
management 
plan of care  
2010 Joint 
Commission/ 
ORYX 
Percentage of cases that have received the 
appropriate treatment identified to provide the 
best outcome for the patient. 
Patient 
satisfaction 
w/access 
2010 DHA Number of surveys returned with a 4 or 5 rating 
(out of 5) on Questions 9, 11, and 13 of the 
APLSS Survey (items pertaining to satisfaction 
with access).    
PCM 
continuity 
2011 DHA Number of primary care encounters in which 
the patient saw his or her assigned Primary 
Care Manager.  
Documented 
Body Mass 
Index in health 
record  
2011 DHA The percentage of enrollees with a calculable 
BMI in medical record. 
Well child 
visits (6 in 15 
mos.)  
2012 NCQA/HEDIS HEDIS criteria for percent of eligible 
population with six or more well child visits in 
the first 15 months of life. 
Inpatient 
satisfaction 
2012 DHA Percentage of patients satisfied with MTF 
provided care for TRISS Question 20.  
Preventable 
admissions 
2014 AHRQ Number of admissions meeting AHRQ 
definitions for “potentially preventable.”  
Readmissions 2014 CMS/ 
Partnership for 
Patients 
Penalty per Re-Admission for Three Focus 
Areas: Acute myocardial infarction, heart 
failure, and pneumonia.  Date of readmission, 
for the same diagnosis is within 30 days of 
discharge date. 
Tobacco use 2014 DHA The number of enrollees without tobacco use in 
the previous 12 months.  
Healthy 
weight 
2014 DHA Number of enrollees 24 months and older that 
had a Healthy Weight measured in a Primary 
Care Clinic within the prior 12 months using 
CDC standards.  
Tobacco use 2015 DHA Number of enrollees 18 years or older who 
report that they do not use tobacco.  
Low back pain 2016 NCQA/HEDIS Percent of enrollees aged 18-50 with a primary 
diagnosis of low back pain who did not have an 
imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan) 
within 28 days of diagnosis.  
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Measure Year Measure source Definition 
PTSD 
depression 
treatment 
dosage 
2016 DHA Number of patients initially diagnosed with 
PTSD or Major Depressive Disorder who met 
the requirement of initial visit plus three or 
more follow-up visits within the first 90 days 
after diagnosis.  
PTSD 
depression 
treatment 
outcome  
2016 DHA Number of PTSD and depression episodes of 
care with either a clinical response or full 
remission. 
Exclusive 
breastfeeding 
2016 Joint 
Commission 
Overall rate of newborns that were exclusively 
fed breast milk during the entire 
hospitalization.  
Body Mass 
Index outcome  
2016 DHA Number over enrollees with a BMI > 25 who 
have at least three primary care visits and 
achieve 1.0% BMI reduction per person. 
All cases 
morbidity 
index 
2017 (NSQIP) / 
American 
College of 
Surgeons 
Measures the quality of surgical care using a 
case-mix adjusted, risk-adjusted, and outcomes-
based odds ratio to compare actual performance 
to expected performance.  
CLABSI  2017 CDC NHSN Risk-adjusted rate ratio of CLABSI in MTF 
ICUs compared to other participating ICUs in 
the CDC NHSN Program.  
Behavioral 
health 
outcomes 
2017 DHA Percent of patients with clinically significant 
improvement in three areas: depression, PTSD, 
anxiety disorder. Note: Extension of 2016 
outcome metric. 
Behavioral 
health provider 
data input 
2017 DHA Rate of provider input into the Behavioral 
Health Data Portal. 
Medical 
management 
for high 
utilizers  
2017 DHA Number of high utilizing patients (10 or more 
primary care encounters in 12 months) 
receiving appropriate case management. 
Foreign body 
retention 
2017 DHA Number of retained object events. A retained 
object is defined as a surgical object that is 
accidently left in the patient during a procedure. 
Vaginal 
delivery with 
shoulder 
dystocia rate   
2017 National 
Perinatal 
Information 
Center 
Vaginal delivery with shoulder dystocia rate - 
linked to inborn ≥ 2500g with birth trauma. 
Postpartum 
hemorrhage 
rate  
2017 National 
Perinatal 
Information 
Center  
Rate of women who experienced postpartum 
hemorrhage ≥ 1,000 ml. 
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Measure Year Measure source Definition 
Appropriate 
testing for 
children with 
pharyngitis 
2017 NCQA/HEDIS Assesses children 2-18 years of age who were 
diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed an 
antibiotic, and received a group A 
streptococcus test for the episode. A higher rate 
represents better performance (i.e., appropriate 
testing).  
Appropriate 
treatment for 
children with 
upper-
respiratory 
infection 
(URI)  
2017 NCQA/HEDIS Children 3 months to 18 years of age who were 
given a diagnosis of URI and were not 
dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher 
rate indicates appropriate treatment of children 
with URI (i.e., the proportion for whom 
antibiotics were not prescribed). 
Follow-up 
after 
hospitalization 
for mental 
illness 
 
 
2017 
NCQA/HEDIS Adult and children 6 years of age and older 
who were hospitalized for treatment of selected 
mental health disorders and received follow-up 
within 7 days of discharge and within 30 days 
of discharge. 
Patient 
Satisfaction-
Joint 
Outpatient 
Experience 
Survey 
2017 DHA Patient satisfaction incentive transitioned from 
APLSS to JOES survey.  Question 22, overall 
satisfaction, was incentivized. 
Note. LDL = low density lipoproteins. Information compiled from PBAM and IRIS Handbooks, years 
2006-2017, with supplements from briefing slides 2004-2017. 
1 Some Army facilities participated in a pilot study of PBAM and started to be incentivized in 2004.  
Non-pilot sites started these incentives when PBAM was rolled out to all Army facilities in 2006. 
 
The fee-for-service payments were intended to cover medical costs for patients not 
enrolled to the facility (such as servicemembers on short-term training assignments or in 
transition between permanent assignments).  The supplemental funds covered the costs of 
designated special programs.  The proportion of each facility’s budget affected by supplemental 
funds varied from year to year based on several factors, such as the strategic priorities of the 
Army, and initiation of congressionally funded special projects.  Due to the annual variation in 
special programs, enrollment, and funding at each facility, a full economic analysis of PBB in 
Army healthcare facilities is beyond the scope of this analysis.   
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To date, researchers have not conducted any rigorous studies to evaluate the effects of 
the Army’s PBB programs on quality improvement.  Analysts have conducted a small number 
of unpublished internal studies on performance improvement, but these were small in scope and 
did not include a comparison group.  One unpublished study on the PBAM program did include 
a comparison to Navy and Air Force, but this study compared service-level performance and did 
not provide analysis to determine if service-level pre/post differences in performance were 
statistically significant.  It remains unclear what effects the incentives in PBAM and IRIS had 
on the quality improvement in Army hospitals, if any. 
Summary 
This chapter began with an overview of the history, definitions, and research on pay for 
performance.  This literature review demonstrates that the drive to improve the safety and 
quality of healthcare services in the United States has increased over the past 20 years.  Pay for 
performance emerged over that period, but the research evidence supporting its use has yielded 
mixed findings.  Some researchers have hypothesized that this heterogeneity in results may be 
due to patient factors, differences in care settings, and heterogeneity in program design features.  
Research findings for each of these factors was discussed.  Overall, the literature on pay for 
performance suggests that it usually does not result in significant performance improvement.  
When performance does improve in conjunction with pay for performance programs, it is 
usually for process measures rather than patient outcomes, and those improvements tend to 
diminish or disappear over time.   
This chapter also provided an overview of PBB and presented arguments for why it 
should be considered a special case of pay for performance that pertains to government 
programs.  Rigorous research on PBB is limited, but the existing literature suggests that 
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programs often fail to achieve their intended results.  The most commonly cited reason for the 
failure of PBB programs is an inability to definitively link program performance to budget 
decisions.  Unlike private sector organizations whose performance is primarily driven by market 
forces, public program resourcing is determined through political processes that may attenuate 
the link between program performance and program funding.   
After PBB and its links to pay for performance, this chapter transitioned into an 
overview of the U.S. Army’s PBB program in its healthcare facilities.  Background information 
about the MHS was provided to establish the context for the emergence of the Army’s PBB 
programs.  Though PBB has been widely implemented in U.S. Army healthcare facilities, there 
is no experimental or comparative research to determine if it works in the Army or in other 
contexts.  
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Introduction 
In this chapter, the basic tenets of RDT are reviewed.  RDT concepts are then discussed 
in terms of their applicability to the MHS and the Army’s adoption of PBB programs.  Next, a 
conceptual model is presented that demonstrates how RDT can be used to predict the impact of 
PBB on quality performance in Army hospitals.  The final section of this chapter presents 
hypotheses using the conceptual model and RDT as its basis.   
Conceptual Framework 
This study employs the conceptual framework of RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to 
examine the impact of PBB on quality metrics in U.S. Army medical facilities.  The RDT 
framework has been used extensively in healthcare research related to financial incentives 
(Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014) and can therefore be useful in guiding this study on the 
effects of PBB incentives in military healthcare facilities.   
According to RDT, organizations depend on critical resources from the external 
environment to function and survive.  Organizations must develop strategies to manage or 
reduce dependencies on those external resources critical to survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
According to RDT, external forces in the environment can influence the strategies that 
organizations adopt in order to manage access to critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Three environmental factors affect organizations’ access to critical resources: munificence, 
complexity, and dynamism.  Munificence refers to the overall supply and accessibility of 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
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resources in the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Environmental complexity and 
dynamism are both related to the overall degree of uncertainty in the market (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Yeager, Savage, Ginter, & Beitsch, 2014).  Complexity refers to factors that 
make strategic decision-making and actions more difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Dynamism refers to the level of change internal and external to the organization (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). 
Most health services research studies that used RDT have examined private sector 
healthcare organizations such as hospitals, long-term care facilities (nursing homes and nursing 
subacute facilities), and medical practices (Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014).  Though DOD 
healthcare organizations do not face the same environmental market pressures as private sector 
healthcare organizations, they still rely on resources in their environment to survive.  Due to this 
dependency, the predicted relationships between organizations and their resource environment 
are also applicable to DOD healthcare organizations.  The following section discusses key 
concepts in RDT and outlines how those concepts can be applied to the MHS resource 
environment to predict changes in hospital performance. 
Application of RDT Concepts to the MHS 
Healthcare studies applying the RDT framework define critical resources in many ways, 
although financial resources are the most common (Fareed & Mick, 2011).  Other types of 
resources include reputation, prestige, status, and knowledge (Fareed & Mick, 2011).  For the 
present study, the critical resource is financial.  It is operationalized as the overall DHP budget 
allocation for military healthcare facilities, which is comprised of the portion of the U.S. 
National Defense budget that is set aside to cover the costs associated with delivering in-house 
healthcare within military health facilities (Mendez, 2018a).   
 
86 
 
Most healthcare studies investigate the impact of elements in the external resource 
environment on a dependent variable related to performance or organizational strategy (Yeager, 
Savage, et al., 2014).  Examples of organizational strategies in the healthcare literature include 
participation in managed care (Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014; Zinn, Proenca, & Rosko, 1997), 
adoption of electronic medical records (Kazley & Ozcan, 2007; Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014), 
admission of obese nursing home residents (Zhang, Li, & Temkin-Greener, 2013), participation 
in the subacute care market (Weech-Maldonado, Qaseem, & Mkanta, 2009), adoption service or 
quality innovations (Banaszak-Holl, Zinn, & Mor, 1996; Fareed & Mick, 2011; Zinn, Weech, & 
Brannon, 1998), or some dimension of organizational performance (Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli, 
2010; Yeager, Savage, et al., 2014; Zinn, 1994).  For U.S. Army healthcare facilities that 
participated in the PBAM (2006-2013) and IRIS (2014-present) PBB programs, the 
organizational strategies refer to the performance improvement actions that Army healthcare 
facilities undertake to obtain bonuses or avoid penalties.   
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) described munificence in terms of the availability of critical 
resources in the environment.  Limitations on critical resources in the environment can create 
uncertainty, which shapes the behavior of organizations in response to resource austerity 
(Fareed & Mick, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In the context of PBB, fiscal climate may 
impact the degree to which performance measurement is used for resource decisions (Jordan & 
Hackbart, 1999; Lauth, 1985; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). In periods of fiscal stress, 
across-the-board cuts are more likely to be used regardless of program performance (Jordan & 
Hackbart, 1999; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993).  This reduces the incentive for 
organizations to improve performance and also reduces the availability of resources for 
organizations to devote to performance improvement efforts.  In the context of military 
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healthcare, a significant determinant of environmental munificence is the size of the DHP 
budget.  The DHP budget impacts all military healthcare facilities and can fluctuate annually 
based on Congressional allocation through the NDAA (Mendez, 2018a; U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Armed Services, 2017; DOD, 2018a).  The DHP budget allocation shapes each 
medical facility’s fiscal environment and affects the financial resources that are available for all 
operations, including quality improvement activities.  During periods of fiscal austerity, 
facilities may have fewer resources available for performance improvement.  
Any factor that makes a situation more intricate or complicated increases its level of 
complexity.  In health services research, complexity has been operationalized as market 
competition among healthcare organizations (Banaszak-Holl et al., 1996; Hsieh et al., 2010; 
Kazley & Ozcan, 2007; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2009; Zinn et al., 1997; Zinn et al., 1998) 
because market competition increases the information uncertainty that decision-makers use to 
select organizational strategy in response to environmental variables (Yeager, Menachemi, et 
al., 2014, p. 52).  The present study defines complexity in terms of patient demographic mix and 
acuity because these variables have the potential to complicate quality performance efforts.   
For example, a facility with a higher population of elderly patients may be at greater risk 
for adverse health outcomes that can affect a facility’s quality performance (Green, Passman, & 
Wintfield, 1991; Iezzoni, 2003).  Patient age has also been found to be a predictor of 
satisfaction on military-sponsored patient satisfaction surveys (Mangelsdorff & Finstuen, 2003).  
Thus, facilities with a younger patient population may face more difficulty in achieving higher 
patient satisfaction score relative to peers.  Complexity of healthcare needs in the patient 
population is another factor that may vary from facility to facility and impact organization-level 
quality performance.  For example, during the peak periods of combat operations in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, sick and wounded servicemembers were routed through four major facilities: 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Bethesda Naval Medical Center, Brook Army Medical 
Center, and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (DHA, Wounded Warrior Care Center, n.d.; 
U.S. Army, 2012; U.S. Army Medical Department, 2016).  This concentration of complex 
patients may make it more difficult for certain facilities to achieve higher quality performance 
relative to peer facilities with less vulnerable patients.  Since patient safety is at increased risk 
during care transitions (Coleman, Parry, Chalmers, & Min, 2006; Forster, Murff, Peterson, 
Gandhi, & Bates, 2003), facilities serving higher acuity patients may be more vulnerable to 
adverse outcomes than facilities serving less complex patients requiring fewer care transitions.   
Dynamism relates to the level of change in the resource environment.  Factors that 
create fluctuations in the resource environment increase uncertainty and make it more difficult 
to predict the future and execute an organizational strategy (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014, p. 
52).  The most common operationalization for dynamism in health services research is the 
unemployment rate (Yeager, Menachemi, et al., 2014), but it has also been operationalized in 
terms of number of managed care contracts (Menachemi, Mazurenko, Kazley, Diana, & Ford, 
2012; Menachemi, Shin, Ford, & Yu, 2011) and proportion of Medicare and Medicaid inpatient 
days (Hsieh et al., 2010).   
In the context of the current study, there are two major sources of dynamism: staff 
discontinuities and government shutdowns.  Staff discontinuities in military facilities are 
common due to the dynamics of military deployments, military training exercises, and 
mandated movement of military servicemembers.  When military staff members within 
hospitals deploy, it can impact staffing levels and create a disruption in continuity of medical 
services for patients (Schwab, 2018).  Deployed staff are typically replaced by temporary 
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backfills from the U.S. Reserves, but it is common for facilities to experience periods of 
underlap during these transitions.  In addition to deployments, military facilities are also 
impacted by the frequent reassignment of military servicemembers.  On average, military 
servicemembers are reassigned to a different geographic location at least once every 36 months, 
although moves can be more frequent due to requirements for professional development, 
training, and deployments (Vergun, 2013).  Frequent moves by active duty military members 
can also have a direct impact on non-military (civilian) employees in healthcare facilities.  
Many government service employees are family members of active duty personnel and move 
just as frequently as their military spouses.  High staff turnover and discontinuities can make it 
more difficult for organizations to execute a consistent performance improvement initiative.  It 
can also cause disruptions in the patient-provider relationship, which can impact patient care 
(Schwab, 2018) and potentially impact quality performance.   
Government shutdowns are another source of dynamism in the military healthcare 
environment.  Government shutdowns contribute to dynamism in military facilities because they 
can temporarily disrupt human and financial resources within a facility.  Government 
shutdowns impacting federal employee pay can sometimes require select civilian employees to 
be furloughed or work without pay (Burwell, 2013).  These furloughs can negatively impact 
staffing levels, strain operations, and make facilities more vulnerable to poor outcomes.  For 
example, low nurse staffing levels have been associated with nurse burnout (Spence Laschinger 
& Leiter, 2006) and poorer patient outcomes (Lang, Hodge, Olson, Romano, & Kravitz, 2004; 
Spence Laschinger & Leiter, 2006).  Shutdowns may also force organizations to prioritize the 
essential tasks of care delivery over performance improvement efforts.  Even when government 
shutdowns are short-lived or are threatened but do not materialize, they can cause disruptions in 
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resources.  Organizations may conserve or curtail nonessential resource expenditures in order to 
manage uncertainty about a future government shutdown.  These resource disruptions can 
potentially impact hospital performance, particularly if resources are shunted from performance 
improvement activities to cover essential healthcare services during periods of shutdown or 
threatened shutdown. 
Conceptual Model 
RDT predicts that when MTF funding is dependent upon quality performance, facilities 
will have a motive to improve performance in order to access more financial resources for that 
facility.  Thus, facilities will enact performance improvement efforts to improve performance 
and manage access to critical financial resources.  The change in quality performance is also 
impacted by characteristics of the resource environment, including munificence, dynamism, and 
complexity.  (see Figure 5 for a depiction of the RDT framework that is applicable to this 
study).   
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Figure 5. Conceptual framework using RDT as its basis. 
 
92 
 
 
Hypotheses 
When financial incentives are contingent upon performance, it creates a motive for 
organizations to focus attention on performance improvement activities (Ocasio, 1997; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978).  Through financial incentives, the entity responsible for establishing the 
performance criteria and disbursing the financial rewards is able to influence the practices and 
priorities of healthcare organizations (Ramanujan & Rousseau, 2006).  In the private sector, 
third-party payers motivate hospitals based on the revenue they provide to those organizations.  
When payers institute pay for performance programs, it creates a motive for healthcare 
providers to improve performance on the measures incentivized by those payers.  Similarly, 
within the MHS, the medical departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force exert influence 
over MTFs in their commands through the resources they provide to those facilities.  When 
MEDCOM instituted its PBB programs (PBAM and IRIS), it sought to motivate Army MTFs to 
improve performance on selected quality measures in order to obtain greater funding levels.  
Because Army hospitals are dependent on DHP funds, RDT predicts that Army facilities will 
adopt performance improvement strategies if funding is contingent upon quality performance.  
In facilities with no PBB programs (e.g., Navy and Air Force MTFs), there is less 
incentive to devote resources to quality improvement because funding levels are not tied to 
performance.  Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
H1: There will be greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics 
in Army healthcare organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to 
military healthcare organizations in other branches that did not participate in 
PBB programs, ceteris paribus. 
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The effects of the PBB programs (PBAM and IRIS) may not be limited to the immediate 
postincentive period.  Though the greatest performance change is expected to occur closest to 
the time in which each specific performance measure became incentivized, the effects may last 
well beyond that time period.  As long as the incentives remains in place, RDT predicts that 
PBB programs will maintain ongoing pressure for facilities to sustain performance.  Facilities 
are expected to maintain performance in order to obtain the highest possible funding levels.  
Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
H2: Quality improvements attributable to PBB programs in PBB facilities will be 
sustained throughout the post period after each metric is incentivized.   
Summary 
RDT predicts that organizations will adopt strategies to help manage access to critical 
resources in the environment.  This chapter established a theoretical framework by drawing on 
RDT to predict the impact of PBB on quality performance in U.S. Army healthcare facilities.  
Two testable hypotheses were proposed based on the theoretical framework.  The next chapter 
outlines this study’s methods and approach, including the research design, study sample, data 
sources, operationalization of variables, analytic methods, and sensitivity analysis.   
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This chapter outlines the research methods used to explore the effects of PBB on quality 
metrics in military healthcare facilities.  The first section describes the research design and the 
rationale behind its use.  The next two sections identify the data sources and study sample, 
followed by a description of how all of the variables were measured and constructed from the 
available data.  The next two sections discuss the empirical methodology and analytic strategies 
used to examine the study’s research questions.  The final section describes the sensitivity 
analyses used to assess the robustness of the empirical results. 
Research Design 
This study is a longitudinal post-hoc analysis of quality performance in military 
healthcare facilities using a quality performance dataset that spans a 15-year time frame.  This 
study aims to assess the impact of PBB on quality performance (Research Question 1) and 
determine how quality performance is sustained over time after the initiation of PBB (Research 
Question 2).   
To test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, this study uses an organization-
level (MTF) difference-in-differences (DID) analysis.  The DID approach is used because it 
enables a quasi-experimental post-hoc analysis of the U.S. Army’s two PBB programs.  The 
credibility of the DID design has been widely established in a variety of studies involving health 
policy analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015).  It is useful in this 
context because it represents the best approach for estimating the potential effect of PBB on 
Chapter 4: Methodology
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quality performance when examining observational data by comparing facilities exposed to 
PBB programs to facilities not exposed to PBB programs before and after program 
implementation.   
The study encompasses two separate analyses for Research Questions 1 and 2, each 
using a slightly different estimation approach.  Research Question 1 (main analysis) examines 
whether the Army’s PBB programs are linked to a change in quality performance, ceteris 
paribus.  This research design employs an approach similar to prior research by R. M. Werner, 
Konetzka, and Polsky (2013) using a DID model to compare Army treatment facilities (subject 
to PBB incentives) to a comparison group comprised of Navy and Air Force treatment facilities 
(that did not employ PBB programs).  For Research Question 1, quality performance is 
compared for both groups in the 1- to 3-year period immediately prior to the implementation of 
PBB incentives.  Quality performance is also compared between both groups up to 5 years after 
the implementation of the PBB programs.  Since each quality measure became incentivized 
through the Army’s PBB programs at different points in time, the pre- and postimplementation 
periods will differ from measure to measure based on when PBB incentives were first offered 
for each measure.  For some performance measures, 5 years of postincentive performance data 
are not yet available.  For these measures, a shorter period of post-PBB performance data is 
included in the analysis.   
In order to assess how performance changed over time in postimplementation period 
(Research Question 2), performance in both the treatment and comparison groups is also 
analyzed for two different postimplementation time periods for those quality metrics with 5 
years of postimplementation data.  The first postimplementation period encompasses the first 10 
quarters (2.5 years) after the PBB incentives were initially offered to the treatment group.  
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Quality performance is also assessed in the second postimplementation period for quarters 11-
20 (2.5-5 years) after PBB incentives were offered to the treatment group.  
Data Sources 
Data for this study are retrieved and merged from a variety of sources to develop a 
dataset that encompasses a wide range of administrative, demographic, and performance 
information about each healthcare facility.  The two primary data sources are the MDR and the 
Carepoint Information Portal.  The MDR is a centralized data repository that receives, archives, 
and validates DHA corporate healthcare data from military healthcare facilities worldwide 
(DHA, 2019f).  It uses standardized data processing methods approved through the DHA 
(2019f) to ensure that health data are collected and managed in a consistent manner across all 
DOD healthcare organizations.  The MDR captures individual, patient-level data about all 
healthcare encounters that occur within the MHS.   
For the current study, de-identified patient-level data was aggregated for each MTF to 
obtain facility-level data on patient demographics, patient acuity, and provider continuity.  
Individual-level data were aggregated using statistical software available on a secure virtual 
server linked to the MDR through the Army’s Person-Data Environment, which is an Army and 
DOD secure business intelligence platform that enables researchers to access unclassified 
information on active duty, reserve, and retired servicemembers and their dependents using an 
extensive transformation process that minimizes the risk of identifying individuals (Vie, 
Griffith, Scheier, Lester, & Seligman, 2013; Vie et al., 2015).  Specific information about the 
construction of these variables is provided in a later section.   
Facility-level performance data are obtained from the Carepoint Information Portal.  
Carepoint is also operated by the DHA and contains facility-level performance data for a wide 
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range of quality performance metrics (DHA, 2019b).  It is the primary platform used by clinical 
leaders at MHS facilities to monitor and track performance trends for improvement initiatives 
and programs such as the Army’s PBAM and IRIS programs.  The measures reported through 
the Carepoint Information Portal are metrics commonly used in healthcare performance 
evaluation in the private sector.  Examples include the HEDIS (NCQA, 2019), ORYX National 
Hospital Quality Measures (The Joint Commission, 2018), the National Perinatal Information 
Center (2019) outcome measures, and the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program 
(American College of Surgeons, 2019).  Data in the Carepoint Information Portal are validated 
through partnerships between the DHA and the healthcare quality agencies that develop the 
measures and manage the data.  For example, the MHS HEDIS data are managed and validated 
through the NCQA and disseminated to clinical leaders at each facility through the Carepoint 
portal.   
Administrative data about the healthcare facilities, such as location, state, market regions 
and bed sizes, are retrieved from the health.mil website.  This website is updated monthly by the 
DHA and is publicly available (DHA, 2020).  Data are merged across all sources using the 
unique Defense Medical Information System identifier (DMIS ID). The DMIS ID numbers are 
four-digit codes attached to all military healthcare facilities.  These codes are the controlling 
standard for facility identification in cost, manpower, and healthcare applications across the 
DOD (DHA, 2020), which makes it possible to accurately merge data across multiple 
information systems.   
Study Sample 
Data for this study are drawn from direct care (i.e., military operated) healthcare 
facilities in the MHS.  As of 2019, the MHS is comprised of a total of 475 health facilities 
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(DHA, 2019e), but 47 are excluded.  Exclusion criteria are established to ensure the 
homogeneity of the sample and reduce the likelihood of confounding influence from variables 
unrelated to the research questions.  Coast Guard clinics and facilities jointly operated by the 
DOD and VHA are excluded from analysis due to significant differences in management 
structure and funding, which would have made them an inappropriate for comparison to 
hospitals affected by PBB.  Navy Operational Force clinics and military Aid Stations are also 
excluded from the sample due to the fact that these clinics are under minimal management by 
the MHS and unlikely to be impacted by funding changes or policies enacted through the MHS.  
Behavioral health clinics and occupational health clinics were excluded because they provide a 
limited scope of services that were largely unrelated to the performance measures examined in 
this study.   
The majority of the 428 facilities in the study sample are located on or around military 
installations in the United States (n = 334) and abroad. The facilities located outside of the 
United States are spread across various countries in Europe (n = 53), Latin America (n = 3), and 
the Pacific region (n = 38).  
Sample healthcare facilities are collectively referred to as Military Treatment Facilities 
or MTFs but are divided into three types: health clinics, hospitals, and medical centers.  Health 
clinics are defined as medical facilities that do not provide inpatient services.  Health clinics 
typically offer primary care and a limited number of specialty care services (DHA, 2019g).  
Hospitals are defined as facilities that offer both inpatient and outpatient services and a variety 
of specialty care services.  Medical centers are defined as large hospitals that offer both 
inpatient and outpatient care, as well as a combination of specialty and subspecialty care 
services.  Medical centers typically operate Level 1 Trauma Centers that are authorized to 
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provide emergency care for non-military patients in their respective communities.  Due to the 
diversity of specialty care provided, medical centers also usually host GME programs and 
medical research (DHA, 2019g).   
The majority of the sample facilities are clinics (n = 377), many of which are 
subordinate to larger healthcare organizations, or parent facilities.  The remaining sample 
facilities offer inpatient services (n = 51) and are comprised of a combination of hospitals (n = 
34) and medical centers (n = 17).  As of 2020, the number of inpatient beds in sample medical 
centers ranges from 47 to 382 with an average of 155.  The number of beds in sample hospitals 
range from 12 to 132 with an average of 59.   
All facilities in the sample are principally operated by one of the three major service 
components (i.e., Army, Navy, or Air Force).  As of 2018, all facilities are aligning under the 
operational control of a single entity, the DHA, although they are still primarily staffed and 
operated through their respective military branches.  Within this study sample, there are 88 Air 
Force facilities, 187 Army facilities, and 153 Navy facilities.  There are also five facilities in the 
sample that are jointly operated by two or more services (referred to as joint facilities) and 132 
facilities operating in MSMs.   
The sample is subdivided into two groups based on inclusion in PBB programs.  The 
intervention group (n = 187) is comprised of Army facilities that participated in PBB programs 
during the study period (2006-2018).  The comparison group (n = 241) is comprised of Navy, 
Air Force, and combined-service facilities that were not included in PBB programs during the 
study period.   
The choice of these particular comparison groups helps to address the potential 
confounding effects commonly arising from post-hoc secondary analyses that do not employ a 
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randomized control design (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015).  The intervention group is 
comprised of Army facilities that were exposed to PBB.  Navy and Air Force hospitals were 
chosen for the comparison group because they are part of the same health system, they serve 
similar patient populations and they are financed through the same funding source (the DHP 
budget).  Facilities in both groups also support U.S. military missions, which means they face 
similar organizational stressors that impact their resource environment (such as rapid 
deployment of military staff and government shutdowns).  Facilities in both groups also have 
similar regulatory environments, since many of the governing regulations and policies are 
implemented at the DOD level and apply to all three services.  Finally, all facilities share a 
common performance management platform, the Carepoint Information Portal (DHA, 2019b).  
These similarities help to reduce validity threats that may arise due to pre-intervention 
differences between the groups that are unrelated to PBB.  Table 2 provides descriptive 
information about the facilities in each group.   
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Table 2  
Description of Facilities in Study Sample 
Variable Facilities 
Location   
  United States  
    East 208 
    West 126 
  Outside U.S.   
    Europe 53 
    Pacific 38 
    Latin America 3 
Facility type   
    Medical center 17 
    Hospital 34 
    Clinic 377 
Sample totals 428 
Inpatient beds (2020 mean)   
    Medical center 155 
    Hospital 59 
 
The demographics of the patient population reflect approximately 3.4 million patients 
who received care at each facility during the study period and do not necessarily reflect the 
demographics of the full population of 9.5 million patients eligible for care within the MHS.  
For example, active duty patients and their dependent family members are overrepresented in 
military facilities because they are given the highest priority for enrollment in the direct care 
system, followed by retirees and their family members.  Thus, the average age of patients 
enrolled at each facility in the sample is 28 with demographics skewed toward the18-24 age 
band (25.1%) and the 25-34 age band (28.3%), which heavily reflects the active duty population 
and their family members.  Additionally, facilities in this study are, on average, comprised of 
65% male patients.  This is likely due to the fact many clinics exclusively serve active duty 
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servicemembers, and only 16.5% of the active duty U.S. military force are female (DOD, 
2018b).  Table 3 provides more detailed demographic information for study facilities.  
Table 3  
Patient Demographics for Study Facilities 
    Group 
 Variable Sample Population 
Gender (%)       
  Male 64.5 51.0 
  Female 35.5 49.0 
Age (%)       
  < 4 8.1 6.0 
  5-14 7.1 11.4 
  15-17 1.4 3.3 
  18-24 25.1 12.3 
  25-34 28.3 12.5 
  35-44 17.2 9.2 
  45-64 11.0 22.3 
  65+ 1.7 24.1 
Acuity  RVUs per patient per year  130.0  * 
Note. RVUs = relative value unit.  Population refers to the total population of patients enrolled in the 
TRICARE program during FY 2019.  This includes patients who receive care at civilian (non-DOD) 
healthcare facilities.  
1 From Evaluation of the TRICARE Program: Fiscal Year 2019 Report to Congress. 
It is important to note that the sample size fluctuates for each performance metric based 
on the number of applicable facilities in existence during the relevant timeframe.  This reflects 
the fact that the number of MTFs in the MHS has fluctuated over the study period in response to 
the operational needs of the U.S. military, coupled with the implementation of Community-
Based Medical Homes (Carabajal, 2012) and the closing/restructuring of inpatient healthcare 
facilities.  The sample size also fluctuates for some performance measures due to the scope of 
services offered at the facilities and the number of patients eligible for those services.  For 
example, the CLABSI performance measure includes a significantly smaller sample size in 
 
103 
 
comparison to the population-health measures because only 51 of the sample facilities have 
inpatient capabilities.  Additionally, facilities are excluded from the analysis of each 
performance measure if there are fewer than 5 patients receiving care at that facility that were 
eligible for the relevant services (e.g., mammographies).   
Variable Measurement 
The following section provides information about the construction of key variables, 
including descriptions of dependent variables, model covariates, and the key independent 
variable.  The dependent variables and model covariates are presented first because they are the 
same for both Research Questions 1 and 2.  The key independent variable is presented in the 
third section because it differs for each research question.   
Variable Construction: Dependent Variables 
Both research questions investigate whether participation in the Army’s PBB programs 
is associated with a change in quality performance for incentivized metrics.  Over 40 quality 
measures were incentivized at various times in the PBAM and IRIS programs.  These were 
selected for inclusion in the PBB programs based on the Army’s strategic priorities and their 
applicability to the MHS Quadruple Aim.  The MHS Quadruple Aim encompasses four 
domains of which three follow: improving population health, per capita cost, and experience of 
care (Berwick et al., 2008).  The fourth domain of the Quadruple Aim, readiness, is specific to 
the U.S. military and is defined as “ensuring that the total military force is medically ready to 
deploy and that the medical force is ready to deliver healthcare anytime, anywhere in support of 
the full range of military operations, including humanitarian missions” (DHA, 2013).   
Though quality, cost, efficiency, productivity, and experience of care measures were 
included in both the PBAM and IRIS programs, the current study focuses specifically on quality 
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measures.  The specific measures under investigation are a subset of the total list of quality 
measures that were incentivized over the life of the program.  The dependent variable (quality 
improvement) is constructed using 13 of the 40 quality metrics that were incentivized through 
the Army’s PBB programs.  Performance measures are selected with incentive start dates that 
span the timeframe of the PBAM and IRIS programs.  This facilitates examination of the 
programs’ effects over time and helps to reduce threats to internal validity caused by historical 
artifacts.  Performance measures are also selected based on the availability of data.  Measures 
with less than four quarters of pre- or postintervention data are excluded.  This exclusion 
primarily pertains to measures that were first incentivized near the start of the PBAM program 
in 2006 or very recently in the IRIS program.  Measures are also excluded if data are not 
available for both the intervention and comparison groups.  This exclusion pertains to certain 
measures that were specific to Army facilities.   
For example, the healthy weight performance metric measures the proportion of patients 
in each facility with a Body Mass Index value recorded during primary care medical encounters.  
This metric is excluded from the study because data were collected within Army facilities but 
not uniformly collected and reported in the comparison facilities.  A third exclusion criterion is 
applied to eliminate instrumentation threats to internal validity.  Performance measures are 
eliminated if they did not use the same measurement instrument for all facilities in both the 
intervention group and the treatment group.  For example, all patient satisfaction measures are 
eliminated because the service branches did not start using a common satisfaction survey until 
2014.  Figure 6 presents a diagram of the selection process for performance measures selected 
for study inclusion. 
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Figure 6. Diagram depicting selection criteria for performance measures. 
All performance metrics that comprise the dependent variable are evaluated 
independently (i.e., a composite score is not used).  They are measured at the facility level and 
are expressed as facility rates or proportions of patients obtaining care at each facility.  There 
are two types of performance metrics: population health measures and one clinical safety 
measure.   
Population health.  The well-being and population health domain pertains to all 
outpatient facilities that offer primary care services.  This variable indicates facility-level 
performance on measures that assist in the management of chronic conditions and promote 
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well-being and healthy behaviors.  The population health domain is comprised of 12 measures 
derived from the HEDIS.  The HEDIS dataset is a group of quality performance measures that 
are validated, supported, and maintained through a partnership between the DHA and the 
NCQA. HEDIS measures are used to analyze quality performance in managed care 
organizations in domains such as managing chronic disease, delivering preventive care, and 
managing acute illness (U.S. Army Medical Command, 2016).   
Population health measures are investigated in this study because they are an important 
part of promoting health system accountability in improving the overall health of communities.  
The use of population health measures, particularly those  measures pertaining to preventive 
health, are intended to reduce costs by keeping patients healthier, reducing hospitalizations, and 
reducing unnecessary utilization (Stoto, 2017).  HEDIS measures are chosen in particular 
because these measures are some of the most widely adopted healthcare performance 
measurement tools in the United States (NCQA, 2019).  Studies have indicated that HEDIS 
population health measures are associated with better health outcomes, particularly among 
populations of patients with chronic diseases such as diabetes (Harman et al., 2010).  The use of 
HEDIS measures can also promote cost-effective care by reducing future costs associated with 
serious illness, although the measurement of such benefits varies widely (Neumann & Levine, 
2002).  Additionally, prior evidence suggests that pay for performance has had significant 
effects in diabetes care and disease management in primary care settings (Gupta & Ayles, 2019; 
Lin et al., 2016), though no studies are yet available to determine effects in conjunction with 
PBB.   
Three of the selected HEDIS population health measures specifically pertain to children.  
Though these measures do not directly address healthcare quality pertaining to military 
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servicemembers, they do reflect the comprehensive nature of the overall MHS mission.  As 
discussed previously, one of the two primary missions of the MHS is its purpose in providing 
medical benefits to retirees and dependent family members of military servicemembers.  The 
three measures pertaining to children are selected because they help to assess each facility’s 
performance in providing care that is specifically tied to the dependent family members as 
opposed to the active force.   
Clinical safety.  The clinical safety domain pertains to all inpatient facilities in the study 
sample.  It is constructed using the rate of CLABSI, which is one type of HAI commonly 
addressed in the quality literature.  Although some researchers have noted inconsistent results in 
pay for performance related to HAIs (Vokes et al., 2018), several studies have demonstrated 
positive effects (Bastian et al., 2016; Calikoglu et al., 2012).  This measure is selected for the 
clinical safety domain in order to add to the body of research on pay for performance and HAIs. 
The CLABSI measure is defined as the risk-adjusted rate of CLABSIs at each facility, 
relative to predicted rates of CLABSI events based on data collected from hospitals 
participating in the NHSN program sponsored by the CDC (2019; U.S. Army Medical 
Command, 2017).  A central line is defined by the CDC as “an intravascular catheter that 
terminates at or close to the heart or in one of the great vessels which is used for infusion, 
withdrawal of blood, or hemodynamic monitoring” (Powell, 2018).  Further, a central line that 
is eligible for inclusion in the CLABSI measure is defined as  
a central line that has been in place for greater than two consecutive calendar days 
following the first access of the central line, in an inpatient location, during the current 
admission. Central lines are eligible for CLABSI events until the day after removal from 
the body or patient discharge, whichever comes first. (Powell, 2018)   
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The MHS collects and reports its CLABSI data using the protocols developed and 
validated by the CDC.  The CLABSI measure incentivized through the Army’s IRIS program 
corresponds to the CDC’s CLABSI standardized infection ratio (SIR), which “is calculated by 
dividing the number of observed events by the number of predicted events. The number of 
predicted events is calculated using probabilities estimated from negative binomial models 
constructed from 2015 NHSN data, which represents the baseline population” (CDC, 2020, p. 
4-28).  Table 4 provides detailed information about the construction of the dependent variable 
and the relevant time frames. 
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable Construction and Data Collection Periods 
Measure 
Incentive 
start Pre- Post- 
Variable 
type Definition 
Aim 1: Population Health            
  
Mammography 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at the facility with mammography within the last 24 
months.   
  
Cervical cancer screening 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility with cervical cancer screening within the 
past 36 months. 
  
Diabetes-A1C screening 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have had 
A1C testing within the past 12 months. 
  
Diabetes-A1C control 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at the facility, diagnosed with diabetes, with A1C levels 
at nine or below. 
  
Diabetes-LDL control 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have an 
LDL level below 100. 
  
Asthma care 2006 
2004 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% patients with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered 
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma. 
  
Well child visits (6 in 15 mos.) 2012 
 2010 Q1-
2011 Q3 
2011 Q4-
2016 Q4 
Population 
Health 
HEDIS criteria for percent of eligible population with 6 or more well child visits 
in the first 15 months of life. 
  
Low back pain 2016 
2013 Q4-
2015 Q3 
2015 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility, aged 18-50, with a primary diagnosis of 
low back pain who did not have an imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan) 
within 28 days of diagnosis. 
  
Appropriate testing for children 
with pharyngitis 
2017 
2015 Q1-
2016 Q3 
2016 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% children 2=18 years of age who were diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed 
an antibiotic and received a group A streptococcus test for the episode. A higher 
rate represents better performance (i.e., appropriate testing). 
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Measure 
Incentive 
start Pre- Post- 
Variable 
type Definition 
  
Appropriate treatment for 
children with URI 
2017 
2015 Q1-
2016 Q3 
2016 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% children 3 months to 18 years of age who were given a diagnosis of URI and 
were not dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher rate indicates better 
performance. 
  
Follow-up after 7 days of 
hospitalization for mental 
illness 
2017 
2014 Q4-
2016 Q3 
2016 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% adult and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for 
treatment of selected mental health disorders and received follow-up within 7 
days of discharge. 
  
Follow-up after 30 days of 
hospitalization for mental 
illness 
2017 
2014 Q4-
2016 Q3 
2016 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% adult and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for 
treatment of selected mental health disorders and received follow-up within 30 
days of discharge.  
Aim 1: Clinical Safety           
  CLABSI  2017 
2015 Q2-
2017 Q3 
2017 Q4-
2018 Q4 
Clinical 
Safety 
Risk-adjusted rate ratio of CLABIs in MTF ICUs compared to other 
participating ICUs in the CDC NHSN Program. 
Aim 2 
          
  
Mammography 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at the facility with mammography within the last 24 
months.   
  
Cervical cancer screening 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility with cervical cancer screening within the 
past 36 months. 
  
Diabetes-A1C screening 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have had 
A1C testing within the past 12 months. 
  
Diabetes-A1C control 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at the facility, diagnosed with diabetes, with A1C levels 
at nine or below. 
  
Diabetes-LDL control 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% eligible patients seen at each facility, diagnosed with diabetes, who have an 
LDL level below 100. 
  
Asthma care 2006 
2003 Q4-
2006 Q3 
2006 Q4-
2011 Q4 
Population 
Health 
% patients with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered 
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma. 
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Variable Construction: Model Covariates 
As discussed previously, there are several factors related to munificence, dynamism, and 
complexity that can impact a facility’s performance and response to PBB incentives.  Measures 
for each of these factors are operationalized as follows, and are included as facility-level 
covariates in multivariate regression analyses.  
Complexity.  The covariates associated with complexity are age, gender, and the acuity 
level of the patients seen at each facility.  These variables are based on patient-level variables 
identified as risk adjusters in previous research (Iezzoni, 2003).  Age and gender mix data for 
each facility are constructed from patient-level data obtained from the MDR for each study 
quarter.  The individual-level data are aggregated to the facility level based on the medical 
encounters that occurred at each facility during the specified quarter.  The gender variable is 
expressed as the proportion of patients seen at each facility who are female.  The age variable is 
expressed as the average age of patients seen at each facility during each study quarter.   
The overall health status of patients, measured in various ways, is widely accepted as a 
risk adjuster in health services research (Elixhauser, Steiner, & Harris, 1998; Iezzoni, 2003; 
Kane & Radosevich, 2011) due to the impact that it can have on individual health outcomes 
(Kane & Radosevich, 2011).  For the current study, a proxy variable for the acuity level of 
patients seen at each facility is constructed using  the total RVUs added up for a patient’s care 
across all medical facilities over a 12-month period.  RVUs provide a standardized measure of 
the resources that are used to provide patient services (National Health Policy Forum, 2015).  
An assumption of this study is that the complexity and intensity of medical care required for 
each patient is roughly proportional to the RVU value of the patient’s medical encounters.  
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Thus, the total sum of a patient’s RVUs over a specified period of time can provide an 
approximation of the patient’s medical acuity.   
The acuity variable is constructed by adding each patient’s aggregate RVUs (work and 
practice expense) for a full calendar year.  In order to avoid endogeneity concerns, the acuity 
variable is then lagged by 1 year for each patient, so that the patient’s acuity represents the total 
RVU’s for the year prior.  Specifically, each patient’s individual acuity is expressed as the sum 
total of all RVUs generated by that patient across all medical facilities in the year prior.  The 
facility-aggregated acuity variable represents each facility’s average acuity for all patients seen 
in a particular quarter.   
Dynamism.  Covariates related to dynamism are government shutdowns and provider 
discontinuities.  Government shutdowns are indicated with a dummy variable equaling 1 during 
periods with an active government shutdown and 0 otherwise.  Data regarding periods of 
government shutdowns are collected from publicly available historical records.   
The variable for provider discontinuities is constructed using a methodology similar  to 
previous research on provider continuity in U.S. military medical facilities (Schwab, 2018).  
Staff discontinuity is operationally defined for this study as any period of 60 days or greater in 
which a medical provider (staff member with a National Provider Identifier) records zero 
medical encounters.  This variable is constructed using encounter data from the MDR.  The first 
step is to count the number of medical encounters recorded for each National Physician 
Identifier code at each facility for each month.  Physician discontinuities are identified if a 
provider records zero patient encounters in a particular month after having recorded at least one 
encounter in the same facility during the preceding month (i.e., discontinuity = 1 for each month 
a provider records zero encounters).  Discontinuities are recorded for the first 60 consecutive 
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days in which a provider records zero patient encounters in a facility in which he or she had 
previously seen patients.  To avoid biasing the discontinuity estimates, a provider is no longer 
counted as a discontinuity after 60 consecutive days of recording zero medical encounters.  The 
rationale for this exclusion is that if the provider has no medical encounters after the 60-day 
window, this is an indication that he or she no longer works at a particular facility rather than 
indicating a disruption in providing care for a short period of time.  
Provider discontinuities are aggregated to the facility level by calculating the ratio of 
provider discontinuities divided by the total number of active providers in each facility in each 
time period.  Providers are considered to be active in a facility if the National Physician 
Identifier code is associated with at least one medical encounter occurring in that facility.  As 
mentioned, providers are dropped from the facility’s count of active providers after 60 
consecutive days of recording zero medical encounters in that facility.  
Munificence.  Munificence is operationalized according to the yearly inflation-adjusted 
DHP budget for all facilities.  Data for the DHP budget is obtained from the public archives of 
the NDAA for each FY (DOD, 2019).  The DHP budget is then adjusted for annual inflation 
using the general Consumer Price Index for each period and transformed to a logarithmic value.  
Table 5 provides detailed information regarding the construction of model covariates and 
variables of interest, along with data sources for each variable. 
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Table 5 
Overview of Key Variables and Model Covariates 
Variable    Data source Construction 
Variables of Interest (IV)       
  PBB         Coded as 1 if the facility is subject to PBB 
incentives through the PBAM or IRIS programs, 
0 otherwise. 
  Aim 1          
    Post       Coded as 1 if the observation occurs during the 
postintervention period, 0 otherwise. 
  Aim 2           
    First       Coded as 1 if the observation occurs in quarters 
1-10 of the postintervention period. 
    Second      Coded as 1 if the observation occurs in quarters 
11-20 of the postintervention period. 
Facility-level covariates       
  Complexity         
    Age (Average)   MDR (2004-2018) Average patient age for all patients seen at 
facility j at time t. 
    Age (Band)   MDR (2004-2018) Proportion of patients seen at facility j at time t in 
each age band: 
      Band 1 (Reference) 0-4 years 
      Band 2     5-14 years 
      Band 3     15-17 years 
      Band 4     18-24 years 
      Band 5     25-34 years 
      Band 6     35-44 years 
      Band 7     45-64 years 
      Band 8     65+ years 
    Gender   MDR (2004-2018)   
      %Female     Percent of patients who are female. 
    Acuity (00s)   MDR (2004-2018) Average lagged total RVU's for each patient seen 
at facility j at time t-1, in 100s. 
  Dynamism         
    Shutdown   Public Records 
(2004-2018) 
Coded as 1 if a government shutdown occurred 
during the time period, 0 otherwise. 
    Provider  
Discontinuity 
  MDR (2004-2018) Percent of active medical providers who recorded 
0 patient encounters for a period >60 days.  
  Munificence       
    DHP budget   NDAA  
(2004-2018) 
Natural log of the inflation-adjusted DHP budget 
for each year. 
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Variable Construction: Key Independent Variable 
The key phenomenon under investigation in this study is the exposure to PBB incentives 
through the Army’s PBAM and IRIS programs.  Exposure to PBB incentives is indicated by a 
dichotomous variable (1 = PBB) for Army facilities involved with the program.  For Research 
Question 1, the key independent variable is an interaction between PBB = 1 (for Army facilities 
participating in PBB) and Post = 1, which represents the years for which the PBB incentives 
were active for each measure.  The pre- and postintervention periods vary for each outcome 
measure based on the timeframe in which the measure first became incentivized and data 
availability.  Table 4 provides specific information about the pre- and postintervention periods 
for each measure and each research question.  For Research Question 1, the postintervention 
period is defined as up to 5 years after the measure was incentivized.   
For Research Question 2, the postintervention period is divided into two separate 
periods for the seven performance metrics in Table 4 that have 5 years of postimplementation 
data.  The first postintervention period is indicated by a dichotomous variable (1 = First) if the 
observation occurs during the first 2.5 years (10 quarters) after the measure became 
incentivized.  The second postintervention period is indicated by a different dichotomous 
variable (1 = Second) if the observation occurs 2.5-5 years (quarters 11-20) after the initiation 
of the incentives.  The key independent variable for Research Question 1 is an interaction 
between PBB = 1 (for Army facilities participating in PBB) and First = 1 (first 10 quarters 
postincentive), and PBB = 1 and Second = 1 (second 10 quarters postincentive).   
The main analysis for Research Question 1 estimates the marginal effect of the PBB 
incentives by comparing pre-/post-differences in the performance for facilities exposed to the 
program (Army facilities) to those facilities in the comparison group that were not exposed to 
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PBB incentives (Air Force and Navy facilities).  The main analysis for Research Question 2 
estimates the marginal effect of PBB incentives during two distinct time periods after the 
initiation of the performance incentives (the first 10 quarters and the second 10 quarters).  As 
indicated previously, the purpose is to determine how performance changes over time in the 
postintervention period.   
Empirical Methodology 
The research design for both the main analysis (Research Question 1) and the secondary 
analysis (Research Question 2) is an organization-level (MTF) DID analysis.  The DID 
approach is used because it enables a quasi-experimental analysis of post-hoc data that were 
collected to support the U.S. Army’s two PBB programs.  This approach addresses the potential 
validity concerns associated with post-hoc analysis by assessing performance trends before and 
after program implementation using similar comparison groups.   
Inferences about the effects of PBB are drawn using two key assumptions of the DID 
analysis.  First, the parallel trends assumption requires that the pattern of performance of both 
groups must be similar prior to the program implementation.  The assumption is that, in the 
absence of treatment or intervention, any differences in performance between the two groups 
would hold constant over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).  To determine if this assumption is 
reasonable, performance tends for the intervention and comparison groups are plotted over time 
and visually inspected for parallel trends.   
The second critical assumption of the DID is the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(Rubin, 1977), which requires that there is only one form of the treatment (exposure to PBB or 
no exposure to PBB) and that there is no interference between the groups (spillover effects).  
The potential for spillover effects is assessed using a sensitivity analysis in which treatment and 
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comparison facilities operating in close proximity to one another (in MSMs) will be eliminated 
from the analysis.   
The study uses a Poisson panel regression to conduct the analyses for Research 
Questions 1 and 2.  The nature of the data is most appropriate for a Poisson or negative 
binomial regression model because the dependent variable is comprised of a discreet count of 
the number of patients eligible for a particular type of treatment or service and a discreet count 
of the number of patients that received the prescribed care.  For the CLABSI variable, a 
negative binomial regression may have been more appropriate given the large number of 
observations that were zero (patients did not get an infection).  However, the model did not 
converge during preliminary analyses, indicating that the data were a poor fit for this model. 
Research Question 1 tests whether the Army’s PBB programs are linked to a change in 
quality performance, ceteris paribus, using a research design similar to prior research by R. M. 
Werner et al. (2013).  In this case, the DID model is applied to compare Army treatment 
facilities (subject to PBB incentives) to a comparison group comprised of Navy and Air Force 
treatment facilities (that did not employ PBB programs).  The analysis for Research Question 2 
is an extension of Research Question 1, examining two distinct postperiods for those indicators 
with sufficient postintervention data.  This second analysis addresses whether performance 
improves, declines, or remains the same throughout the 5-year postintervention period, ceteris 
paribus.   
Preliminary Analyses 
Several preliminary analyses are performed.  First, the data are analyzed carefully to 
identify any missing data.  Large sections of missing data are investigated to determine if there 
are indications of merge errors.  A variable for merge errors is retained in the master dataset for 
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each merge that is performed so missing data occurring through merge errors can be easily 
identified and addressed.  In most cases, missing data are attributable to clinics that either 
activated or deactivated during the study period.  This is identified through an “IA” code in the 
facility name.  Next, the data are carefully analyzed to identify and address extreme or 
inappropriate values.  Box plots, distribution tables, and other methods are used to examine the 
spread of data, which are subsequently used to identify extreme values and outliers.  Extreme 
values are assessed individually and excluded from the study sample when appropriate.  For 
example, extreme values in the performance variable usually occur in clinics with very few 
patients eligible for the relevant care.  In most cases, this is due to the fact that the clinic was 
activating or deactivating during the specified time period.  Due to this concern, clinics with 
fewer than 5 patients eligible for care (pertaining to the quality measure) are dropped from the 
analysis to avoid biasing the results.   
Since the majority of dependent variable measures are proportions (i.e., number of 
patients receiving the appropriate care divided by the total number of patients eligible for the 
care), data are also examined to determine if all values fall between the bounds of 0 and 1.  The 
ranges of these variables are analyzed to determine the most appropriate regression model.  For 
example, when the values in the dependent variable occur close to the bounds (less than .2 or 
greater than .8), then a Poisson regression provides more valid statistical tests of coefficients 
(Long, 1997).   
Estimation Approaches 
Aim 1 
A facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression model is used for Aim 1, except in the 
cases indicated below.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the facility level to account 
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for the fact that observations are repeated for each facility over time and  nonindependent 
(Huber, 1967; Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015; R. M. Werner et al., 2013; White, 1980). 
The equations for study Aim 1 follow: 
[Equation 1]   𝑌 =  𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀  
All variables are indexed j for a given facility and t for each quarter.  The 𝑃𝐵𝐵  indicator 
variable is coded as a 1 if the facility was subject to PBB incentives during the observation 
period and 0 otherwise.  The 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  indicator variable is coded as a 1 if the observation occurred 
in the years after the implementation of incentives for the specific quality metric under 
investigation.  Χ  corresponds to a vector of time-variant, facility-level covariates, including 
complexity (age, gender, and acuity composition of patients at each facility), facility-aggregated 
dynamism indicators (percent staff discontinuity, government shutdown (0/1)), and munificence 
indicators (size of DHP budget).  Finally, 𝑢  represents other time-invariant facility 
characteristics (fixed effects) and 𝜀  is the random error term.  
For all Aim 1 analyses, if 𝑏  is significant and positive, it is concluded that PBB 
incentives have a positive effect on quality improvement for the given quality measure.  As an 
exception, for areas of performance where a reduction is desirable, it is concluded that PBB 
incentives have a positive effect on quality improvement if 𝑏  is significant and negative. 
[Equation 1a]   𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 =  𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀  
Equation 1a employs a Poisson regression and includes all HEDIS measures.  It applies 
to all outpatient facilities.  𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙  indicates a cluster of performance metrics related to well-
being and population health indicators among the patients receiving care at each facility.  For 
each of these measures, dependent variable is generically defined as a count of the number of 
patients at each facility receiving the appropriate care.  The exposure variable is defined as the 
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count of total patients at each facility j who are eligible for the indicated care.  For example, the 
dependent variable in the HEDIS mammography measure is the total count of patients at facility 
j who have had mammography services in the past 24 months.  The exposure variable 
(denominator) is the total number of patients at facility j who are eligible for mammography 
services.   
[Equation 1b]   𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 =  𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀  
Equation 1b applies to all inpatient facilities and employs a Poisson regression.  The 
dependent variable is clinical safety and is measured using the count of the observed CLABSI at 
each facility.  The exposure variable is the number of predicted CLABSI events.  Predicted 
CLABSI events are modeled based on national data compiled by the CDC among 
approximately 25,000 hospitals participating in the NHSN Program (CDC, 2019).   
Aim 2 
A facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression model is used for all measures in Aim 
2.  Equation 2 mirrors the analysis of Equation 1, except the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  variable is broken into two 
increments: 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  for first half of the 5-year postperiod (quarters 1-10 after the incentive) and 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑  for second half of the 5-year postperiod (quarters 11-20 after the incentive).  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  
and 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑  are be interacted with the 𝑃𝐵𝐵  indicator variable to denote Army facilities 
targeted by PBB incentives in the first or second 10 quarters of the post implementation period.  
Equation 2 is used to estimate the effects of the PBB incentives in two distinct periods after the 
introduction of each incentive in order to determine if the response to incentives was confined 
to a particular time period (e.g., immediately after the incentive started) or alternatively, if there 
was a change in the response in the first and second periods after the implementation of PBB.  
Equation 2 is only applied to the metrics for which 5 years of postincentive data are available.   
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[Equation 2]   𝑌 =  𝑏 + 𝑏 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ) +
𝑏 (𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ) + 𝑏 Χ + 𝑢 𝜀  
All variables are indexed j for a given hospital and t for each quarter after the incentives 
were initiated for the given measure.  The 𝑃𝐵𝐵  indicator variable is coded as a 1 if the facility 
was targeted by PBB incentives, and 0 otherwise.  The 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  indicator variable is coded as a 1 
if the observation occurs in quarters 10-20 after the implementation of incentives for the 
specific quality metric under investigation.  The 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑  indicator variable is coded as a 1 if 
the observation occurs in quarters 11-20 after the implementation of incentives for the specific 
quality metric under investigation.  Χ  corresponds to a vector of facility-level covariates, 
including complexity (age, gender, and acuity composition of patients at each facility), facility-
aggregated dynamism indicators (percent provider discontinuity, government shutdown (0/1)), 
and munificence indicators (size of DHP budget).  Finally, 𝑢  represents other time-invariant 
facility characteristics (fixed effects) and 𝜀  is the random error term. 
For all Aim 2 analyses, statistical tests are conducted to assess the relative magnitudes of 
estimated coefficients b3 and b4. Where an increase in the value of a quality metric is desirable, 
if 𝑏  is significantly greater than  𝑏 , it is concluded that performance attributable to PBB 
improved over the course of the postintervention period.  Alternatively, if the two coefficients 
are not significantly different, it is concluded that performance remained the same over the two 
periods.  Finally, if b4 is significantly less than b3, it is concluded that initial improvement in the 
metric diminished.  Similar assessments are made for metrics where a decline in value is 
desirable (i.e., CLABSI) to determine whether performance improved, remained the same, or 
diminished.   
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Sensitivity Analyses 
Several sensitivity analyses are conducted to determine the robustness of the empirical 
results with respect to various changes in specification and context that may alter quality 
performance.  The first sensitivity analysis considers the possibility that quality performance 
may be impacted during an anticipatory period immediately prior to the implementation of 
incentives.  Thus, two sensitivity analyses are performed to determine if facilities alter quality 
performance in the anticipatory period before incentives are offered.  The first sensitivity 
analysis drops all observations that occur in the 6-month period immediately prior to the 
effective date of performance incentives.  The second sensitivity analysis in this group creates a 
dichotomous variable indicating observations that occur during the 6-month “anticipatory 
period” and tests for significance with respect to quality performance. 
The second sensitivity analysis considers the possibility that the estimation model is 
overspecified with the inclusion of the covariates for munificence, dynamism, and complexity.  
Though the estimates are unbiased, if the model is overspecified, it may have an adverse effect 
on the variances of the estimators (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 88).  The second sensitivity analysis 
drops all covariates from the model to determine the robustness of the effects of PBB on 
performance.   
A third sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine the impact of operating in a MSM.  
As discussed previously, MSMs are geographic locations that include healthcare facilities 
operated by two or more of the uniformed services.  Under these MSM conditions, patients are 
sometimes seen in more than one healthcare facility, often operated by different service 
branches.  This creates the potential for PBB to have spillover effects in local healthcare 
facilities not directly participating in the program.  This is particularly problematic for 
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performance measures involving the management of chronic disease because patient outcomes 
may be impacted by treatment from a variety of providers in different locations, making it more 
difficult to isolate the performance effects of the program.  To determine if this has an impact 
on the robustness of the results, a third analysis performs all regressions with the exclusion of 
facilities operating in MSMs.   
As mentioned, observations are dropped for facilities in which fewer than 5 patients are 
indicated for the care relevant to the performance measure (for example, cervical cancer 
screenings).  In many cases, small numbers are due to the fact that the clinic is activating or 
deactivating during the specified time period, or the clinic serves a patient population that is 
largely not applicable to the performance measure (such as a pediatric clinic).  A fourth 
sensitivity analysis examines the robustness of the empirical results using different exclusion 
parameters for the minimum number of patients eligible for each type of care.  Observations are 
dropped for facilities with fewer than 10 and fewer than 20 patients eligible for care.   
The fifth sensitivity analysis provides further examination of the effect that patient age 
has on the performance results.  The age variable used in all regressions in the primary analysis 
indicates the average age of patients seen at each facility during each specified quarter.  
Specifying the average patient age is much less precise than using age bands to identify specific 
age groups that have a larger (or smaller) impact on performance results.  It is possible that 
important age-related effects on performance may be overlooked when patient ages are 
averaged together rather than specified independently within age bands.  Thus, the fifth 
sensitivity analysis examines a subset of quality metrics for which PBB has demonstrated the 
anticipated effect of improved performance to assess if replacing the average age variable with 
variables that indicate patient age bands has an effect on these findings.   
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Summary 
This chapter described the empirical and analytic methods used to evaluate the impact of 
PBB on quality performance in military healthcare facilities.  This study uses a DID approach to 
analyze post-hoc performance data for two comparable groups of military facilities that either 
participated in PBB or did not participate in PBB during the specified time period.  Data 
elements from multiple DOD databases are merged with publicly available information to 
construct the variables used in the facility-level, fixed-effect, Poisson regression models.  A 
variety of sensitivity analyses are also presented to determine the robustness of empirical 
results.   
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This chapter presents study findings based on the methodology described in Chapter 4.  
It is divided into four sections. The first section provides descriptive statistics regarding the 
study facilities and patients within those facilities.  The following two sections provide the 
results of the main analysis for Research Question 1 and the sensitivity analyses that were 
undertaken to test the robustness of the results.  The final section describes the results of the 
main analysis for Research Question 2.  A brief summary concludes the chapter. 
Results of Descriptive Analysis 
As discussed earlier, the study sample consists of a total of 428 healthcare facilities 
across the DOD.  Seventy-eight percent of the study facilities (n = 334) are located within the 
continental United States, while 22% of facilities are located outside of the United States (n = 
94).  The majority of study facilities are clinics (n = 377; 88%), followed by hospitals (n = 34; 
8%) and medical centers (n = 17; 4%).  PBB facilities have slightly higher average bed counts 
(2020 means) relative to comparison facilities for both community hospitals and medical 
centers.  Table 6 provides an overview of the PBB and comparison facilities with respect to 
location, facility types, and average number of beds.   
  
Chapter 5: Results
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Healthcare Facilities (2019-2020) 
      Group   
      Comparison PBB Total 
Location       
  United States       
    East 111 97 208 
    West 81 45 126 
  Outside U.S.       
    Europe 23 30 53 
    Pacific 24 14 38 
    Latin America 2 1 3 
Facility type       
    Medical center 8 9 17 
    Hospital 22 12 34 
    Clinic 211 166 377 
Inpatient beds (2020 mean)       
    Medical center 142 169 155 
    Hospital 54 64 59 
 
 Study facilities experienced an average of 10.2% provider discontinuity for each month.  
There were no significant differences observed between the PBB and comparison groups with 
respect to provider discontinuity.  On average, only 35.5% of patients seen at study facilities 
were female.  As discussed previously, the gender composition reflects the fact that active duty 
servicemembers are overrepresented in the patient population of sample facilities, and the 
majority of the U.S. servicemembers are male (DOD, 2018b).  The average age for patients seen 
at study facilities is 28.3 years with no statistically significant differences observed between the 
PBB and comparison group.  The age demographics for both groups are skewed toward the 18-
24 and 25-34 age bands, reflecting the overall demographics of the active U.S. military force.   
Table 7 compares the means of the PBB and comparison groups across all model 
covariates.  There are statistically significant differences observed between the PBB and 
comparison groups for some model covariates.  For example, there is a statistically significant 
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difference between the two groups across all age bands, but the magnitude of these differences 
is small.  Similarly, the PBB facilities provide care to a slightly higher percentage of women (M 
= 35.6, SD = 14.0) in comparison to the comparison group (M = 35.4, SD = 11.6), but the 
magnitude of the difference is also negligible, t(54390) = -2.06, p < .001.  There is also a 
statistically significant difference between the two groups for acuity, but it is important to note 
that the standard deviation is very high, indicating a high degree of data spread with respect to 
this variable.   
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Table 7 
Group Comparison of Means for Model Covariates 
      Group           
      Comparison   PBB     All study facilities   
      M SD  M SD  Difference M SD   
Complexity                       
  Gender (%)                       
    Female 35.4 11.6   35.6 14.0   ** 35.5 12.6   
    Male 64.6 --   64.4 --     64.5 --   
  Age (%)                       
    < 4 (reference) 8.2 5.8   7.9 6.6   *** 8.1 6.1   
    5-14 6.9 4.8   7.5 6.2   *** 7.1 5.4   
    15-17 1.3 1.1   1.6 1.8   *** 1.4 1.4   
    18-24 25.4 17.1   24.2 15.0   *** 25.0 16.3   
    25-34 28.5 8.2   28.4 9.0   *** 28.5 8.6   
    35-44 16.8 6.3   17.9 6.8   *** 17.2 6.5   
    45-64 11.2 8.1   10.9 9.0   *** 11.0 8.5   
    65+ 1.7 3.0   1.7 3.2   *** 1.7 3.1   
  Age (average)   28.3 4.2   28.3 4.8     28.3 4.4   
                          
  Acuity                       
  
  RVUs per patient 
per year 149.2 202.5 
  
110.2 123.8 
  
*** 134.2 177.524 
  
Dynamism                       
  Provider Discontinuity (% monthly) 10.2 9.0   10.3 9.2     10.2 9.1   
                      
Note. PBB = Performance-based budgeting.  SD = Standard Deviation.  RVU = Relative Value Unit.  Means are aggregated across all study years.  
Statistically significant differences between the PBB and comparison groups for each variable are indicated by *p < .1, **p < .05, and ***p < .01.
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Empirical Analysis: Research Question 1 
Table 8 reports the average performance for all measures for both groups in the pre- and 
postimplementation time periods.  The performance for each of the population health measures 
is measured as a percent of patients receiving the appropriate care, as a function of the total 
number of patients eligible for the indicated care.  For example, the mammography performance 
measure is the total number of patients at facility j who received a mammogram within the 
preceding 24 months, divided by the total number of patients at facility j who were eligible to 
receive a mammography.   
The clinical safety measure is the CLABSI SIR, which is calculated as the total number 
of observed CLABSI events per time period divided by predicted number of CLABSI events, 
based on nationwide data collected by the CDC from over 25,000 hospitals participating in the 
NHSN.  It is important to note that the sample size for the CLABSI SIR measure is substantially 
smaller than the other measures.  This is due to the inclusion criteria defined by the CDC, which 
states that CLABSI rates can be reported “in any inpatient location where denominator data can 
be collected, which can include critical/intensive care units (ICU), specialty care areas (SCA), 
neonatal units including neonatal intensive care units (NICUs), step down units, wards, and long 
term care units” (CDC, 2020, p.3).    
 
130 
 
Table 8 
Pre/Post Comparison of Quality Performance for All Dependent Variable Measures, 2004-2018 
      Group 
    
Sample size 
Comparison     PBB 
    Pre  Post    Pre  Post  
Population health (% performance)a                     
  Mammography 323 74.52   71.90       59.00   66.29   
  Cervical cancer screening 342 87.05   86.29       83.00   85.85   
  Diabetes-A1C screening 311 85.45   86.23       79.28   82.20   
  Diabetes-A1C control 311 72.28   73.15       65.08   68.55   
  Diabetes-LDL control 311 47.36   48.75       39.80   42.18   
  Asthma care 334 85.49   96.61       84.20   95.76   
  Well child visits 267 58.39   77.86       66.07   80.78   
  Low back pain 358 76.75   81.63       69.33   77.82   
  Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing 261 77.58   82.92       73.56   80.27   
  URI-Appropriate treatment 266 93.82   94.85       91.23   94.15   
  Mental health-7-day follow-up 323 73.37   73.77       76.63   77.22   
  Mental health-30-day follow-up 323 85.03   85.90       87.28   88.16   
Clinical safetyb                       
  CLABSI SIR 15 0.81   0.711       1.683   0.748   
Note. CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR = standardized infection ratio. 
aPopulation health performance measures are the percent of target patient population receiving the appropriate care.   
bClinical safety performance measure is the CLABSI SIR, which is the number of observed infections divided by the number of predicted 
infections, based on nationwide CDC data. 
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Mammography 
Figure 7 depicts mammography performance in the PBB facilities and comparison 
facilities over time during the study period.  This figure and ones like it for subsequent 
performance indicators are used to visually inspect trends in the performance measure before 
the implementation of PBB for the treatment and comparison groups given the assumption of 
parallel trends in DID analysis (McKenzie, 2020).  Generally, the trends for mammography in 
both the comparison and treatment groups appear similar in the preperiod based on the data in  
Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of mammography performance trends over time (2004-2011).  
Mammography performance is the percent of eligible patients seen at the facility with 
mammography within the last 24 months.   
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Table 9 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with 
mammography as the dependent variable.  Performance is defined as the percentage of eligible 
patients at each facility who have received mammograms in the previous 24 months (NCQA, 
2019).   
In support of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for PBB*Post was significant and positive.  
These results indicate that the change in performance for the Mammography HEDIS measure 
for the facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation period was higher than the 
comparison facilities (coefficient = 0.069, p < .001), controlling for other variables in the 
model.  The acuity and sex variables were not significantly associated with performance on the 
mammography measure, whereas the age (coefficient = 0.007, p < .001), and DHP (coefficient 
= 0.075, p < .05), variables were both significant.   
 
Table 9 
Results of Poisson Regression for Mammography Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.069 *** 0.012 
  Post  -0.063 *** 0.009 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) 0.075 **   0.035 
  Acuity (00s) -0.001     0.002 
  Age 0.007 *** 0.002 
  Sex 0.074     0.079 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error.   Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-
unit increase in the variable, or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  
Coefficient for the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Cervical Cancer Screening 
Figure 8 depicts cervical cancer screening performance in the PBB facilities and 
comparison facilities over time during the study period.  Performance on this measure is 
indicated by the percentage of eligible enrollees at each facility with cervical cancer screening 
within the previous 36 months (NCQA, 2019).  The trends for performance in cervical cancer 
screening appear to be similar for the treatment and comparison groups in the pre-intervention 
period, which suggests that parallel trends are likely present.  
 
 
Figure 8. Cervical cancer screening performance over time (2004-2011). 
 
 
Table 10 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with 
cervical cancer screening as the dependent variable.  In support of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient 
for the Post*PBB variable was significant and positive.  This indicates that the change in 
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performance for the HEDIS cervical cancer screening measure was higher for the facilities 
participating in PBB in the postimplementation period, relative to comparison facilities, and 
controlling for other variables in the model (coefficient = 0.0336, p < .001).  The size of the 
DHP budget (coefficient: 0.0563; p < .01) and acuity (coefficient: -0.002; p < .01) were also 
significantly associated with performance, although the effect size for acuity was small.  The 
age and gender variables for this model were not significant.   
 
Table 10 
Results of Poisson Regression for Cervical Cancer Screening Measure 
  Variable   Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB   0.0336 *** 0.0055 
  Post    -0.0226 *** 0.0031 
Control variables           
  DHP (logged)   0.0563 *** 0.0197 
  Acuity   -0.002 *** 8.52E-04 
  Age   -0.0012     0.0015 
  Sex   -0.0404     0.0384 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Diabetes A1C Screening 
Figure 9 compares the performance of PBB facilities to the performance of comparison 
facilities on the diabetes A1C screening measure over time.  Performance is indicated by the 
percentage of eligible patients at each facility with diabetes who have had A1C testing within 
the previous 12 months (NCQA, 2019).  The treatment and comparison groups show similar 
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performance trends in the pre-implementation period with the slope of performance 
improvement appearing to be higher for the PBB facilities after initiation of the PBAM program 
in 2006.  
 
 
Figure 9. Diabetes A1C screening performance over time (2004-2011). 
 
 
Table 11 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with 
diabetes A1C screening as the dependent variable.  These results provide some support for 
Hypothesis 1.  Participation in PBB was associated with an increase in performance from the 
pre-intervention period to the postintervention period in comparison to facilities that did not 
participate in PBB (coefficient: 0.0175; p < .001).  An increase in the DHP budget was also 
associated with an increase in performance (coefficient: 0.1023; p < .001), whereas the age, 
acuity, and gender variables were not significant in this model. 
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Table 11 
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes A1C Screening Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0175 *** 0.0053 
  Post  -0.0178 *** 0.0041 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) 0.1023 *** 0.0220 
  Acuity (00’s) -0.0011     0.0011 
  Age -4E-05     0.0013 
  Sex -0.0367     0.0421 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB, in the postimplementation 
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Diabetes A1C Control 
Figure 10 presents a comparison of diabetes A1C control performance between the 
treatment and comparison groups over time.  Performance is indicated by the percentage of 
eligible patients at each facility with diabetes with A1C performance levels at nine or below 
(NCQA, 2019).  Both groups demonstrated a similar pattern of increasing performance through 
2005 with performance leveling off through most of 2006.  The slope of performance 
improvement appears to be slightly higher for the PBB facilities in the postimplementation 
period.   
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Figure 10. Diabetes A1C control performance over time (2004-2011). 
 
 
Table 12 presents the results generated from a fixed effect Poisson regression with 
diabetes A1C control as the dependent variable.  The results of this regression provides some 
support for Hypothesis 1.  The coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was significant and 
positive, indicating that participation in PBB programs in the postimplementation period was 
associated with higher performance improvement on the diabetes A1C control measure relative 
to comparison facilities (coefficient: 0.0194; p < .05).  The size of the DHP budget (coefficient: 
0.0933; p < .001) and patient population age (coefficient: 0.0038; p < .05) were also positively 
associated with diabetes A1C performance, although the effect size for age was small.  The 
acuity and gender covariates were not significant in this model.  
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Table 12 
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes A1C Control Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0194 **   0.0099 
  Post  -0.0142 **   0.0068 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) 0.0933 *** 0.0292 
  Acuity -0.0015     0.0017 
  Age 0.0038 **   0.0018 
  Sex -0.0087     0.0609 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period. Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Diabetes LDL Control 
Figure 11 displays performance trends over time for both groups on the diabetes LDL 
control measure.  Performance is indicated by the percentage of eligible patients diagnosed with 
diabetes at each facility who have an LDL level below 100 (NCQA, 2019).  The PBB facilities 
and comparison facilities demonstrate a similar pattern of performance improvement in both the 
pre- and postintervention time periods with the level of performance in PBB facilities remaining 
below comparison facilities for the entire study period.  Based on similarities in performance 
trends between both groups in the pre-intervention period, Figure 11 suggests that the parallel 
trends assumption is likely not violated, although there are no obvious performance 
improvements for the PBB group in the postintervention period in these descriptive data. 
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Figure 11. Diabetes LDL control performance over time (2004-2011). 
 
 
Table 13 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with diabetes LDL 
control as the dependent variable.  The results fail to support Hypothesis 1.  Participation in the 
PBAM PBB program was not associated with significant performance improvement on the 
diabetes LDL control measure in the postintervention period relative to comparison facilities.  
The DHP budget (coefficient: 0.4195; p < .001) and age (coefficient: 0.0134; p < .001) 
covariates were both significantly associated with diabetes LDL control performance in this 
model.  However, the effect size for age was small.  Patient population acuity and gender were 
not associated with any effects on performance for this measure.   
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Table 13 
Results of Poisson Regression for Diabetes LDL Control Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0243     0.0258 
  Post  -0.0749 *** 0.0151 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) 0.4195 *** 0.0563 
  Acuity (00s) -0.0026     0.0054 
  Age 0.0134 *** 0.0050 
  Sex 0.0028     0.1837 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Asthma Care 
Figure 12 displays performance trends over time for both groups on the asthma care 
performance measure.  Performance on this measure is defined as the percentage of eligible 
enrollees at each facility with persistent asthma who are prescribed medications considered 
acceptable as a primary therapy for the long-term control of asthma (NCQA, 2019).  The PBB 
and comparison facilities demonstrated similar patterns in performance throughout the study 
period.  Figure 12 highlights a significant and abrupt change in performance for both groups, 
occurring between the second and third quarters of 2005.  This abrupt change is suggestive of 
confounding instrumentation effects, possibly related to a change in how performance was 
measured and recorded.   
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Figure 12. Asthma care performance over time (2004-2011). 
 
Based on Figure 12, the abrupt change in performance occurring in 2005 appears to have 
impacted both groups similarly.  However, since the exact cause of the anomaly could not be 
confirmed, observations prior to the third quarter of 2005 were dropped from the analysis.  
Dropping these observations helped to provide a more consistent measurement of pre-
implementation performance trends, though the preperiod was shortened.  The trend analysis 
from this abbreviated observation period is presented in Figure 13.  It appears that the 
performance trends prior to the implementation of PBAM incentives were similar for both 
groups, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption was likely not violated.   
 
142 
 
 
Figure 13. Asthma care performance over time (third quarter 2005-2011). 
 
Table 14 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with asthma care as the 
dependent variable.  The results do not support Hypothesis 1.  The coefficient for the Post*PBB 
variable was negative and significant, indicating that performance improvement for PBB 
facilities in the postimplementation period was lower than comparison facilities, controlling for 
all other model variables (coefficient: -0.0042; p < .10).  However, it is important to note that 
this effect size was small.  The DHP control variable was significant and positive (coefficient: 
0.0465; p < .001), while the other model covariates were not significant.   
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Table 14 
Results of Poisson Regression for Asthma Care Performance 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB -0.0042 *   0.0024 
  Post  0.0020     0.0021 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) 0.0465 *** 0.0083 
  Acuity (00s) 0.0000     0.0004 
  Age -0.0003     0.0006 
  Sex -0.0016     0.0185 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Well Child Visits 
Figure 14 depicts performance on well child visits in the PBB facilities and comparison 
facilities over time during the study period.  Performance is defined by HEDIS criteria for the 
percentage of eligible children at each facility with six or more well child visits in the first 15 
months of life (NCQA, 2019).  Both the PBB and comparison groups demonstrate a similar 
pattern of increasing performance in the pre-implementation period.  Based on similar 
performance improvement trends in the pre-implementation period, the parallel trends 
assumption seems reasonable for this model.   
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Figure 14. Performance on well child visits over time (2010-2016). 
 
Table 15 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with well child visits as 
the dependent variable.  The results do not support Hypothesis 1, as the coefficient for the 
Post*PBB variable is significant and negative.  Though both groups exhibited significant 
performance improvement throughout the study period (coefficient: 0.1713; p < .001), the rate 
of improvement in the pre- and postimplementation periods was slightly lower for the PBB 
group relative to the comparison group (coefficient: -0.0663; p < .001). 
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Table 15 
Results of Poisson Regression for Well Child Performance Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB -0.0663 *** 0.0294 
  Post  0.1713 *** 0.0178 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -0.9159 *** 0.0841 
  Provider discontinuity  -0.0317     0.0643 
  Government shutdown -0.0374 *** 0.0044 
  Acuity -0.0390 *** 0.0048 
  Age 0.0135 **   0.0059 
  Sex 0.1028     0.1574 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Low Back Pain 
Figure 15 depicts performance on the low back pain measure in the PBB facilities 
relative to the comparison facilities over time.  Performance is indicated by the percentage of 
enrollees at each facility with a primary diagnosis of low back pain who did not have an 
imaging study (plan x-ray, MRI, CT scan) within 28 days of diagnosis (NCQA, 2019).  The 
slopes of performance trends are similar for the PBB and comparison facilities in the pre-
implementation period, suggesting that the parallel trends are present.   
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Figure 15. Performance on low back pain measure over time (2013-2018). 
 
 
Table 16 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS low 
back pain measure as the dependent variable.  The results of this regression support Hypothesis 
1.  Both groups exhibited an overall trend of improvement in performance in the postperiod 
(coefficient: 0.0308; p < .001).  However, the coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was both 
significant and positive, indicating that participation in the IRIS PBB program was associated 
with a higher degree of performance increase in the postperiod relative to comparison facilities 
(coefficient: 0.0533; p < .001).  The DHP (coefficient: -0.7524; p < .001), government 
shutdown (coefficient: 0.0281; p < .001), and acuity (coefficient: 0.0364; p < .001) covariates 
also yielded statistically significant results, although the magnitude of the effect for acuity was 
small.  The provider discontinuity, age, and sex covariates did not yield statistically significant 
results for this model. 
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Table 16 
Results of Poisson Regression for Low Back Pain Performance Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0533 *** 0.0086 
  Post  0.0308 *** 0.0058 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -0.7524 *** 0.1071 
  Provider discontinuity  0.0226     0.0327 
  Government shutdown 0.0281 *** 0.0027 
  Acuity 0.0364 *** 0.0094 
  Age 0.0020     0.0014 
  Sex -0.0439     0.0818 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod. Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Appropriate Testing for Pharyngitis 
Figure 16 presents a comparison of performance on the appropriate treatment of 
pharyngitis measure between the treatment and comparison groups over time.  Performance is 
defined by NCQA as the percentage of children 2-18 years of age at each facility who were 
“diagnosed with pharyngitis, dispensed an antibiotic and received a group A streptococcus test 
for the episode. A higher rate represents better performance (i.e., appropriate testing)” (NCQA, 
2019).  The PBB group and comparison group exhibited similar patterns of performance in the 
pre-implementation period.  A visual inspection of performance over time suggests that the 
parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this case.  Though PBB facilities exhibited overall 
lower levels of performance, it appears that performance rose more sharply for the PBB group 
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after incentives were introduced through the IRIS program in 2017.  By the end of 2018, 
performance in PBB facilities exceeded performance in comparison facilities.   
 
 
Figure 16. Performance on pharyngitis performance measure over time (2015-2018). 
 
Table 17 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS 
pharyngitis measure as the dependent variable.  The coefficient for the Post*PBB variable is 
significant and positive, which supports Hypothesis 1.  Both groups exhibited an overall trend 
of performance improvement in the postperiod (coefficient: 0.0370; p < .001), but PBB facilities 
experienced a sharper increase in performance in the postimplementation period, relative to the 
comparison facilities (coefficient: 0.0337; p < .10).   
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Table 17 
Regression Results for Performance Measure: Pharyngitis 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0337 *   0.0180 
  Post  0.0370 *** 0.0119 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -0.6383 *** 0.1627 
  Provider discontinuity  -0.0266     0.0426 
  Government shutdown 0.0009     0.0072 
  Acuity 0.0906 *** 0.0336 
  Age 0.0017     0.0024 
  Sex 0.1655     0.1616 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Appropriate Treatment for URI 
Figure 17 presents a comparison of performance over time between both groups on the 
URI treatment measure.  Performance is defined by the NCQA as the percentage of children at 
each facility, “3 months–18 years of age who were given a diagnosis of URI and were not 
dispensed an antibiotic prescription. A higher rate indicates appropriate treatment of children 
with URI (i.e., the proportion for whom antibiotics were not prescribed)” (NCQA, 2019).  
Figure 17 does not appear to show similarity in performance trends between the two groups in 
the pre-implementation period.  It appears that both groups trend improved performance in the 
pre-implementation period, but performance appears to have risen more sharply in comparison 
facilities relative to PBB facilities.   
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Figure 17. Performance on the URI treatment performance measure over time (2015-2018). 
 
Table 18 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the HEDIS URI 
measure as the dependent variable.  The results from this regression support Hypothesis 1.  The 
coefficient for the Post*PBB variable was significant and positive (coefficient: 0.0239; p < 
.001), controlling for other variables in the model.  Additionally, the DHP (coefficient: -0.2132; 
p < .001) and acuity (coefficient: 0.0320; p < .05) covariates were significant in this model, 
although the magnitude of the effect for acuity was small.  The provider discontinuity, 
government shutdown, age, and gender covariates were not significant.  
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Table 18 
Results of Poisson Regression for URI Performance Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   Robust SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.0239 *** 0.0060 
  Post  0.0034     0.0024 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -0.2132 *** 0.0452 
  Provider discontinuity  0.0100     0.0184 
  Government shutdown -0.0003     0.0020 
  Acuity (00’s) 0.0320 **   0.0144 
  Age 0.0010     0.0009 
  Sex 0.0778     0.0533 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Seven-Day Follow-Up After Mental Health Hospitalizations 
Figure 18 presents a comparison of performance between both groups over time for the 
mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up performance measure.  Performance is defined as 
the “percent of adults and children 6 years of age and older who were hospitalized for treatment 
of selected mental health disorders and received a follow-up within 7 days of discharge” 
(NCQA, 2019).  Figure 18 shows similar trends of performance between both groups in the pre- 
and postimplementation periods.   
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Figure 18. Mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure performance over time 
(2014-2018). 
 
 
Table 19 provides the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the mental health 
hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure as the dependent variable.  The results of this 
regression do not support Hypothesis 1.  There were no statistically significant differences in 
performance between the PBB and comparison facilities in the period after the IRIS incentives 
were introduced for this measure.  The size of the DHP budget (coefficient: -1.1526; p < .001), 
provider discontinuity (coefficient: 0.0313; p < .10), presence of a government shutdown 
(coefficient: -0.1195; p < .001), average patient age (coefficient: -0.0036; p < .10), and female 
gender (coefficient: -0.2767; p < .05)  all had significant effects on performance.  The acuity 
covariate was not significant in this model. 
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Table 19 
Results of Poisson Regression for Mental Health Hospitalization 7-Day Follow-Up 
  Variable Coefficient   SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB -0.0001     0.0122 
  Post  0.0212 **   0.0089 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -1.1526 *** 0.1394 
  Provider discontinuity  0.0313 *   0.0411 
  Government shutdown -0.1195 *** 0.0095 
  Acuity -0.0050     0.0244 
  Age -0.0036 *   0.0020 
  Sex -0.2767 **   0.1390 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error.  Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Thirty-Day Follow-Up After Mental Health Hospitalizations 
Figure 19 presents a comparison of performance between the PBB and comparison 
facilities over time for the mental health hospitalization 30-day follow-up performance measure.  
Performance is defined as the “percent of adults and children 6 years of age and older who were 
hospitalized for treatment of selected mental health disorders and received a follow-up within 
30 days of discharge” (NCQA, 2019).  Figure 19 shows similar trends in performance between 
both groups throughout the entire study period.   
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Figure 19. Mental health hospitalization 7-day follow-up measure performance over time (2014-
2018). 
 
 
Table 20 displays the results of a fixed effects Poisson regression with the performance 
measure for follow-ups within 30 days for mental health hospitalization as the dependent 
variable.  The results do not support Hypothesis 1.  The PBB incentives were not associated 
with a significant change in performance for the PBB facilities relative to the comparison 
facilities in the postimplementation period.  Neither of the groups experienced any significant 
change in performance between the pre- and postimplementation periods.  The size of the DHP 
budget (coefficient: -0.5109; p < .001), presence of a government shutdown (coefficient: -
0.0349; p < .001), and average patient age (coefficient: -0.0025;  p <.10) were all associated 
with significant impacts on performance.  The provider discontinuity, acuity, and gender 
covariates were not significant for this model.   
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Table 20 
Results of Poisson Regression for Mental Health Hospitalization 30-Day Follow-Up 
  Variable Coefficient   SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB -0.0034     0.0074 
  Post  0.0089     0.0057 
Control variables         
  DHP (logged) -0.5109 *** 0.0858 
  Provider discontinuity  0.0394     0.0241 
  Government shutdown -0.0349 *** 0.0053 
  Acuity (00’s) 0.0024     0.0137 
  Age -0.0025 *   0.0013 
  Sex -0.1338     0.0852 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error.  Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient =  parameter estimate for the continuous proportional change in performance  for a one-unit 
increase in the variable or relative to the base of comparison facilities in the preperiod.  Coefficient for 
the DHP variable is an elasticity.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
CLABSI 
Figure 20 depicts a trend analysis for clinical safety performance over time for both the 
PBB and comparison facilities.  Performance on clinical safety is defined as the risk-adjusted 
rate ratio of CLABSIs in hospital ICUs, compared to other participating ICUs in the CDC 
NHSN Program.  The risk-adjusted rate ratio is calculated by dividing the number of observed 
CLABSIs at each facility by the predicted number of CLABSIs, based on CDC NHSN data for 
similar facilities (CDC, 2020).  
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Figure 20. CLABSI performance over time (2014-2018).  Standardized infection ratio = 
observed number of CLABSIs/predicted number of CLABSIs based on CDC NHSN data.   
 
 
The Y-Axis in Figure 20 displays the average CLABSI SIR, which is the observed count 
of CLABSIs divided by the CDC-predicted number of CLABSIs.  Performance above1 
indicates that facilities have a higher rate of CLABSIs than predicted, whereas performance 
below 1 indicates that facilities have a lower CLABSI rate than predicted.  Performance trends 
on the CLABSI measure were not similar between the PBB and comparison groups prior to the 
initiation of incentives through the IRIS program.  The figure illustrates much variability in 
rates for both groups over the study period, most likely due to small sample sizes.  It is 
important to note that the sample size for the CLABSI measure (n = 15) was significantly lower 
than the other measures in this study due to the measure-specific inclusion criteria defined by 
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the CDC.  The only facilities eligible to report CLABSI rates are inpatient settings that use 
central lines (CDC, 2020). 
Table 21 presents the results of a fixed effect Poisson regression with the CLABSI SIR 
as the dependent variable.  It is important to note that the patient-related variables (age, gender, 
acuity) were dropped from this analysis because they apply to the outpatient population at each 
facility.  Additionally, this measure is already risk-adjusted using CDC methodology for 
patient-level risk factors.  The provider discontinuity variable was also dropped from this model 
because it applies primarily to outpatient medical encounters.   
 
Table 21 
Results of Poisson Regression for CLABSI SIR Measure 
  Variable Coefficient   SE 
Key independent variables         
  Post*PBB 0.9014 **   0.4242 
  Post  -1.2067 *** 0.4394 
Control variables         
  Government shutdown -0.0630     0.1831 
  DHP (logged) -4.2230     2.6873 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting.  DHP = inflation-adjusted, logged value of DHP total 
budget. SE= Standard Error. Post*PBB = facilities participating in PBB in the postimplementation 
period.  Post = all facilities (comparison and treatment group) in the postimplementation period.  
Coefficient = marginal effect of each variable on quality performance.  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
The regression results do not support Hypothesis 1.  The coefficient for the post-variable 
was significant and negative, indicating that CLABSI SIRs dropped for both groups in the 
postintervention period (coefficient: -1.2067; p < .001).  Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the 
coefficient was significant and positive for the Post*PBB variable (coefficient: 0.9014; p < .05), 
indicating that the CLABSI SIR did not drop more for PBB facilities in the postperiod relative 
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to the comparison facilities.  However, this result should be interpreted with caution due to 
small sample sizes and the substantial variability in this measure as depicted in Figure 19. 
Summary of Results for Research Question 1 
Table 22 presents a summary of the results of all fixed effects Poisson regressions for all 
performance measures included as dependent variables for Research Question 1.  The far right 
column displays the marginal effect on performance for each measure for which significant 
effects were observed.  In support of Hypothesis 1, PBB was associated with performance gains 
for the majority of measures: mammography, cervical cancer screening, diabetes A1C 
screening, diabetes A1C control, low back pain, appropriate testing with pharyngitis diagnosis 
in children, and appropriate treatment for URI.  In contrast to Hypothesis 1, PBB facilities 
experienced less of an increase in performance in well child visits measure and CLABSI 
measure in the postimplementation period and a potential decline in performance for the asthma 
measure relative to comparison facilities.  No significant marginal impacts on performance were 
observed for PBB facilities in the postimplementation period for the diabetes LDL control, 
follow-up on mental health hospitalization within 7 days, and follow-up on mental health 
hospitalization within 30 days measures.  It is important to note that the results for the CLABSI 
and URI measures should be interpreted with caution due to the lack of parallel trends observed 
in a visual inspection of the pre-implementation data.   
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Table 22 
Summary of the Marginal Effects of PBB on Quality Performance 
      Marginal effect of PBB on quality performance 
Variable Sample size (facilities) Coefficient   SE   
PBB Marginal 
Effecta 
(% change in 
performance) 
Population health                
  Mammography 323 0.0687 *** 0.0118   7.1% 
  Cervical cancer screening 342 0.0336 *** 0.0055   3.4% 
  Diabetes-A1C screening 311 0.0175 *** 0.0053   1.8% 
  Diabetes-A1C control 311 0.0194 **   0.0099   2.0% 
  Diabetes-LDL control 311 0.0243     0.0258                 -- 
  Asthma care 322 -0.0042 *   0.0024   -0.4% 
  Well child visits 267 -0.0663 **   0.0294   -6.4% 
  Low back pain 358 0.0533 *** 0.0086   5.5% 
  Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing 261 0.0337 *   0.0180   3.4% 
  URI-Appropriate treatment 266 0.0239 *** 0.0060   2.4% 
  Mental health-7-day follow-up 323 -0.0001     0.0122                 -- 
  Mental health-30-day follow-up 323 -0.0034     0.0074                  -- 
Clinical safety                
  CLABSI 15 0.9014 **   0.4242     
Note. Coefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for 
each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.  
aOnly significant results listed.  Marginal effect (% simple change in performance) is calculated as [exp(coeff)-1]*100. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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It is important to note that some of the control variables were omitted in the analysis for 
some of the indicators.  For the measures that contained observations prior to 2007, the provider 
discontinuity variable was omitted due to data availability.  The provider discontinuity variable 
requires the use of the National Physician Identifier data, which was not reliably recorded in 
encounter data until after 2007.  Additionally, the analyses for some of the measures did not 
contain the government shutdown variable.  If no government shutdowns occurred during the 
observation period for a given performance indicator, this covariate was omitted due to 
collinearity.   
Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to determine the robustness of the 
results for Research Question 1.  Table 23 presents the first group of sensitivity analyses, which 
tested for anticipatory effects in the 6-month period immediately preceding the start of each set 
of incentives.  Sensitivity analysis 1a (center columns) demonstrates the effect of dropping all 
observations occurring in the 6-month period prior to the start of incentives.  Sensitivity analysis 
1b creates a dichotomous variable indicating observations in the 6-month period immediately 
prior to the start of incentives.  The far right columns represent the interaction of PBB in the 6-
month anticipatory period.  A significant, positive coefficient suggests that anticipatory effects 
may be present.  As an exception, a significant, negative coefficient suggests anticipatory 
effects for measures in which a decrease is desirable (such as the CLABSI measure).   
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Table 23 
Sensitivity Analysis Testing for Anticipatory Effects 
    Original results   
Sensitivity analysis 1a: 
6-month anticipatory period 
dropped   
Sensitivity analysis 1b: 
Test for significant 
anticipatory effects  
Variable 
Coefficienta 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficienta 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficientb 
Ant*PBB   SE 
Performance measure                       
  Mammography 0.0687 *** 0.0118   0.6814 *** 0.0125   -0.0002   0.0069 
  Cervical cancer screening 0.0336 *** 0.0055   0.0338 *** 0.0058   -0.0010   0.0028 
  Diabetes-A1C screening 0.0175 *** 0.0053   0.0178 *** 0.0060   0.0011   0.0069 
  Diabetes-A1C control 0.0194 ** 0.0099   0.1791   0.0116   -0.0055   0.0104 
  Diabetes-LDL control 0.0243   0.0258   0.0204   0.0270   -0.0101   0.0125 
  Asthma care -0.0042 * 0.0024   -0.0062 ** 0.0028   -0.0049 ** 0.0022 
  Well child visits -0.0663 ** 0.0294   -0.0542 * 0.0314   0.0387 ** 0.0170 
  Low back pain 0.0533 *** 0.0086   0.0531 *** 0.0093   0.0002 ** 0.0076 
  Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing 0.0337 * 0.0180   0.0286   0.0201   -0.0149   0.0131 
  URI-Appropriate treatment 0.0239 *** 0.0060   0.0224 *** 0.0067   -0.0049   0.0041 
  Mental health-7-day follow-up -0.0001   0.0122   -0.0016   0.0139   -0.0090   0.0118 
  Mental health-30-day follow-up -0.0034   0.0074   -0.0062   0.0083   -0.0124   0.0076 
  CLABSI SIR 0.9014 ** 0.4242   0.8501 ** 0.4208   -0.1379   0.2336 
Note.  PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR= standardized infection ratio. SE= 
Standard Error.    
aCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period.  It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each 
metric in the the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities. 
bCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the anticipatory period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each metric in 
the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Excluding the observations in the 6-month period immediately preceding the start of the 
incentives did not have a significant impact on the results of the main analysis.  Dropping 
observations in the 6-month anticipatory period produced only minor changes in statistical 
significance for four measures: diabetes A1C control, asthma care, well child visits, and 
appropriate testing for children diagnosed with pharyngitis.  This minor change in statistical 
significance may be attributable to a loss of statistical power associated with dropping 
observations and not interpreted as a change in results.  For the second sensitivity analysis (final 
columns in Table 23), only three measures demonstrated a statistically significant change in 
performance in the 6-month anticipatory period: well child visits, asthma, and low back pain.  
For the asthma indicator, measurement issues that led to the elimination of some pre-PBB data 
periods may be having some effect on subsequent periods given the graph in Figure 13.  The 
reasons for pre-implementation improvement in well child visits and low back pain require 
further study to assess why these trends were observed. 
 Table 24 presents the results of the next group of sensitivity analyses, the first of which 
evaluates the impact of dropping facility-level covariates from the model and the second of 
which drops facilities from the analysis that operate in MSMs.  Sensitivity analysis 2 considers 
the possibility that the model may be overspecified while sensitivity analysis 3 accounts for the 
possibility that facilities operating in MSMs may experience spillover effects from local 
facilities that are not participating in PBB.  The coefficients represent the interaction of PBB in 
the postimplementation time period.  In comparison to the original analysis, sensitivity analysis 
2 did not produce any significant changes in results.  The magnitude of the effect of PBB in the 
postperiod was similar for both models across all measures, although two measures had a minor 
change in statistical significance (diabetes A1C control and well child visits). 
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Table 24 
Results of Sensitivity Analyses Testing the Impact of Covariates and MSM 
    Original results    
Sensitivity analysis 2: 
All covariates dropped from 
analysis   
Sensitivity analysis 3: 
All MSM facilities dropped 
from analysis 
Variable 
Coefficienta 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficienta 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficienta 
Post*PBB   SE 
Performance measure                       
  Mammography 0.0687 *** 0.0118   0.0641 *** 0.0121   0.0811 *** 0.0151 
  Cervical Cancer Screening 0.0336 *** 0.0055   0.0357 *** 0.0052   0.0398 *** 0.0075 
  Diabetes-A1C Screening 0.0175 *** 0.0053   0.0179 *** 0.0050   0.0192 ** 0.0079 
  Diabetes-A1C Control 0.0194 ** 0.0099   0.0172 * 0.0099   0.0226   0.0152 
  Diabetes-LDL Control 0.0243   0.0258   0.0141   0.0274   0.0435   0.0351 
  Asthma Care -0.0042 * 0.0024   -0.0040 * 0.0024   -0.0026   0.0033 
  Well Child Visits -0.0663 ** 0.0294   -0.0978 *** 0.0273   -0.0369   0.0327 
  Low Back Pain 0.0533 *** 0.0086   0.0551 *** 0.0086   0.0744 *** 0.0106 
  
Pharyngitis-Appropriate 
testing 0.0337 * 0.0180   0.0335 * 0.0181   0.0352 * 0.0203 
  URI-Appropriate treatment 0.0239 *** 0.0060   0.0242 *** 0.0062   0.0356 *** 0.0082 
  
Mental Health-7-day follow-
up -0.0001   0.0122   0.0006   0.0126   -0.0137   0.0151 
  
Mental Health-30-day follow-
up -0.0034   0.0074   -0.0042   0.0074   -0.0134   0.0087 
  CLABSI SIR 0.9014 ** 0.4242   0.9471 ** 0.4222   0.9686 b 0.7554 
Note.  PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI = central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR= standardized infection ratio; MSM = 
multi-service market. SE= Standard Error.    
aCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period.  It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each 
metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities.  
bSample size dropped to 7. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Sensitivity analysis 3 produced some minor changes in the magnitude of the effect sizes 
for PBB in the post period.  In most cases, dropping MSM facilities from the analysis 
strengthened the effect sizes for PBB, providing some evidence that facilities in these markets 
may be experiencing some spillover effects.  For some measures, such as the diabetes A1C 
screening, diabetes A1C control, asthma, and the well child visits measures, dropping MSM 
facilities produced a minor loss of statistical significance.  This may be attributable to a loss of 
statistical power resulting from dropping over 100 facilities from the analysis.  Despite these 
changes, the overall conclusions drawn from the original analysis remain the same.  For most 
performance measures, there was a significant, positive change in performance among PBB 
facilities relative to comparison facilities after the start of incentives.  The purpose of the fourth 
sensitivity analysis was to determine if the results were potentially biased by facilities that had 
very few patients eligible for each type of care or treatment (i.e., a low denominator for each 
performance measure).  The original analysis for Research Question 1 eliminated any 
observations with fewer than 5 patients in the facility who were eligible for the care or 
treatment.  The same model was estimated for sensitivity analyses 4a and 4b, except facilities 
were dropped if they had fewer than 10 or 20 patients eligible for the care, respectively.  On 
average, 20 facilities were dropped from the analysis for each measure when the minimum 
number of eligible patients was changed from 5 to 10.  Another 24 facilities were dropped, on 
average, when the minimum number of eligible patients was changed from 10 to 20.   
Table 25 presents the results of the fourth sensitivity analysis.  There were no 
appreciable changes to the coefficients, standard errors, or level of statistical significance for 
any of the measures as a result of changing the threshold for the minimum number of patients 
necessary for inclusion in the analysis from 5 to 20.   
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Table 25 
Results of Sensitivity Analyses Testing the Impact of Altering Minimum Patient Thresholds 
    Original results   Sensitivity analysis 4a:   Sensitivity analysis 4b: 
    
Observations with < 5 eligible 
patients dropped   
Observations with < 10 
eligible patients dropped    
Observations with < 20 
eligible patients dropped 
Variable 
Coefficientb 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficientb 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coefficient b 
Post*PBB   SE 
Performance measurea                       
  Mammography 0.0687 *** 0.0118   0.0688 *** 0.0118   0.0689 *** 0.0118 
  Cervical cancer screening 0.0336 *** 0.0055   0.0336 *** 0.0055   0.0335 *** 0.0055 
  Diabetes-A1C screening 0.0175 *** 0.0053   0.0175 *** 0.0053   0.0179 *** 0.0053 
  Diabetes-A1C control 0.0194 ** 0.0099   0.0194 ** 0.0099   0.0197 ** 0.0100 
  Diabetes-LDL control 0.0243   0.0258   0.0241   0.0259   0.0241   0.0260 
  Asthma care -0.0042 * 0.0024   -0.0043 * 0.0024   -0.0044 * 0.0024 
  Well child visits -0.0663 ** 0.0294   -0.0659 ** 0.0294   -0.0655 ** 0.0296 
  Low back pain 0.0533 *** 0.0086   0.0534 *** 0.0086   0.0530 *** 0.0086 
  Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing 0.0337 * 0.0180   0.0338 * 0.0180   0.0351 * 0.0183 
  URI-Appropriate treatment 0.0239 *** 0.0060   0.0238 *** 0.0060   0.0238 *** 0.0060 
  Mental health-7-day follow-up -0.0001   0.0122   -0.0043   0.0126   -0.0070   0.0133 
  Mental health-30-day follow-up -0.0034   0.0074   -0.0057   0.0076   -0.0067   0.0079 
Note.  Eligible patients are defined as the number of patients eligible for each type of care or treatment for each performance measure.  Analysis 
were conducted with minimum thresholds of 5, 10, and 20.  PBB = Performance-based budgeting. SE= Standard Error.    
aCLABSI measure omitted from this sensitivity analysis because “eligible patients” is not applicable to this measure. 
bCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period. It represents the continuous proportional change in performance for each 
metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison facilities. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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 The fifth sensitivity analysis altered the age variable in the original model.  The average 
patient age variable was replaced by a comprehensive set of dummy variables representing 8 
age bands.  This enabled distinction between facilities on the age distribution of the patient 
population, which may have otherwise been obscured by using the average age variable.  This 
new model did not produce any appreciable changes to the study results.   
The final sensitivity analysis evaluates the impact of including a comprehensive set of 
quarterly time dummy variables into the model.  The purpose of this analysis is to account for 
potential seasonal effects or trends in the outcomes.  Since the DHP budget changes on a yearly 
basis, it was dropped from this model due to collinearity with time.  
Table 26 presents the results of the sixth sensitivity analysis.  Changing the time variable 
to a comprehensive set of quarterly dummy variables did not have an appreciable effect on the 
results.  For most measures, the effect size was slightly larger but the change was small.  For 
example, the marginal effect in mammography performance for PBB facilities relative to 
comparison facilities in the postperiod changed from 7.1% improvement to 7.4% improvement.  
The other measures demonstrated similarly small changes as a result of this change in 
specification of the time variable. 
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Table 26 
Results of Sensitivity Analysis Changing the Specification of Time Variable 
    Original results   
Sensitivity analysis 6: 
Accounting for seasonal 
trends 
Variable 
Coeff.a 
Post*PBB   SE   
Coeff.a,b 
Post*PB
B   SE 
Performance measure               
  Mammography 0.0687 *** 0.0118   0.0717 *** 0.0116 
  Cervical cancer screening 0.0336 *** 0.0055   0.0346 *** 0.0055 
  Diabetes-A1C screening 0.0175 *** 0.0053   0.0186 *** 0.0054 
  Diabetes-A1C control 0.0194 ** 0.0099   0.0203 ** 0.0101 
  Diabetes-LDL control 0.0243   0.0258   0.0225   0.0260 
  Asthma care -0.0042 * 0.0024   -0.0034   0.0023 
  Well child visits -0.0663 ** 0.0294   -0.0799 *** 0.0294 
  Low back pain 0.0533 *** 0.0086   0.0546 *** 0.0085 
  Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing 0.0337 * 0.0180   0.0342 * 0.0181 
  URI-Appropriate treatment 0.0239 *** 0.0060   0.0239 *** 0.0060 
  Mental health-7-day follow-up -0.0001   0.0122   0.0005   0.0120 
  Mental health-30-day follow-up -0.0034   0.0074   -0.0030   0.0073 
  CLABSI SIR 0.9014 ** 0.4242   0.8404 ** 0.4190 
Note. Sensitivity analysis includes a comprehensive set of quarterly time dummy variables to account for 
seasonal trends in performance on each measure.  PBB = performance-based budgeting; CLABSI = 
central line-associated bloodstream infection; SIR = standardized infection ratio. 
aCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period.  It represents the continuous 
proportional change in performance for each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison 
facilities. 
bDHP variable omitted from model due to collinearity. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis: Research Question 2 
Table 27 presents a summary of the results of all fixed effects Poisson regressions for 
those performance measures with sufficient postimplementation data to be examined as a 
dependent variable for Research Question 2.  As discussed previously, Research Question 2 
seeks to determine if trends in performance improvement attributable to PBB are sustained over 
time in the postimplementation period.  This is assessed by breaking the 5-year 
postimplementation period into two parts, evaluating how the performance trends in the first 10 
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quarters compare to performance in the second 10 quarters after the start of incentives.  The two 
left columns in Table 27 report the interaction of PBB in the first and second 
postimplementation periods.  The coefficients in each of these columns represent the continuous 
proportional change in performance for PBB facilities in each period relative to comparison 
facilities.  The final column presents the results of postestimation tests evaluating the difference 
between the coefficients in the first two columns.  Values less than 0.10 indicate a significant 
change in performance between the first 10 quarters and the second 10 quarters of the 
postimplementation period, for PBB facilities.  
 
Table 27 
Summary of the Regression Results for Research Question 2 
    
Postperiod 1 
Quarters 1-10 
after start of 
incentives 
Postperiod 2 
Quarters 11-20 
after start of 
incentives 
Significance of 
performance change 
postperiod 1 to 
postperiod 1b 
Variable Coefficienta   Coefficienta   Prob > Chi2 
Population health                
  Mammography 0.0442 *** 0.0966 *** 0.0000 
  Cervical cancer screening 0.0214 *** 0.0497 *** 0.0000 
  Diabetes-A1C screening 0.0047     0.3206 *** 0.0000 
  Diabetes-A1C control 0.0047     0.0360 *** 0.0001 
  Diabetes-LDL control -0.0046     0.0529 *   0.0016 
  Asthma care -0.0061     -0.0015     0.0383 
Note.  Measures with less than 20 quarters of post data are excluded. 
aCoefficient is the interaction of PBB in the postimplementation period(s). It represents the continuous 
proportional change in performance for each metric in the PBB facilities relative to the comparison 
facilities. 
bPBB facilities.  Based on chi2 postestimation tests: PBB*Period1-PBB*Period2 = 0. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 As depicted in Table 27, PBB facilities experienced increased performance relative to 
comparison facilities from period 1 to period 2 for all measures.  For the mammography and 
cervical screening measures, the change in performance for PBB facilities in both periods is 
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significantly higher than comparison facilities.  These findings support Hypothesis 2 by 
suggesting that performance improved for PBB facilities in the postimplementation periods 
(relative to comparison facilities) and that performance gains continued throughout the 5-year 
postimplementation period and in fact grew in the second postimplementation period when 
compared to the first.  For the diabetes A1C screening measure, the diabetes A1C control 
measure, and the diabetes LDL control measure, performance gains for PBB facilities relative to 
comparison facilities were not significant until the second 10 quarters of the postimplementation 
period.  This partially supports Hypothesis 2 in that no significant gains were present initially 
but instead there appears to have been a delayed response that led to performance improvements 
in quarters 11-20 after the incentives were introduced.  The results for the asthma care measure 
fail to support Hypothesis 2.  The change in performance for PBB facilities relative to 
comparison facilities did not reach statistical significance in either half of the 
postimplementation period.  Even though performance improved for PBB facilities from period 
1 to period 2, there was never a statistically significant, positive change in performance for PBB 
facilities relative to comparison facilities, suggesting that PBB did not have a significant 
marginal effect for that measure. 
Summary 
This chapter provided the results of the descriptive analyses, main empirical analyses, 
and sensitivity analyses that address the study’s two research questions.  In reference to 
Research Question 1, the study findings indicate that PBB was associated with increased quality 
performance on seven out of 13 measures under investigation.  PBB facilities had less quality 
performance improvement relative to comparison facilities on three out of 13 of the measures 
under investigation.  Another three out of 13 measures demonstrated no significant change in 
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performance for PBB facilities relative to comparison facilities.  The study findings also suggest 
that performance improvement attributable to PBB was either sustained or improved for at least 
5 years for five out of six measures under investigation.   
The next chapter summarizes and interprets the empirical results of this study.  It also 
provides an evaluation of the study’s limitations and discusses the practical and policy 
implications of the research findings.  The chapter concludes with a suggestion for relevant 
future research on PBP in healthcare settings. 
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PBB is a promising but underresearched approach for encouraging quality improvement 
in government-funded healthcare facilities.  The purpose of this research was to investigate the 
effects of PBB on performance improvement in U.S. military healthcare facilities.  This was 
accomplished by addressing two research questions, both of which pertained to performance 
improvement on healthcare quality metrics.  The first research question sought to determine if 
PBB was associated with performance improvement in military healthcare facilities that 
implemented it versus military healthcare facilities that did not.  The second research question 
sought to determine if quality improvements tied to PBB were sustained over time in those 
same facilities.   
The extant research on PBB and its related approach, pay for performance, were 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Chapter 2 also presented reasons why PBB should be explored as a 
special case of pay for performance and why PBB may produce similar effects on quality.  
Chapter 2 concluded with an overview of the MHS and the conditions that gave rise to an 
experimental program using PBB in Army healthcare facilities.  Chapter 3 presented a 
conceptual model that applied the concepts of RDT to explain why PBB might give rise to 
performance improvement in military healthcare facilities.  This conceptual model was applied 
to generate the study’s two hypotheses that PBB would be associated with quality performance 
improvement in healthcare facilities, and that performance improvement would be sustained for 
at least 5 years in the presence of performance incentives.   
Chapter 6: Discussion
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Chapter 4 outlined an empirical method for testing the study’s hypotheses and 
conceptual model.  A post-hoc DID approach was proposed to test the impact of PBB in Army 
healthcare facilities by measuring performance on various quality metrics before and after 
implementation of incentives, and comparing these performance trends to performance of 
facilities that did not participate in PBB.  Detailed results of that analysis were presented in 
Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 starts with a summary and interpretation of those findings, followed by a 
discussion of the study’s limitations.  This chapter concludes with a presentation of the study’s 
implications and future research directions.   
Summary of Research Findings 
This study applied RDT to examine the relationship between PBB and quality 
performance improvement in military healthcare facilities.  Because military healthcare 
facilities are dependent upon financial resources from the DHP, if access to those resources are 
made contingent upon quality performance, RDT predicts that healthcare facilities will improve 
performance on those metrics that are incentivized.  Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be 
greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in Army healthcare 
organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to military healthcare organizations in 
other branches that did not participate in PBB programs, ceteris paribus.  The study tested 
Hypothesis 1 using a DID, Poisson regression analysis to compare performance on a variety of 
quality measures between PBB and non-PBB facilities, both before and after implementation of 
PBB incentives.  Table 28 summarizes the findings for Research Question 1 and specifies 
whether the hypothesis was supported for each measure examined.   
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Table 28 
Summary of Research Question 1 Findings Categorized by Performance Metric 
Hypothesis Supported 
Research Question 1: What is the impact of performance-based budgeting on quality improvement in U.S. Army 
healthcare facilities?     
Hypothesis 1: There will be greater performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in Army healthcare 
organizations that participated in PBB programs relative to military healthcare organizations in other branches that did 
not participate in PBB programs, ceteris paribus.   
Measures   
  Population health    
    Mammography Yes 
    Cervical cancer screening Yes 
    Diabetes-A1C screening Yes 
    Diabetes-A1C control Yes 
    Diabetes-LDL control No 
    Asthma care No 
    Well child visits No 
    Low back pain Yes 
    Pharyngitis-Appropriate testing Yes 
    URI-Appropriate treatment Yes 
    Mental health-7-day follow-up No 
    Mental health-30-day follow-up No 
  Clinical safety    
    CLABSI No 
Note.  PBB = performance-based budgeting; LDL = low density lipoproteins; URI = upper respiratory infection; CLABSI = central line-associated 
bloodstream infection.  
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These findings lend support to Hypothesis 1.  PBB was associated with performance 
improvement for over half of the measures under investigation.  Though these findings are 
specific to PBB in military healthcare facilities, they are generally consistent with the literature 
on pay for performance.  The measures with stronger associations between PBB and 
performance improvement tended to be process measures such as mammography and cervical 
cancer screening with weaker effect sizes (or no effect) observed for outcome measures such as 
diabetes management, CLABSI, and asthma care.  Three measures (diabetes LDL control, and 
7- and 30-day mental health hospitalization follow-ups) were not associated with any 
performance effects in PBB facilities after initiation of incentives.  It is unclear why this pattern 
of results emerged for the mental health follow-up measures.  It is possible that these measures 
are more challenging for performance improvement because they require robust systems of case 
management and communication between teams of healthcare professionals.  Clarifying 
underlying reasons for these findings is beyond the scope of this research, but it is worthy of 
future investigation.   
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the results for the well child visits performance measure 
appeared to show a decrease in performance for PBB facilities in the period after program 
incentives were offered.  It is unclear why this result was observed, but it may relate to the level 
of mobility among military families during this period.  Since performance on this metric spans 
15 months, there is some potential for spillover effects from non-PBB facilities because patients 
move between military installations.  For example, a family might move from an Army facility 
to a MSM and transfer care to a Navy, Air Force, or civilian facility (or vice versa).  Thus, 
performance from one facility may be carried over into performance in a new facility for 
children between the ages of zero and 15 months.   
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Additionally, during the study time period, there were a significant number of 
deployments for Army personnel.  When servicemembers deploy, families often move away 
from military installations for the duration of the deployment.  For the families remaining on 
military installations, there is often a strain on the nondeploying spouse.  This can potentially 
lead families to forgo routine wellness care, particularly if adequate childcare resources are not 
available for other children in the family in order to support participation in wellness care.  This 
unexpected finding warrants further investigation. 
Research Question 2 of this study investigated the effects of PBB over a 5-year 
postperiod to determine whether performance changes were sustained, with Hypothesis 2 
predicting that quality improvements attributable to PBB programs will persist throughout the 
postperiod after each metric is incentivized.  The results of this analysis lend support for 
Hypothesis 2.  Five of six measurements demonstrated statistically significant improvement, 
relative to comparison facilities, by the second half of the postperiod.   
Of the measures for which PBB facilities demonstrated significant improvement in the 
postperiod, three measures did not achieve that level of improvement until the second half of the 
postperiod.  This suggests that incentives may have a delayed effect on performance in some 
cases.  Since all three of these measures pertained to diabetes management, it is possible that the 
delayed improvement was related to the relative complexity of performance improvement 
specific to these measures.  In contrast to simpler process measures, diabetes management 
indicators may take longer to produce an observable improvement, possibly due to the need for 
more complex and sustained patient engagement.  PBB was associated with more immediate 
effects for the mammography and cervical cancer screening measures, which showed significant 
improvement in both phases of the postperiod.  For both measures, performance in PBB 
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facilities improved in the second half of the postperiod relative to the first.  It is possible that the 
immediate effects observed with these two measures are related to the fact that they are process 
measures that can be impacted within a single visit per patient.   
Table 29 presents a summary of findings for Research Question 2.  The only indicator 
that did not show significant improvement relative to comparison facilities in either period was 
the asthma measure.  It is unclear why this result was observed, but it possible that it may be 
related to the abbreviated preperiod, which reduced the number of observations for that 
timeframe.  Due to this concern, this result should be interpreted with caution.   
 Overall, the empirical results suggest that PBB is associated with performance 
improvement effects for a select set of quality performance measures in military healthcare 
facilities.  Consistent with pay for performance research, the largest effects are observed in 
process measures and measures that are easily impacted with a single medical visit, such as 
mammography and cervical cancer screenings.  Additionally, the results of this study suggest 
that PBB incentives can have long-lasting impact on performance improvement, with quality 
performance either sustained or continually improved over a five-year period for most 
measures.  Empirical results also suggest that, for some measures, the performance 
improvement response to PBB incentives may be delayed.  This is particularly true of measures 
pertaining to diabetes management.   
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Table 29 
Summary of Research Question 2 Findings Categorized by Performance Metric 
      
Significant 
improvementa     
Hypothesis 
Postperiod 
1 
Postperiod 
2 
Performance change 
Period 1 to Period 2 
Hypothesis 
2 supported 
Research Question 2: Are quality improvements tied to 
performance-based budgeting sustained over time in U.S. Army 
hospitals?           
Hypothesis 2: Quality improvements attributable to PBB programs 
in PBB facilities will be sustained throughout the postperiod after 
each metric is incentivized.           
Measures         
  Population health          
    Mammography Yes Yes Improve Yes 
    Cervical cancer screening Yes Yes Improve Yes 
    Diabetes-A1C screening No Yes Improve Yes 
    Diabetes-A1C control No Yes Improve Yes 
    Diabetes-LDL control No Yes Improve Yes 
    Asthma care No No   Improveb No 
Note. PBB = performance-based budgeting; LDL = low density lipoproteins; URI = upper respiratory infection; CLABSI = central line-associated 
bloodstream infection.   
aRelative to comparison facilities.  
bPBB had a negative (but not significant) effect on asthma care in both periods, but the negative association in the second period was smaller in 
absolute value when compared to the first period. 
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Several sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to determine the robustness of 
results in light of changes in model specification and exclusion criteria for facilities.  One set of 
sensitivity analyses assessed the relative impact of changes in the specification of the age and 
time variables.  Another sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the impact of dropping 
all model covariates.  None of these changes produced significant changes to the observed 
results.  Two additional sensitivity analyses altered the exclusion criteria for facilities included in 
the original model.  One analysis excluded all facilities operating in MSMs in order to account 
for the potential of spillover effects.  This exclusion produced slightly larger effect sizes for 
PBB, indicating that some spillover effects may be present in MSMs.   
For example, for many measures the comparison group performed better than the PBB 
group in the pre-intervention period.  In MSMs, patients may have circulated between PBB and 
non-PBB facilities, which would make the performance changes for those patients less 
distinguishable in Army facilities in those markets.  The fact that removing MSM facilities from 
the analysis increased PBB effect sizes strengthens the evidence for this inference.  Despite this, 
the relative changes in effect sizes were very small and did not impact the overall interpretation 
of the results.  Another sensitivity analysis assessed the relative impact of changing the 
thresholds for the minimum number of eligible patients required for inclusion in each analysis.  
The original model excluded facilities with a denominator of fewer than 5 eligible patients.  The 
sensitivity analyses assessed the relative significance of changing this threshold to a minimum of 
10 and 20 eligible patients.  This did not have a significant impact on the results.   
Another sensitivity analysis evaluated the potential for anticipatory effects on 
performance in the 6-month period prior to the implementation of PBB incentives.  The 
underlying assumption for this analysis was that organizations might start performance 
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improvement efforts ahead of time in order to maximize the potential for receiving incentives 
once they are offered.  For the majority of performance indicators, there was little evidence of 
anticipatory effects.  However, two indicators (well child visits and low back pain) did exhibit 
some small performance improvements in the 6-month period prior to the implementation of 
incentives, suggesting anticipatory effects.   
Study Limitations 
The results of this study indicate that PBB may be a promising approach for encouraging 
quality performance improvement in military healthcare facilities.  However, this study does 
have five noteworthy limitations.  
The first limitation is that this study divides the intervention and comparison groups 
along military service lines, with the intervention group including Army facilities and the 
comparison group including Navy and Air Force facilities.  This assignment strategy presents the 
possibility that unobserved or unmeasured differences between the two groups may result from 
service-specific differences rather than the effects of PBB.  For example, the intervention group 
(Army) had significantly lower performance on many of the performance metrics in the pre-
intervention period in comparison to the Navy and Air Force facilities.  This suggests that there 
may have been factors that differed between Army and comparison facilities that could not be 
controlled but may be relevant to the different performance trajectories that were measured.  
Since the two groups were not equal prior to the intervention, the Navy and Air Force facilities 
may not have been a perfect counterfactual for what may have occurred in Army facilities if PBB 
had not been implemented.  Despite this, there are several research design features that were 
implemented that help to mitigate this concern.   
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The use of a fixed-effect model helps to address some concerns about service-specific 
variations that may confound the interpretation of results.  In theory, any potential service-
specific time-invariant factor is controlled through the use of fixed effects in that each study 
facility is compared to itself over time with respect to each quality measure.  Additionally, all 
measures were examined for performance trends between the two groups prior to intervention.  
Though there were some pre-intervention differences in the levels of performance, the 
performance trends appeared to be similar for almost all measures.  Additionally, for the 
majority of the measures, there was an observable change in performance that occurred in 
conjunction with the timing of the incentives for the intervention group.  Because this occurred 
for several measures over different periods of time, it strengthens the inference that the PBB 
incentives played a key role in these performance changes.   
Another limitation is that this study focuses on a narrow set of quality metrics.  This was 
largely due to the fact that the MHS did not collect quality performance data in an integrated 
manner in the earliest years of PBB.  During the beginning stages of the Army’s PBB program, 
each military service collected and reported most of their data independently.  Very few 
measures were included in the early PBB program that had consistent data collection across the 
three military services.  HEDIS measures were a notable exception to this because all HEDIS 
measures are collected using standardized NCQA protocols, and all three military services 
participated in collecting these data.  As a result, the majority of the quality measures in this 
study pertain to population health and the use of evidence-based medicine, which have been the 
focus of the HEDIS program.  
It is possible that the results observed in the limited set of quality metrics examined in 
this study may not produce similar results in other types of measures.  As discussed previously, 
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the results of pay for performance studies vary widely depending on the type of quality metric 
examined (Damberg et al., 2014; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Van Herck et al., 2010).  Though this 
study includes a mixture of process and outcome measures, most of these metrics are related to 
the technical aspects of ambulatory care services and do not measure patient or physician 
perception of quality.  According to a policy review by Hanefeld, Powell-Jackson, and 
Balabanova (2017), comprehensive measures of clinical quality should include aspects of care 
that go beyond technical quality, including a comparison of clinical quality and perceived 
quality; measures of quality at varying points in the patients’ pathway through the system; 
measures of immediate and upstream drivers of quality care; and individual and collective 
assessments of contextual variables such as power, social status, trust and values that impact 
perception of quality.  Though many of these aspects of quality measurement were addressed in 
measures that the Army included in its PBB programs, not all of these metrics were evaluated in 
this study due to the consistency issues previously discussed.   
A third limitation is that some of the indicators exhibited trends that looked different in 
the pre-PBB period across the intervention and comparison group (specifically, the URI and 
CLABSI measures).  The findings for these indicators should be interpreted with more caution 
when compared to the conclusions reached for indicators where the pre-PBB trends appeared to 
be more similar and stable across the PBB and non-PBB facilities.  A critical aspect of the quasi-
experimental DID approach is that the intervention and comparison groups must have similar 
pre-intervention trends in the measurement of the variable in question.  Since these pre-
intervention parallel trends were not observed in the URI and CLABSI measures, there is less 
strength in the conclusions that can be drawn from these results.  In the case of the URI measure, 
the pre-intervention trends for the comparison group appear to have risen and then levelled off 
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around the time the incentives started.  For the intervention group of PBB facilities, the opposite 
was true.  Performance was mostly level until just prior to the start of incentives, and then it rose 
sharply and continued to rise throughout the majority of the postintervention period.  Even 
though the timing of sharp performance improvement in conjunction with the timing of the 
incentives suggests that PBB incentives had an impact on performance, this cannot be reliably 
concluded without similarity in pre-intervention performance trends for  the comparison group.  
With respect to the CLABSI measure, there was not enough consistency in performance from 
either group in either time period to adequately assess pre- or postintervention performance 
trends.  As mentioned previously, this is likely due to the small sample size.  A larger sample 
may have generated more distinct results and enabled a better observation of pre- and 
postintervention performance trends between the two groups.   
A fourth limitation in this study is the use of suboptimal control variables.  The variables 
for patient characteristics, namely age, gender, and acuity, were derived from the encounters that 
occurred within the facility, whereas the performance data were derived from the enrolled patient 
population at each facility.  This is due to the fact that the control variables were constructed 
from data retrieved from the MHS MDR.  This data repository stores multiple datapoints for 
every medical encounter in the MHS.  Thus, the patient variables that were aggregated for each 
facility during each month or quarter were generated from the data on the visits that occurred 
within each facility, not the characteristics of the underlying patient population enrolled to that 
facility.  In theory, the medical encounters occurring in each facility should provide a rough 
approximation of the patient characteristics of all enrollees, though it is possible that these 
estimates are biased.  Thus, the patient characteristics used to construct the control variables may 
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not have been a precise reflection of characteristics of the specific patient population to which 
each performance measure pertained.   
For example, if a diabetes patient is assigned to facility j at time t, but did not have an 
appointment at facility j during time t, then that patient’s characteristics (age, gender, acuity) 
would not have been captured in the data used to generate facility j’s aggregated age, gender, and 
acuity variables.  However, that same patient would have been included in the facility’s diabetes 
performance measure if the patient was enrolled to facility j, regardless of whether the patient 
had a medical encounter at that facility during the relevant time period.  This is because the 
HEDIS performance measures are constructed from enrollment data, whereas the aggregated 
control variables are constructed from encounter data.  Another related issue exists with the 
measurement of facility-aggregated patient acuity.  Since this measure is derived from patient 
encounter data, it is likely that acuity estimates are biased by the exclusion of low acuity patients 
who are assigned to facilities but did not seek medical care.  For young, healthy active duty 
servicemembers, medical encounters may be as infrequent as once per year, when the 
servicemember receives a required physical exam.  This can potentially create a stronger bias in 
the acuity estimates for those facilities that exclusively serve active duty servicemembers.   
The use of suboptimal data in constructing the facility aggregated control variables may 
have contributed to the lack of significance observed in the estimates of many of these variables.  
The opposite is true, however, of the DHP (munificence) control variable.  The DHP variable 
was problematic because it was a blunt instrument for approximating the level of munificence in 
each of the facilities in the study.  The DHP budget applied to the entire MHS, meaning that it 
was time-variant but not facility-variant.  Thus, this measure did not capture the distinctions in 
the availability of resources that may have existed between facilities.  Nonetheless, the DHP 
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variable was significant in almost all regression models, although its association with 
performance was not always in the predicted direction.  For some indicators, the size of the DHP 
budget and performance were inversely related.  The reasons for this unexpected association are 
unclear, but may be correlated with time.  Due to concerns about the precision of control 
variables, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the impact of dropping all control 
variables in the model.  This change in model specification did not significantly alter the results 
or change the interpretation of the findings.  Even though the control variables were suboptimal, 
they did not appear to have a substantial impact on the findings related to potential PBB 
influence on the quality metrics studied.   
A final limitation pertains to the generalizability of the empirical findings.  The results of 
this study suggest that PBB can be an effective tool for encouraging healthcare organizations to 
improve performance on a select set of quality indicators.  However, it is unclear whether these 
results will generalize to other types of programs or government-funded healthcare 
organizations.  Military healthcare facilities are unique organizations for several reasons that 
have previously been discussed.  Most notably, military healthcare organizations have a very 
centralized, top-down governance structure that may enable programs such as PBAM and IRIS 
to generate performance effects that may not be actualized in other types of organizations and 
governance structures.  For example, it is possible that PBB is best situated for performance 
change in organizations with a uniform set of priorities from a single executive agency (such as 
the DHA) and may not work as well in other government-funded hospitals that must still contend 
with multiple priorities from several health insurers.  This study did not address the 
organizational factors that may have contributed to the success of PBB in military healthcare 
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facilities, so it is unknown whether these results will generalize to other types of healthcare 
organizations.   
Implications and Future Research Directions 
Theoretical Implications 
Most of the literature on PBB has previously been derived from the political science 
research and has not included rigorous comparative analyses of organizations using and not 
using PBB.  The political science literature on PBB is centered on debates about the most 
effective mechanism for linking budgetary resources (“inputs”) to government “outputs” such as 
high-performing public programs.  Most of this literature is devoted to defining and measuring 
performance and determining how to most effectively integrate it into the budgeting process.  
This study offers a new direction for PBB research by examining PBB from an organizational 
rather than political perspective. 
This study draws from the widely used RDT to explain how military healthcare 
organizations might respond to performance-contingent changes in funding.  This theoretical 
approach was selected over the theories in the political science domain because it focuses on 
behavior at the organizational level of a healthcare facility as opposed to examining it from the 
larger governmental and legislative perspective.   
The hypotheses generated from the RDT framework and conceptual model were 
supported for the majority of the indicators in this study.  However, this conceptual model may 
not provide a complete picture of how organizations respond to PBB incentives.  It does not 
explain why PBB had a positive effect for some performance indicators and not others.  It also 
does not explain why PBB was relatively successful in the context of military healthcare 
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organizations, whereas similar approaches, such as pay for performance, have not been as 
successful in private sector health organizations.   
For future analysis, it may be helpful to draw from a wider range of organizational 
theories to develop a more complete understanding of the factors that may influence the relative 
success of PBB programs in improving quality performance.  For example, future studies might 
draw upon the elements of contingency theory to determine which types of organizations are 
most likely to respond positively to performance-based contingencies in funding, such as PBB 
programs.  Future studies might also draw upon the conceptual model posited by William 
Ocasio’s (1997) attention-based view of the firm.  Using this framework, PBB might be 
considered a mechanism by which decision-makers use performance-contingent funding to focus 
the attention of organizational leaders on the quality issues that are most important to leaders and 
the organization as a whole.  This framework also opens up many opportunities for future 
research in determining the organizational contexts in which this approach might be most 
successful.   
Policy Implications 
This study complements the existing literature on PBB by providing empirical evidence 
that suggests it can be effective in military healthcare organizations in promoting quality in 
certain healthcare metrics.  It also adds to the wide body of extant literature on pay for 
performance by examining the specific case of PBB and the unique context of federally funded 
military healthcare organizations.  Additionally, the findings of this study diverge slightly from 
the trends observed in pay for performance research, which are often contradictory and mixed in 
terms of offering evidence to support its use.  The positive results from this study provide 
evidence for a type of pay for performance that might be effective in the context of government 
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funded healthcare facilities and programs.  This warrants further investigation and replication to 
determine the contextual factors that may be contributing to the success of PBB in healthcare 
when much less success has typically been observed for pay for performance.   
This study builds upon previous research by West, Cronk, Goodman, and Waymire 
(2010) that found that the Army’s PBAM program demonstrated significant initial improvements 
in productivity and the use of evidence-based medicine.  That study was used to evaluate PBAM 
and justify its future use.  This study extends that line of research by investigating the impact of 
PBAM and its successor, IRIS, to determine if those programs had ongoing positive impacts on 
quality performance.  This study confirms those initial findings and provides evidence that those 
initial performance gains were sustained.  It also provides evidence that this approach facilitated 
continued success for other indicators as the programs were expanded to include a wider range of 
quality measures.   
As the MHS continues its integration under the DHA, leaders will have to decide 
between a range of policy approaches that have been implemented individually across the three 
service branches.  The choice to expand the Army’s IRIS program to include all military 
healthcare facilities is one such decision.  This study provides some empirical support to justify 
its expansion and future use.  Though this study did not find evidence that PBB demonstrated 
positive performance effects for all quality indicators, there were enough instances of success 
that it should be considered for future use in the areas for which it had significant effects.  
Because this study did not find PBB to be universally effective across all indicators, it 
underscores the need for leaders to continually monitor its effects and adjust strategies and 
incentives accordingly  
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Finally, the results of this study offer evidence to support the future investigation of PBB 
as an approach that can potentially be expanded to other government-funded healthcare facilities, 
such the VHA or the Indian Health Service.  It is possible that the success observed in military 
healthcare facilities may generalize to other types of government-funded healthcare programs.   
Suggestions for Future Research 
As previously discussed, not all of the indicators demonstrated performance improvement 
in response to PBB incentives.  The well child visits and mental health measures should be 
examined closely for potential resource shortfalls, barriers to implementation, or other factors 
that may help to explain their lack of improvement.  It would be helpful from a research and 
policy perspective to better understand which types of performance indicators might be most 
responsive to incentives so leaders can strategically craft future programs to ensure that 
budgetary resources are maximized in the areas in which they are likely to be most helpful.  It 
would also be helpful to better understand what (if any) better alternatives exist for indicators 
that do not respond well to budget incentives.  For example, if poor performance is related to 
resource barriers, then it is possible that resolving these issues may lead to the same types of 
positive effects as financial incentives.  Examining these types of questions may best be 
accomplished with qualitative research such as grounded theory methods.   
Qualitative research might also help to expose some of the underlying organizational 
factors that either hinder or facilitate the implementation of effective PBB programs.  For 
organizations that are successful in improving performance, qualitative research might help to 
identify the specific tools or implementation factors that were most advantageous.   
Additionally, the results of this study open up many possibilities for future research in 
that they offer preliminary support for the use of PBB in a military healthcare context but leave 
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many research questions unanswered  An important first step is to continue this line of research 
to confirm that the results replicate in non-Army healthcare facilities.  As military hospitals of all 
three service branches integrate under the management of the DHA and if PBB is expanded to all 
military facilities, it will be possible to assess the impacts of PBB on a wider selection of military 
facilities.  This can be accomplished using a time-phased comparison of performance change as 
hospitals integrate into a unified PBB program.  A study of this nature will help to address one of 
the key limitations in this study, namely whether unmeasured service-specific factors may have 
confounded the interpretation of results.  A study of this nature would also offer an opportunity 
to evaluate a more comprehensive set of quality indicators, as the three services are presently 
measuring more quality indicators in a uniform manner than during the early stages of PBB 
adoption.  
Future studies might also consider the impact of removing incentives once a high level of 
performance is achieved.  Numerous studies in the pay for performance domain have found 
evidence of ceiling effects or diminishing performance gains over time, usually once an 
organization reaches a high level of performance (Ryan, Blustein, & Casalino, 2012; Van Herck 
et al., 2010; R. Werner et al., 2011).  This raises policy questions regarding the point at which 
incentives could be removed or shifted to other performance areas where they may be more 
beneficial.  Future studies might address this question by studying the impact on performance 
when incentives are removed after a long period of sustained improvement.  It is possible that 
performance may be sustained because organizations have already developed permanent systems 
and processes for high performance.  It is also possible that the removal of incentives might 
cause organizations to shift attention to incentivized measures, and performance will decline for 
measures that are no longer incentivized.  Studies that enable more precise estimates of the 
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performance impacts of incentives and their removal will aid decision-makers in crafting policies 
that maximize the use of performance-based funding incentives.   
Another opportunity for future research may be to evaluate the impact of PBB on other 
types of indicators within the healthcare domain.  For example, the PBAM and IRIS programs 
include productivity and access measures, which have not yet been rigorously studied.  
Additionally, nontechnical aspects of healthcare such as patient satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction and well-being, and healthcare equity are also recognized as important indicators for 
robust medical systems (Hanefeld et al., 2017) and could be included in future research involving 
PBB. 
Conclusion 
This study applied RDT as a theoretical model explaining how PBB might impact 
facility-level performance on various healthcare quality indicators.  Research Question 1 drew 
upon a wide body of extant research on pay for performance to question the impact of a related 
approach, performance-based budgeting, on quality improvement in U.S. Army healthcare 
facilities.  To address this question, a quasi-experimental, DID analysis was undertaken to 
compare changes in quality performance among military healthcare facilities that adopted PBB 
in comparison to healthcare facilities that did not adopt PBB.  Performance changes were 
compared for both groups before and after the implementation of incentives for a variety of 
quality indicators.  The hypothesis was that PBB facilities would demonstrate greater 
performance improvement on incentivized quality metrics in comparison to military healthcare 
organizations in other branches that did not participate in PBB programs.  This hypothesis was 
supported for seven out of 13 of the indicators examined, suggesting that PBB can be a helpful 
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tool for encouraging performance improvement on a select group of quality measures in military 
healthcare organizations.   
Research Question 2 was an extension of Research Question 1, asking whether initial 
performance changes attributable to PBB would be sustained over time.  To address this 
question, six performance measures were examined over a 5-year postperiod.  The 5-year period 
was divided into two 2.5-year periods, and performance was compared between the two periods.  
It was hypothesized that quality improvements attributable to PBB programs will be sustained in 
PBB facilities throughout the 5-year postperiod.  Supporting Hypothesis 2, performance 
improved in the second half of the postperiod, relative to the first half, for five of six 
performance indicators.  The results of this portion of the study suggest that once performance 
incentives are offered, facilities sustain their performance long term or continue to improve. 
Several sensitivity analyses were undertaken to examine the robustness of the empirical 
results.  In general, the results for Research Question 1 were robust across all model 
specifications.  A notable finding in one of the sensitivity analyses is that very few of the 
indicators showed any evidence of significant anticipatory effects.  It did not appear that 
healthcare facilities improved performance prior to the start of the program in anticipation of 
future incentive opportunities.  This finding, taken in conjunction with the some of the findings 
from Research Question 2, suggests that performance improvement is often sluggish or even 
delayed in some cases.  This appears to be especially true of performance indicators that likely 
involve a more complex interaction between provider processes and patient variables, such as 
with the diabetes management measures.   
Although this study has several limitations, the results are promising from both practical 
and theoretical perspectives.  The study findings are relevant to clinicians and administrators in 
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military and government-funded healthcare organizations, as they offer evidence to support the 
future use of PBB as a mechanism for improving quality performance.  This study also extends 
pay for performance research by proffering an argument for classifying PBB as a unique variant 
of pay for performance and offering evidence that it is effective under certain conditions.  As 
military healthcare leaders continue to grapple with resource allocation decisions to support the 
highest level of quality healthcare, more studies are needed to examine the impact of resourcing 
policies such as PBB.  This study offers an important first step in understanding the degree to 
which military healthcare facilities alter performance in response to funding incentives.   
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